

Foreign policy of China under the CCP

Sino-soviet relations

Pre-1949

- Tensions with the soviet union
 - From stalin's perspective: Mao, by basing his revolution on the peasantry, did not follow the right path to socialism ⚡ did not trust him to be a fellow communist leader
 - From Mao's perspective:
 - Thought that stalin and the USSR did not understand china/genuinely want to support china's communist revolution
 - Evidenced by the failure to prevent close destruction of the ccp during the end of the first united front (ussr had continued to encourage the ccp to stay on even after the brutal white terror)
 - Stalin had also made a treaty with Chiang, and Mao was unhappy about this
 - Stalin had also advised the Ccp not to fight KMT and not engage in civil war
 - Thought that stalin would try to subjugate china/threaten its sovereignty
 - E.g. stalin schemed to have Xinjiang declare independence with his guarantee of diplomatic recognition and subsequent incorporation into the soviet union
 - Although the plot failed and Xinjiang became part of ccp in 1949
- Attempts to get American aid/solidify relations with America
 - From Mao's perspective: he wanted to reduce dependence on the soviet union
 - In Jan 1945, ccp secretly proposed a visit to Washington in order to confer with Roosevelt as "leaders of a primary Chinese party"
 - They wanted to convince Roosevelt that they, not the KMT, represented the future of china
 - From Roosevelt's perspective:
 - He was consumed by the problems and issues arising from the approaching allied victory and postwar arrangements, thus was not receptive to Mao's request
 - Mao continued to talk to John S. Service, a political officer of the Dixie Mission in Yanan, about the need for American aid
 - Mao recognised that China's greatest postwar need was economic development, and that China lacked the necessary foundation in capitalism to carry this out alone
 - But Americans were unresponsive to Mao's suggestion

From the birth of the PRC to Stalin's death, 1949-53

- From Mao's perspective: even though Mao was suspicious of soviet union's imperialist intentions, he needed economic aid from soviet union (USA had chosen not to cooperate)
 - The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed on 14 February 1950
 - Superficially: the solidification of the Moscow-Peking axis
 - China got a modest loan of \$500 million from the Soviets

- From Stalin's perspective: use the alliance to support national interests
 - As part of the alliance, Mao had to accept the independence of Outer Mongolia, joint Sino-Soviet exploitation of mineral resources in Xinjiang, joint administration of the Changchun railway, and joint use of Port Arthur and Dairen
- From Mao's perspective: resentment against Soviets
 - To Mao, Stalin behaved like a "new Tsar"
 - E.g. China sent a million volunteers to intervene in the Korean War and had to pay the entire 1.35 billion for the Soviet equipment used in the war

From rising tensions to the split during the Khrushchev era (after 1953, Stalin's death yr)

- From Mao's perspective: Khrushchev was not someone to be respected. Why?
 - Khrushchev could not hold claim to Stalin's attributed seniority and accomplishment of building socialism
 - Khrushchev was seen as a coward by Mao
 - Khrushchev thought that Mao's thinking that combined might of China and Russia was greater than the capitalist West
 - Khrushchev had sought peaceful coexistence with the West
- From Mao's perspective: still wary of Soviet dominance
 - Mao rejected multiple times requests from Khrushchev for the right to operate a radio station on Chinese soil to maintain contact with Soviet submarines
 - Mao, recalling that China had suffered from foreign encroachment, did not want anyone else on Chinese land for their own purposes
- Mao was also wary of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin
 - Khrushchev had attacked Stalin and his personality cult at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956
 - Mao himself practised the personality cult
- Mao had also aspirations for himself to be the leader of the communist world
 - Convinced that he, not Khrushchev, was the true torch bearer of Marxism-Leninism
 - Convinced that the Chinese model for revolution applied to colonial and semi-colonial states especially those in Asia
 - E.g. of attempt to assert power in the communist bloc: mediation efforts in Eastern Europe
 - Unrest in Eastern European satellite states followed Khrushchev's destalinisation
 - E.g. attempt: denunciation of Tito
 - In 1957 Mao launched a vehement attack on Tito's revisionism
 - Increased tensions between Soviets and Chinese, since both wanted to lead world communism
- Khrushchev's attempts to subvert Mao
 - He had encouraged Peng Dehuai to criticise Mao (which he did about the GLF at the Lushan conference in 1959)
 - Attempted to weaken Mao's position by unilaterally cancelling the Oct 1957 Pact for New Technology and National Defense
 - This had agreed to assist China in her development of atomic weapons
- Mao-Khrushchev disagreement about peaceful coexistence with the West
 - The Chinese Communist subscribed to the Marxist-Leninist concept that war between the capitalists and Communist was inevitable

- o But Khrushchev disputed the Chinese view. He argued that war had become too devastating to be inevitable and that WWII would decimate the earth, rendering meaningless the victory of communism
- Mao did not like Soviet unilateral action in...
 - o Cuban missile crisis, 1962
 - o Soviet's acceptance of nuclear test ban treaty without consulting Chinese
 - o Refusal to support China in 1962 border dispute with India

Tensions between the Soviets and Chinese escalated into territorial disputes

- Two large clashes erupted in March 1969, where both countries claimed Chen-pao or Damansky Island in the Ussuri River
- Bone of contention:
 - o To the Soviets, territory was for national security
 - o To the Chinese, territory was a symbol of sovereignty
- Sino-Soviet split was complete

Cooling down in the Deng, Gorbachev era

- For most of the decade of the 1980s, Sino-Soviet relations were plagued by
 - o Soviet support for a Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia
 - o Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
 - o Soviet troops stationed near the Chinese border
- However, things changed when Gorbachev came to power in the USSR
 - o He wanted to overhaul the Soviet economy
 - o Improving relations with China thus became a priority
 - o In Nov 1987 he asked for a meeting with Deng
 - Although Deng rejected cos Vietnamese had not yet withdrawn from Cambodia
- But there was a diffusion of tensions
 - o In May 1988 China and the USSR signed a cultural exchange agreement
 - o Summit meeting between the two leaders in May 1989 and restoration of official relations shortly afterwards

Sino-american relations

The American perspective:

- Before the Korean war broke out: did not see communist China as a national security threat
- But after outbreak of the war: China seen as part of a monolithic communist bloc with the Soviet Union out to spread communism
 - o View of Chinese intentions to invade Taiwan:
 - Seen as the extension of communism
 - Instead of completing the civil war/unifying China as the CCP saw it
- Thus,
 - o American policy:
 - Truman:
 - Extended the policy of containment to Asia
 - Intensified the reconstruction of Japan as a counterpoise to Russia and China
 - Vs China's policy:
 - Expressed "lean to one side" policy
 - Showed indifference to US recognition or UN membership

- Eisenhower:
 - Refused PRC recognition and opposed its participation in the UN
 - A policy of military encirclement was established, involving US bases in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Burma and Thailand
 - His administration allowed for and even secretly encouraged McCarthyism – accusation of communist sympathies without proper evidence
 - E.g. those in the Dept of State attacked for the “loss of China” were dismissed, disgraced, or transferred to insignificant posts
- Kennedy:
 - In 1961 he continued to assure kmt that US would continue to veto the admission of the PRC into the UN
 - Attitude:
 - Even though signs of a sino-soviet split became overt in the 1960s
 - In view of Mao’s attack on Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence with the West and the greater Soviet military threat to the US, it was deemed more expedient and feasible to reach a détente with Moscow than Beijing
 - Kennedy also took an increasingly dark view of China’s nuclear development

Change in American attitude: the Nixon administration

- Reasons for the change:
 - Growing recognition of china as a nuclear power,
 - The rise of japan as the US’s economic rival,
 - And intensification of the Sino-Soviet split
 - Atmosphere created in America by the anti-Vietnam war movement
 - In which liberals called for a re-assessment of America’s China policy
 - Nixon’s own realpolitik
 - A china that is more active in international politics could more easily checkmate Russia and economically powerful Japan would counter-balance China
- Events:
 - In 1969 Nixon articulated the idea of shifting from “confrontation to negotiations” with China
 - In 1972, Nixon announced a dramatic change in Sino-American relations by revealing that Foreign Affairs Advisor Dr Kissinger had secretly travelled to Beijing and that he had an invitation to visit the PRC

Chinese motives for rapprochement with America

- Imminence of a soviet threat (especially with territorial disputes) induced China to seek an American connection, UN membership and extensive diplomatic recognition
 - Nixon was seen as someone willing to discuss China’s UN membership
 - America could deter a possible soviet attack
- The reintegration of Taiwan
 - Last national goal of unification for mao

- He wanted the USA to withdraw from Taiwan and the straits of Taiwan in recognition in principle that Taiwan was a part of the PRC
- He hope he could increasingly isolate the nationalists and coerce them into negotiations and eventual submission to PRC
- China was deeply concerned with Japanese rearmament and burgeoning influence on Taiwan and Korea
 - Having suffered from Japanese aggression since 1894, Chinese were sensitive to potential resurgence of Japanese militarism
 - Since Japan was protected by the American nuclear umbrella, it was necessary to discuss this issue with Nixon

Result of Nixon's visit in 1972 – the Shanghai Communique

- Nixon affirmed that Taiwan was a part of China
 - Agreed to withdraw all US forces and military installations from Taiwan
- Both parties agreed not to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region
- US endorsed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
- Both sides agreed that collusion between nations against other nations should not be allowed – precluded US-USSR collusion against China

Normalisation of relations under Deng and Carter

- At first progress towards normalisation was slow – US vacillated about the Taiwan issue and because it was focused on domestic and issues with the Soviets, did not focus on normalisation
- But in Oct 1978 President Carter finally decided to break America's commitment to Taiwan and set Jan 1979 as the deadline for diplomatic recognition of China
- In 1978, Deng announced that he would like to visit the US, signalling China's acceptance of the communique presented by America on Oct 1978 and the visit was made on 11 Dec
- An announcement was made in Dec 15, 1979 by Carter that the US and PRC had agreed to establish full diplomatic relations on Jan 1979
- In the communique:
 - Normalisation of relations between the two countries
 - USA recognised PRC as the sole legal govt of China
 - Wishes of both countries to reduce possibility of international military conflict
 - Promise neither would seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other region in the world
 - USA recognised that there was only one China (Taiwan subsumed under PRC)
- Achieved purpose of Deng (see Deng's economic policies notes)