Macro Policies Cheat Sheet

Fiscal Policy

Expansionary

How it works:

- Through ↑G, ↓T ⇒ budget deficit (G > T)
- ↓T ⇒ ↑C, I
- \uparrow C, I, G \Rightarrow \uparrow AD \Rightarrow m.t.p. \uparrow real NY
- ↑ real NY ⇒ ↓ cyclical UnN since labour is a derived demand
- 1, G in infrastructure ⇒ 1 productive capacity in LR ⇒ 1AS in LR
- ↑ real NY, ↑G in transfer payments ⇒ ↑mSOL
- ↑G on education/healthcare ⇒ ↑nmSOL

Limitations:

- **Crowding out effect as govt borrows from private sector ⇒ Lesser ↑ in AD
- ↑ national debt ⇒ Burden on future SOL
- Size of k multiplier
 - If small, large increase in G required to ↑ real NY to same extent
- Limited effectiveness of †G in Singapore's case as G contributes small proportion of Singapore's GDP
- · Conflicts with other macro objectives
 - Inflation but unlikely to be significant
 - ∘ ↑C, some of which is imported \Rightarrow ↑M \Rightarrow ↓(X-M), ceteris paribus \Rightarrow Worsening BOP
- Time lag
- · Imperfect info

Contractionary

How it works:

- Through ↓G, ↑T ⇒ budget surplus (G<T)
- ↑T ⇒ ↓C. I
- \downarrow C, I, G $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ AD $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ GPL $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ DD-pull inflation
- ↓C, some of which is imported ⇒ ↓M ⇒ ↑(X-M), ceteris paribus ⇒ Improvement in BOP

Limitations:

- Difficulties in ↓G
 - ↓G in transfer payments ⇒ ↓mSOL of low income earners + ↓nmSOL due to ↓ social stability
 - ↓G in infrastructure ⇒ ↓PG
 - ↓G in healthcare, education ⇒ ↓nmSOL
 - Difficult to cut long term projects
- Difficulties in 1T
 - \circ $\downarrow C \Rightarrow \downarrow mSOL$
 - Politically unpopular
 - Brain drain
- · Conflicts with other macro objectives
 - ↓AD may compromise some real NY and increase UnN assuming operating within intermediate range
- Does not address the root cause of cost-push inflation ⇒ Requires SS-side policies
- Small k value ⇒ ↑ opp cost
- Time lag
- Imperfect info

Interest Rate Policy

Expansionary

How it works:

- Through purchase of bonds in open market/decrease discount rate
- ↑ money supply ⇒ ↓i/r via direct and indirect transmission mechanism
- $\uparrow C$, I, $(X-M) \Rightarrow \uparrow AD \Rightarrow m.t.p. <math>\uparrow$ real NY
- ↑ real NY ⇒ ↓ cyclical UnN since labour is a derived demand
- ↑I ⇒ ↑ productive capacity in LR ⇒ ↑AS in LR
- ↑(X-M) ⇒ Improvement in BOP

Limitations:

- Conflicts with other macro objectives
 - · DD-pull inflation although unlikely to be significant
- Other factors play a role in influencing C and I
- Interest elasticity of demand for investment
 - Based on Keynesian argument, business confidence most important for I
- **Liquidity trap ⇒ Indirect mechanism ineffective if taken to the extreme
- Time lag
- Imperfect info

Contractionary

How it works:

- Through sale of bonds in open market/increase discount rate
- ↓ money supply ⇒ ↑i/r via indirect transmission mechanism
- \downarrow C, I, (X-M) $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ AD $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ GPL $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ DD-pull inflation

Limitations:

- · Conflicts with other macro objectives
 - ↓AD may compromise some real NY and increase UnN assuming operating within intermediate range
 - ↓I ⇒ ↓ productive capacity in LR ⇒ ↓AS in LR
 - \circ ↓(X-M) \Rightarrow Worsening BOP
- Does not address the root cause of cost-push inflation ⇒ Requires SS-side policies
- Other factors play a role in influencing C and I
- Interest elasticity of demand for investment
- Time lag
- Imperfect info

Exchange Rate Policy

Once-off Depreciation

How it works:

- Through purchase of foreign currency using domestic currency
- ↑ supply of SGD ⇒ Depreciation of SGD
- ↑(X-M) assuming MLC is true ⇒ ↑AD ⇒ m.t.p. ↑ real NY
- ↑ real NY ⇒ ↓ cyclical UnN since labour is a derived demand
- ↑(X-M) ⇒ Improvement in BOP
- Accumulation of foreign reserves

Limitations:

- **Time lag as MLC may not hold in SR due to existing contracts making it difficult to reduce X or M (i.e. J curve effect)
- · Conflicts with other macro objectives
 - **Import-push inflation (significant especially in Singapore) ⇒ Can only be used as a emergency measure in the SR ⇒ ↑COP
 - Price competitiveness of exports due to depreciation of SGD might be moderated due to ↑COP ⇒ ↑(X-M) may be moderated
 - †COP may moderate †I
- **Might invite retaliation by trading partners

Imperfect info

Appreciation

How it works:

- Through purchase of SGD using foreign reserves
- ↑ DD for SGD ⇒ Appreciation of SGD
- \downarrow (X-M) $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ AD $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ GPL $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ DD-pull inflation
- \$\prec\$ Import-push inflation
- ↓COP ⇒ ↑AS ⇒ ↓ cost-push inflation

Limitations:

- **Time lag as MLC may not hold in SR due to existing contracts making it difficult to reduce X or M (i.e. J curve effect)
- **Need to finance using foreign reserves ⇒ Depletion of foreign reserves ⇒ ↓ ability to support strength of currency in the future
- Conflicts with other macro objectives
 - \$\dagger\$ AD may compromise some real NY and increase UnN assuming operating within intermediate range
 - ↓(X-M) ₩orsening BOP
- Imperfect info