

History Higher Level – Paper 3 (Early 19th Century, Republic of China 1912-1949, People's Republic of China 1950-2000)

Background Information

Early 19th Century

Chinese status quo:

- Ruled by the Emperor
- Governed by Confucianism, the glue of China
- 18 provinces for a tiny bureaucracy
- Confucian exam system and poor treatment of scholar-officials
- Agrarian economy suffering agrarian crisis and natural disasters
- Majority Han Chinese ruled by Manchus
- Profit motive looked down upon
- Internal strife:
 - Domestic revolts from the booming population and the agrarian crisis due to natural disasters
 - Gentry leaders e.g. Li Hongzhang suppressed these uprisings and created militias (seeds of provincial rule)
- External pressures:
 - Failure of the tributary system (highly inefficient)
 - Unequal treaties stemming from the outbreak of the Opium and Arrow Wars: indemnities, opening up of ports e.g. Shanghai, annexed Hong Kong, extraterritoriality, most-favored nation, freedom of movement

First attempt: the Tongzhi Restoration and Self-Strengthening Movement

- Tongzhi: a court-led movement trying to cherry-pick elements of Western modernism without introducing negative influences
- Revival of Confucian social hierarchy for stability and reformation of the exam system
- Creation of the Zongli Yamen (foreign ministry) and Tongwen Guan, which:
 - Mooted modern Western education (beginning of Peking University)
 - Imperial audiences
 - Overseas embassies
- Maritime Customs Service for revenue
- Zero notions of economic development; agriculture was neglected and population growth outstripped production
- SSM: a province-led movement that tried to revive the might and influence of China
- Tried to develop a modern military through new arsenals, naval ships and training (failed if wars with France and Japan—Treaty of Shimonoseki—were anything to go by)

- Tried to modernize industries: the guandu-shangban and developed modern communications e.g. railroads and telecommunications (failed given entrenched mindsets and lack of capital arising from corruption)

Second attempt: the 100 Days Reforms

- Undertaken by the Guangxu Emperor: driven by an agitation for change and rise of elite nationalism
- Included radicals such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao
- Kang claimed Confucius was a reform-minded philosopher
- Issued over 40 decrees and overloaded the Guangxu emperor
- Political reforms called for access to the emperor, bureaucratic reforms, educational refocusing
- Adopted national cash currency and demobilized surplus troops while training a modernized army and navy
- Negative conservative reactions—these were all proposals anyway with no clear execution
- Halted by Cixi's coup and death of Guangxu but led to growth of revolutionary ideals and modeled by Late Qing

Catalyst for the third attempt: Boxer Rebellion

- From Shandong province, a poor region which was rocked by foreign intervention and railroad building
- Breaking of the Yellow River leading to floods and droughts
- Christianity interfered with the daily lives of the people
- Aggression of the German missionaries and foreigners
- Rebellion possibly driven by Cixi—moved towards Beijing and attacked foreign legations and foreigners, but not supported by provincial leaders
- Relieved by 8 Nations Alliance
- Boxer Protocol
 - Indemnity, punishment, loss of sovereignty and Manchuria
- Birthed Chinese nationalism

Third and last attempt: Late Qing Reforms

- Conceded by Cixi in 1901 but had difficulty financing due to Boxer Protocol: still more impactful than SSM
- Led to increase in Manchu dominance and adopting of the Japanese constitution
- Sinecures and overlapping offices dealt with, tried to make a national budget
- Formed a Ministry of Trade and adopted the silver dollar (lack of confidence), developed private banks
- Failed to develop infrastructure for agriculture or modern industries, began to nationalize key assets
- Sharp increase in railway building and lifted ban on migration, increased taxes
- Creation of New Armies and tried to create a modern national army

- Abruptly abandoned Confucian exam system with no replacement, tried to revise laws on Western models (hastily)

10/10/1911

- Led by Southerners, reformist elite, students and officers, and the bourgeoisie
- Sun's principles of nationalism, democracy and socialism + the three-step revolution
- Revolution sparked by the Wuchang incident, culmination of the railway rights recovery movement
- Abdication of Puyi on 12th February 1912, Yuan took over as president and resulted in the warlord era

Japanese status quo:

- Ruled by an emperor
- Run by the Tokugawa Shogunate and Bakufu, governed by Confucianism, Shintoism and Japanese intellectualism
- Domains led by a daimyo
- Japanese economy was actually relatively strong; agriculture was expanding and commerce was booming, due to a strong communication network and less restrictions on commerce
- External pressures:
 - Japan had closed itself off by 1639, tried to ban Western elements
 - Matthew Perry arrived in 1854, gunboat diplomacy, imposing the treaty of Kanagawa: opening up ports, US Consul, freedom of movement and religion, most favored nation and extraterritoriality
 - Full commercial treaty in the wake of the Opium and Arrow wars in 1858, opened up Edo and Osaka, additional ports, reduced tariffs
- Domestic issues:
 - Weakness of the shogunate: weak and inept, suffered debt to the merchant class
 - Imperial court resurged; Satsuma and Choshu domains attacked the West and were defeated; learned to respect Western power
 - Created an alliance to overthrow the Tokugawa Shogunate, captured Edo by 1869

The Meiji Restoration

- Meiji emperor came to power in 1867 at 14 years old
- Reformed government structure, centralized power following collapse of Tokugawa, replacing domains with prefectures
- Encouraged Shintoism and created a new, Westernized Constitution
 - Bicameral parliament with the Imperial Diet
 - Emperor had significant powers following the constitution
 - Cabinet and the Diet struggled over budgets
- Government sought to promote agriculture; was the most efficient in Asia. Developed Hokkaido and yield rose 16 times between 1890 and 1920

- Pre-Meiji Japan already had a developed money economy; Bank of Japan in 1877 and did not borrow from the West, improving the tax system
- Government formed a Ministry of Industry; focused on arsenals and shipyards as well as niche areas (mining and textiles) and communications
- Developed zaibatsu (cartels) and retrenched many industries, freeing them from bureaucratic control—growth exploded after 1900
- Abolished feudal privileges and introduced Western education and exposure
- Created a Supreme Court and modern legal codes
- Created an Imperial Army and Navy in 1871 and ministries in 1872

The Republic of China from 1912 to 1949

Status quo of warlordism:

- Weak imperial control given provincial leaders
- Cliques and factions
- Lack of socio-economic development
- Imperialism
- Started by Yuan Shikai
 - Attempted to centralize government and create a centralized army
 - Undermined democracy by bribing and terrorizing legislative
 - Dealt with the Second Revolution by executing captured rebels
 - Suppressed political enemies
 - Attempted to reform but also failed to counter Japanese imperialism of the 21 Demands
 - Saw himself as the Emperor
 - Died in 1916

Development of the warlord era:

- Rise of the Beiyang Clique following 10/10/1911
- Duan Qirui committed China to WW1; was opposed by Li Yuanhong and forced to resign, but turned to Zhang Zuolin of the Fengtian clique and defeated Feng in 1918
- Zhili and Fengtian clique combined in 1920 but broke up by 1922; Fengtian captured Beijing
- Led to:
 - Administrative chaos
 - Lack of democracy
 - General economic weakness
 - Growth of cities and simulation of nationalism (May 4th)
 - Continued foreign interferences given the need for foreign backing of the warlords (Japan supported Duan Qirui and Zhang Zuolin)
 - Militarization of society and destruction of war
 - Rise of party armies

New Culture and May 4th

- Rise of foreign imperialism

- The 21 Demands, ToV and prevalent efforts to reduce imperialism were failures
- New Culture saw a sharp rise in literary and intellectual activities, largely urban—ended in 1928 with the rise of the Nanjing decade
- May 4th is the peak of this New Culture Movement
 - 3000 at Tiananmen to oppose ToV in 1919
 - Multi class, mass movement
 - Led by intellectuals and advocated iconoclasm and westernization—Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun, etc.
- Impact:
 - Rise of new values and anti-Confucianism
 - Language reforms—the vernacular Chinese
 - Liberation of women
 - Research on China
 - Rise of GMD and CCP

Formation of GMD and CCP

- CCP
 - Influenced by 1917 Russian Revolution
 - Appeal of communism to end imperialism
 - Friendship of Soviets
 - Formed after Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Mao met Comintern agent in Shanghai
 - Sun was opposed given his predilections to work with West
- GMD
 - Chinese Revolutionary Party formed to replace GMD in 1915 but ruled the party like a dictatorship
 - Took over Guangdong and resurrected the GMD; priority on 1st United Front

1st United Front

- Sun-Joffe manifesto in 1923
- Marriage of convenience with differing attitudes and aims
- Northern Expedition in 1925 (May 30th Movement) as nationalism stirred up by Sun's death and Zhongshan warship incident
- Collapsed given exposure of Soviet complicity and different bases of support
- Purge of Shanghai in 1927 and the White Terror
- CCP tried to respond through urban uprisings; failed, Mao learnt the importance of military might
- Jiang Jieshi unified China under GMD in 1928

Nanjing Decade

- GMD remained divided
- Government was not geographically diverse; bureaucracy was incompetent and did not promote democratic freedoms
- Used terror with the Blue Shirts

- Failure to develop agriculture, industries, communications, stabilize the financial situation and control foreign enterprises
- Suffered growing trade imbalances
- Society
 - New Life Movement was a complete failure and resented
 - Neglected healthcare and education
 - Ban of opium was sabotaged by Japanese sale of drugs in Northern China
 - No women's rights but did allow religious freedoms
- Military failed in preparation for 2nd Sino-Japanese war though there were efforts
- Did succeed in revising the unequal treaties but the UK and US abolished only in 1943 due to threat of war

Mao, post-Autumn Harvest Uprising: the Jiangxi Soviet

- Expanded into Fujian forming the Chinese Soviet Republic: 3 million strong
- Was isolated from CCP in Shanghai: policies could be independent
- Usage of mass line and terror
 - Futian incident in 1930 (Anti-Bolshevik League)
- Socio-economic reforms
 - Land reforms
 - People's Bank
 - Women's rights
- Red Army
 - Zhu De's role and growth of the army with Lin Biao
- Conflict with CCP leadership after failure of CCP leadership's uprisings in 1930s—28 Bolsheviks eclipsed Mao

GMD crackdowns (encirclement campaigns)

- Attack in Shanghai and captured key CCP spy
- Party leaders fled to Jiangxi and were cut off from Moscow
- Jiang Jieshi focused so much on defeating the CCP but failed initially; sucked into traps
- Blockaded the CCP and used scorched earth in 1934—worked better
- 28 Bolsheviks wanted to stay; the Jiangxi soviet planned to retreat, broke out on 16th October 1934

Long March

- Legendary status; brotherhood and loyalty of Mao and the others
- 11 provinces over 6000 miles
- 15 major battles
- Initially suffered major losses but blamed the 28 Bolsheviks
- Luding Bridge incident almost historical
- Zunyi Conference: sidelining of Mao since 1934 meant he had free reign against Bo Ku
- Sidelined Zhang Guotao

- Reached Shanxi in 1936 with less than 8000 troops; fell from 300000 to 40000; propaganda made the most of this

2nd United Front

- Japanese aggression against Manchuria
- Growing anti-Japanese nationalism
- Jiang was too focused on the CCP still
- Soviets endorsed the 2nd United Front and Jiang also required a combined effort
- CCP needed to regroup
- Significance of Xian incident
- Lifted pressure off Yenan

Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945

- Wanted China gone as USSR was a mortal enemy
- Jiang wanted to use attrition
- Disunity within the United Front
- Rape of Nanjing
- Poor rule over Chongqing by GMD turned public support away while the CCP in Yenan strengthened Mao's political authority i.e. 1942 rectification campaign to get rid of intellectuals who blindly advocated the Soviet model—used thought reform, shame, guilt and self-criticisms
- Used moderate land reforms, political reforms, military reforms in the Yenan period
- Red Army:
 - Lin Biao and protracted warfare
 - 70% rest, 20% fight GMD, 10% fight Japanese
- War ended abruptly and the CCP emerged stronger

Chinese Civil War

- Ideological differences
- Impact of Sino-Japanese war and Soviet aid to the CCP
- Guerilla warfare after the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet
 - Began in the Jiangxi Soviet and carried on to the Yenan period
- GMD made significant tactical missteps while the CCP was more developed and adopted guerilla warfare before shifting to conventional
- Tactical superiority of Lin Biao and winning of Manchuria
- Huaihai Campaign in 1949: Jiang's power usurped by his internal enemies

The People's Republic of China from 1950 to 2000

The Communist State

- Middle-class leadership (mainly Long Marchers—Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng)
- National Party Congress > Central Committee > Politburo > Standing Committee

- 21 Provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 2 municipalities
- Cadres were corrupt and had little understanding of ideology

Consolidation of power

- Mass organizations, mass campaigns (three antis and five antis, counterrevolutionary)
- Control over people, education, culture, mass media
- Propaganda and Mao cult, labor camps and thought reform
- Control over the PLA and its modernization—Peng Dehuai
- Crime and secret societies and religion—expelled foreigners
- Control over minorities: Tibet and Xinjiang

Hundred Flowers Campaign

- To work with the intellectuals and minimize growing domestic resentment and to undermine Mao's own critics
- Ambivalent aims and attitudes
- Anti-rightist backlash: punished all the critics—500000 imprisoned/killed

Reforms

- Economic
 - Banking system
 - Destroying landlord class and nationalization
- Social
 - Education with vernacular Chinese
 - Medical and healthcare
 - Women's rights

1st 5-Year Plan

- USSR and PRC collaboration
- Cooperatives
- Industries with huge targets and heavy industries: met with inexperience, exaggeration etc
- GNI grew 8.9%
- Some increased, some fell, some targets not met

Great Leap Forward

- Due to low productivity, rush towards industrialized communist society, control over the masses
- "Walking on two legs" with little serious planning
- Commune system gave Mao control of rural China; wasted time of the peasants; abolition of private life and misguided farming techniques
- Anti-pest campaigns and a manmade famine
- Industrial liftoff; manpower over machinery
- No higher education and backyard furnaces; ecological disaster due to the cutting down of trees
- Three Gorges Dam; flooding of Xian and failure of Ming Tombs project

- Loss of Chinese heritage
- Winded down after the Lushan Conference in 1959, ousted Peng Dehuai
- Famine 1959-1962; 30 million died
- Declined national income and exposure of falsehoods
- Rise of Liu and Deng; rebuilt the agricultural system and exposed CCP corruption/abuse

Cultural Revolution

- Power struggle and ossification of the CCP
- "The Dismissal of Hai Rui From Office"
- Gang of Four and birth of the Red Guards
- Personality cult of Mao and mass rallies
- Red Guards had no central direction and took on barbaric assaults
- Attacked Liu and Deng
- Attack of the Four Olds: culture, thoughts, customs, habits
- Jiang Qing the cultural censor, attacked cultural and intellectual figures
 - Westernization, religion, women, foreign policy
- Disrupted Chinese economy
 - Third Front
 - Industrialization of rural areas and self-reliance
- Rebel Generals (red guard) peaked in the Shanghai Commune, 1966—attacked Scarlet Guards and won
- Mao quickly avoided this and slowly winded down the Red Guards; reopened schools and closed the movement down—stopped by mid-1968
- Rise of the PLA and fall of Lin Biao after growing tensions—crash of the plane Lin Biao was on

Essay Questions/Practice

1. Evaluate the failures and successes of the Self-Strengthening Movement in China (1861-1894). (May 2015)

Introduction:

- Period of reform encompassing the Tongzhi Restoration and the modernizing Self-Strengthening Movement from 1861 to 1891
- Following defeat in the Arrow and Opium Wars—unequal treaties and forced opening up of China as well as internal rebellions against the Qing
- Needed to reform and adopt Western style modernizations
- Tested by the 1st Sino-Jap war (1894-95)

Thesis:

- Did bring some benefits such as diplomatic reforms, some economic development, and benefits to education
- Failures included huge limitations with reference to the attempt to reform and was also due to multiple perennial issues

Benefits (Political)

- Diplomatic reforms which marked the beginning of the diplomatic phase—Prince Gong thought that if China kept its head low, there would be peace
- Accommodating the West to build up its strength; the West did not disagree and sustained the buildup of China; led to a decade of peace
- Establishment of the Zongli Yamen by Prince Gong in 1861—was a ministry of foreign affairs but also dabbled in modernization of schools, Western science, industry and communication
- Prince Gong got hold of a translated text of international law in 1864 and used it to deal with an imperialist Prussian minister, von Rehfues

Benefits (Economic)

- Marked the beginning of industrialization and sowed the seeds of modern capitalism
- Industrialization first focused on defense and munitions such as the Jiangnan arsenal and the Fuzhou Naval Dockyard
 - The Jiangnan arsenal was established in 1865, equipped with machinery purchased in the US and employed a British doctor as an adviser and concentrated on providing weapons and steamships—also maintained a translation bureau
 - Fuzhou Dockyard established in 1866, combining a complete shipbuilding facility with a naval school, hired French technicians and funded by Fuzhou customs revenue
- Followed shortly by heavy industries e.g. coal and iron, heavy machinery (supporting armaments manufacture)
 - Opening up of the Kaiping coal mines at Tangshan in 1877 as heavy industries were getting important in China; wanted to give China

- more control over own mineral resources and to provide fuel for steamships, employed British engineers and began production in 1881, production began to offset the cost due to coal export revenue
 - China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company set up in 1872 as a *guangdu shangban* (official supervision enterprise); officials managed but the merchants ran the enterprises—was granted a monopoly over sea transport of tribute rice
 - Lanzhou Woollen Mill in 1877 and Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill in 1878, to apply steam power to industry and cut the rising imports of textiles
- Such enterprises were concentrated in treaty ports and coastal cities where foreign help was present; led to development of metropolises such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Tianjin
- Socio-economic changes followed as there was huge rural to urban migration and gave rise to a new working class in the cities
- Industries and enterprises brought new professionals e.g. engineers, managers, entrepreneurs, while exchange students came back to be leaders in government fields—led to a new managerial and entrepreneurial class
- Growth in mercantilism due to development of *guangdu shangban*

Benefits (Education)

- Rise of the Tongwen Guan, established in 1862 in Beijing by Prince Gong, known as the Interpreters College or College of Foreign Languages; intended as a school for instructions of Western and Chinese languages
- Astronomy and mathematics by 1866
- However, the Tongwen Guan struggled to attract top students given the incumbent scholar-official exam system
- Tongwen Guan did mark the beginning of Western education in china; the school became a prototype research institute for dissemination of foreign knowledge

Failures

- Limited scope of the movement to firearms, ships, machines, communications, mining and light industries; did not assimilate Western institutions, philosophy, arts and culture—did not appreciate that with Western industry came Western civilization (culture)
- China attempted to create a modern navy in 1862—Prince Gong directed the purchase and equipping of a steam fleet, but the Qing court did not decide who to leave final authority with and disbanded the fleet in the end—spent 550,000 pounds purchasing and disbanding a fleet
- Movement barely scratched the surface—did not achieve real breakthroughs in industrialization
 - Kaiping coal mines hindered by conservatives believing it harms the *fengshui* and ostracized miners—also did not solve the issue of transporting coal from Tianjin as the railway had not been constructed yet; mines fell heavily into debt to foreigners and were taken over by 1900

- China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company lost direction under the leadership of Sheng Xuanhuai who preferred to protect his and the company's financial interests; corrupt Chinese officials would raid the funds of the company as well and the company lost ground to the British steamship lines
- Government sponsored military ventures became power bases of the provincial leaders and thus had a regional and feudal influence; Jiangnan arsenal and Fuzhou dockyard were not coordinated between Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang—the political power became decentralized and would sow the seeds of warlordism
- Weakness of the SSM was eventually exposed in its performance in the Sino-French war of 1884-85 and the 1st Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 when China failed to defend Annam and the Nanyang fleet left the Beiyang fleet to fight the Japanese

Conclusion:

- Despite achievements in diplomacy, education and industrialization, the SSM ultimately fell short due to issues concerning coordination, corruption and limitations of the ventures over the course of the movement

2. Why, and with what consequences for China, did the 100 Days Reform of 1898 fail? (November 2005)

Introduction:

- Reform movement introduced by the Guangxu Emperor who was advised by Kang Youwei after defeat in the 1st Sino-Japanese war and the Scramble for Concessions
- Guangxu Emperor could reform by issuance of decrees (about 40-50) as Cixi withdrew from governance—reforms covered many issues but more importantly would have weakened conservative influence
- Cixi would bring the reforms to an end when she became alarmed by it

Thesis:

- Main reasons for failure involved inexperience of the reformers, misguided strategy, opposition of conservatives, and reluctance of Cixi
- Consequences involved the clear message that top-down reform was impossible; Qing court were shown to have had zero power over the regional authorities; led to the Boxer Rebellion and Manchu resistance grew

Analysis (failure):

Inexperience of reformers

- Kang Youwei was 40, Liang Qichao was 25; had little to no prior experience in government and had a superficial understanding of the West
- Kang was too radical too quickly; their knowledge of the West was limited to missionary publications and observation of the colonial administrations in Hong Kong and Shanghai—were ridiculed

- Kang was too ivory tower to be a statesman; reforms were too radical and failed also to realize that Cixi held all the power
- Kang was impatient and did not consider the effects; failed to realize that the reforms were essentially war on the Confucian status quo; many groups sought to undo the reforms
- Polarized the court into a them vs. us issue; the Qing court vs. radical reformers
- Examples
 - Abolition of the eight-legged essay and its impact on students preparing for the civil service examinations—led to the “Eat Kang” slogan
 - Elimination of sinecure offices and governorships led to fear of dismissals; furthermore, sinecures were often occupied by Manchus
 - Military reforms of demobilizing surplus troops and training a modern army led to jeopardizing of the privileges of the Manchu bannermen and Green Standard Army
 - Attack on corruption opposed by chief eunuch
 - Order to turn temples and shrines into schools were insults

Opposition by powerful conservative groups

- Many Manchu conservatives belonged to the pro-Cixi faction while reformers were Han and belonged to the other faction
- Kang was attacked for establishing the Protect the Country Society because Manchus felt that this task belonged to imperial nobles
- Conservatives were extremely enraged that Kang thought Confucius was a reformer
- Most high officials boycotted the reforms, e.g. the abolition of the eight-legged essay was opposed by the examination boards
- Zongli Yamen opposed the twelve new bureaus
- Most provincial authorities ignored the orders for reform
- Most officials acknowledged the need for reform, but had second thoughts when the edicts specified details for reform; undermining their privileges and vested interests turned these people against the Guangxu Emperor

Cixi's hold on power

- Cixi held the reigns of government tightly even since retirement in 1889; had illegally installed Guangxu on the throne and manipulated him
- Cixi's dismissal of **Weng-Tonghe** (who was instrumental to Guangxu's ability to communicate with the reformers) weakened Guangxu's position
- Was influenced by eunuch Li Lienying who had a vested interest given his corruption
- Consolidation of power by appointing Ronglu governor of Zhili, putting him in control of armies surrounding Beijing and was planning to get Ronglu's armies to stage a coup against Guangxu
- Cixi staged a coup d'état and seized all power from Guangxu in September 1898; placed him under house arrest and revoked all the edicts five days later

- Cixi was initially supportive and had approved the reforms which Guangxu had consulted her about
- However, she began to realize that the reform could have wrestled power from her and as a result objected when it threatened her position of power—she intervened because the reforms threatened to remove her power of patronage and because it raised people's rights

Analysis (consequences):

Short-term

- House arrest of the Guangxu emperor and Cixi took over the regency
- Permanent disqualification of Weng Tong-he
- All edicts revoked five days after the coup
- 22 reformers were banished, imprisoned, dismissed, arrested and their properties confiscated; Kang Youwei's writings were banned
- Everything was reinstated from sinecures to the eight-legged essay

Long-term

- Punishment of reformers leading to greater anti-Manchu sentiment
 - The Manchus began to exclude the Han from top governmental positions
- Anti-foreigner sentiment grew
 - The Qing court began to support the anti-foreigner and anti-Christian societies, e.g. Boxers
 - Ultraconservatives felt that the radical reformers were backed by foreigners; resented the West
 - Led to the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and caused the Boxer Protocol: suspended the exam system, imposed indemnities, stationed foreign troops in China and placed an embargo on arms
- Destabilization of the Qing court
 - Cixi vs. the young Emperor; neither was fully legitimate
 - Clash between Guangxu and Cixi left the emperor permanently wounded; left political and ritual stability in the balance
- Impact on education
 - Imperial University of Beijing and colleges continued, and so did high schools and elementary schools
 - Establishment of Imperial University meant branches of Western learning came to the single institution where it combined with Chinese learning
 - Would go on to become Peking University

Conclusion:

- Main reasons for failure involved inexperience of the reformers, misguided strategy, opposition of conservatives, and reluctance of Cixi
- Consequences involved the clear message that top-down reform was impossible; Qing court were shown to have had zero power over the regional authorities; led to the Boxer Rebellion and Manchu resistance grew

3. Analyze the reasons for, and the consequences of, the Boxer Rebellion (1900-1901) in China. (May 2012)

Introduction:

- The Boxer Rebellion occurred in 1900, begun by the Society of Harmonious Fists who were based in Shandong Province
- Were pro-Qing court and anti-foreigner after encouragement by Manchu governors
- Boxers advanced towards Beijing and killed Christian missionaries, destroyed railways and telegraph lines, and received support in besieging foreign legations
- Cixi and Qing court fled to Xian—foreign nations sent an 8-Nation Alliance to suppress the rebellion
- Imposition of the Boxer Protocol, beginning of the Late Qing Reform movement, railway recovery movement, re-emergence of anti-Qing sentiment, growth of revolutionary sentiment

Thesis:

- Caused due to huge anti-foreigner sentiment and national humiliation, as well as antipathy towards Christianity and anger towards Western imperialism
- Also caused due to economic hardship and natural disasters
- Resulted most significantly in the Boxer Protocol and the late Qing reforms—may have been a long-term cause of the 1911 Revolution

Analysis (reasons)

Anti-foreign sentiment

- Brewing since early 19th century; the opium and arrow wars had wounded China's national pride
- Presence of haughty foreign ministers, aggressive missionaries and traders reminded the people of their misfortune
- Scramble for concessions in China due to the victory of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War
- Borrowing from the Western countries to pay off the Treaty of Shimonoseki and even granted additional concessions to the Western countries
- Strong anti-foreign sentiment under the Empress Dowager, scholars and people at large; Dowager gave her backing to the Boxers by 1900 and led to massacres of Westerners
- Qing court began the rebellion by demanding all foreign legations to withdraw on 19th June and the Boxers began their siege; the court issued an edict on the 21st declaring war

Antipathy towards Christianity

- Chinese were originally imbued with the teachings of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism; resented the Christian onset under gunboat protection

- Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 allowed free travel of missionaries and Beijing Convention in 1860 granted missionaries to rent and buy land to build churches
- Many missionaries resorted to the practice of offering converts monetary subsidies and protection against interference to convince conversions
- Christianity was regarded as a socially disruptive and heterodox sect; the customs of Christianity contradicted Confucian and Chinese traditions
- Christianity was seen as a threat to the natural order—rumors of nuns and priests who raped and ate children or selling them into slavery
- Boxers were originated in Shandong Province where German Catholics alienated the population, such as the German Steyl Society, who seized Jiazhou Bay in 1897 because of the killing of two missionaries; arrogance also heightened this opposition
- Province had to pay 104,000 taels in reparations to missionaries for destruction by rioters

Economic hardship

- Post-Opium war saw the influx of foreign imports which created a depressant effect
- Protective tariff wiped out after customs duty was fixed to 5%
- Cheap foreign cotton cloth imports led to local producers going bankrupt; especially handicraft household industries
- Zhili and Shandong fared the worst; importation of yarn affected cotton growing areas
- Acquiring of railroad and mining rights by the Germans and the construction of the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway threw coolies out of work; decline of commerce along the Grand Canal and loss of livelihood
- Trade deficit of 69 million taels by 1899 and 12 million budget deficit
- Qing court tried to meet this by increasing taxes and soliciting provincial contributions; burden fell on the people—led to hardship and drove people to join the Boxers
- The situation of China by the end of the 19th century was dire; bankruptcy of village industries, decline of domestic commerce, rising unemployment, hardship of livelihood
- This led people to blame the foreigners and stirred up anti-foreigner sentiment

Natural disasters

- Zhili and Shandong (origins of the Boxer Movement) had seen high population densities and a severe famine in 1876
- Bursting of the banks of the Yellow river in 1898 saw serious flooding and harvest failure, affecting 1 million people
- Government corruption in the dissemination of aid meant not everyone got access to the aid
- Prolonged drought in 1900 led to a further loss of life and freed up many young men to join the Boxers; had nothing to lose

- The Boxers usually had good supplies of food due to the pillaging of Christian households
- Boxers blamed the foreigners for bringing bad luck and that China would recover from these disasters only after the foreigners were wiped out

Boxer society's rise

- Society of Harmonious Fists
- Originated in Shandong and called boxers due to the habit of shadow boxing
- "Revive Qing destroy foreigner"
- Society became openly active among the peasants, water and land transport workers and handicraftsman
- Boxers began infiltrating Beijing by April 1900 and the Boxers began their assault in May 1900, besieging foreign legations and killing Christian missionaries and converts and destroying railway and telephone lines

Analysis (consequences)

Imposition of the Boxer Protocol

- 8-Nation Alliance seized Tianjin in July and lifted the siege in Beijing
- Empress Dowager fled toward Xian
- Boxer Protocol signed in 1901 by 12 foreign powers; humiliating China and punishing the Qing court and rebel leaders
- Two-year embargo on importation of arms and munitions
- Destruction of 24 forts and 12 railroad posts so that the West could enter Beijing readily and the posting of Western troops
- Executed 10 high officials and punished 100 others for anti-foreign activities e.g. the execution of Manchu official who egged them on in Shanxi
- Foreign nations punished whole elite class; suspended the civil service exams for 5 years in 45 cities, demoralized the bureaucrats
- 450 million taels in reparations (annual income was 250 million) and interest rates so large that the total debt would be 1 billion taels by 1940—outflow wrecked economic growth
- Apologies via diplomatic mission

Beginning of the Late Qing reforms

- Issuance of a decree by Cixi in January 1901 calling for proposals for reform
- Forced the Qing court to adopt these reforms to survive

Beginning of the 1911 Revolution

- Not only was top-down reforms useless, even top-down actions were useless—revolution was the only way, clearly
- Sun Yat-Sen's advocacy of forceful overthrow was gaining support
- Many overseas Chinese began to support the Tongmenghui or Chinese United League, set up in 1905 to 1) expel the Manchus, 2) restore Chinese rule, 3) establish a republic, 4) equalize land rights
- Wuchang Uprising in 1911 led to a sea of political change in China that was the culmination of a process marked by ten failed uprisings led by Sun

Contribution to warlordism

- Division amongst provincial leaders over the handling of Boxers led to warlordism, as the Qing court issued the declaration of war in June 1900 and was ignored by Li Hongzhang, Liu Kunyi and Yuan Shikai
- They later struck a deal with foreign consuls to protect foreign lives and suppress Boxers in their own provinces
- Deepening of ideological differences between the northern-Chinese and south-Chinese (anti-foreign royalists vs. anti-Qing)
- Escalated to a chaotic warlord era

Rise of tensions between Japan and Russia

- Marching of Russian troops into Manchuria for suppression of “rioters” and had occupied the whole territory by September 1900; Japanese were unhappy with Russia especially as it was demanding advantages from China in the Manchuria region
- Japanese wanted exclusive concessions
- Japanese and British formalized their ties in 1902, which pledged bilateral aid if Russia attacked either one
- Russo-Japanese War from 1904-1905

Japan's international prestige

- Was a part of the 8-Nation Alliance as the single largest contingent and earned international respect
- Joined the peace conference after the rebellion as an equal and stationed their own force in Beijing
- Was now one of Asia's imperial powers

Conclusion:

- The rebellion caused due to huge anti-foreigner sentiment and national humiliation, as well as antipathy towards Christianity and anger towards Western imperialism
- Also caused due to economic hardship and natural disasters
- Resulted most significantly in the Boxer Protocol and the late Qing reforms—may have been a long-term cause of the 1911 Revolution

4. Analyze the reasons for, and the consequences of, the Late Qing reforms (1902-1911) in China. (May 2014)

Introduction:

- A period of reforms following the Boxer Rebellion and the imposition of the Boxer Protocol after 1900
- The Qing court and Cixi reluctantly agreed to allow for some measure of reforms and asked scholar officials to submit their proposals

Thesis:

- Caused by the failure of the SSM and defeat in the Sino-Japanese war, as well as the failure of the 100 Days Reform due to the return of Cixi and the conservatives to power
- Also caused by the Boxer Rebellion and the 1901 Boxer Protocol which was exceedingly humiliating
- Caused the start of the railway recovery movement and the 1911 revolution as the Han Chinese were frustrated with what they perceived as the lack of progress

Analysis (reasons)

Failure of SSM

- Came about as a result of the loss of the Opium and Arrow wars and the signing of the unequal treaties and forced opening up of China's ports
- Wished to adopt Western style modernizations without adopting Western culture and way of life
- Proved once and for all in the end of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 when China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the scramble for concessions began
- Also failed due to lack of ability of the reformers to understand that with Western technology also came Western culture
- The self-strengthening movement was meant to improve the lives of the people and strengthen and modernize the military, but the losses in the Sino-French war and the Sino-Japanese war saw the failure of coordination as the Nanyang and Beiyang fleets separated
- Contributed to the perception that top-down approaches were not effective

Failure of 100 Days Reforms

- Reform movement introduced by the Guangxu Emperor who was advised by Kang Youwei after defeat in the 1st Sino-Japanese war and the Scramble for Concessions
- Guangxu Emperor could reform by issuance of decrees (about 40-50) as Cixi withdrew from governance—reforms covered many issues but more importantly would have weakened conservative influence
- Cixi would bring the reforms to an end when she became alarmed by it
- Reformers were inexperienced and misinterpreted the general sentiments of the people; were too radical for their time and were perceived as warring against the status quo
- Opposed by too many powerful conservative groups and was suppressed by Cixi
- Led to illegitimacy of the Court and caused anti-foreigner sentiment to grow

Boxer Rebellion and the Boxer Protocol

- Not only was top-down reforms useless, even top-down actions were useless—revolution was the only way, clearly
- Sun Yat-Sen's advocacy of forceful overthrow was gaining support

- Many overseas Chinese began to support the Tongmenghui or Chinese United League, set up in 1905 to 1) expel the Manchus, 2) restore Chinese rule, 3) establish a republic, 4) equalize land rights
- Wuchang Uprising in 1911 led to a sea of political change in China that was the culmination of a process marked by ten failed uprisings led by Sun

Analysis (consequences)

Railway recovery movement

- Qing government nationalized the railways and gave the impression that the Manchus were selling out to the foreign powers
- Rallies and protests were mounted against the Qing
- "Railway protection societies" sprang up to fight this nationalization
- Officers and soldiers of the New Armies revolted against the Qing given their nationalism

Frustration amongst the Han Chinese

- Cixi never contemplated giving them a constitutional monarchy
- Resentment due to the higher taxes imposed
- Draft constitution was in fact an instrument of monarchical procrastination, as the constitution specific all power was vested in the Emperor;
- Widening of the division between Manchu and Han especially after the old cabinet was abolished by Prince Chun in 1911 and formed a new cabinet with Manchu majority—stimulated the rise of Han nationalism
- High anti-Qing sentiment and widening of the division between the two

Rise of Sun and the 1911 Revolution

- Felt that Manchu leadership was hopeless; turned to revolution as their only way out
- Disillusioned and disappointed due to the lack of genuineness in the Manchu effort for constitutionalism
- Growth of anti-Manchu sentiment in China and abroad
- Nationalism as a strong force with Dr Sun Yat-sen's Tongmenghui which comprised four basic points:
 - Expel Manchus
 - Restore Han Chinese rule
 - Establish a republic
 - Equalize land rights
- Military reforms of the Qing court led to soldiers being recruited by the Nationalists due to the Manchu dominance, e.g. railway agitation was mostly led by the New Armies
- Wuchang Uprising was due to the ten attempts of the Tongmenghui between 1906 and 1911; it was a New Army revolt that began the 1911 revolution

5. Analyze and assess the impact of the influence of Empress Dowager Cixi upon China's government between 1861 and 1908. (November 2009)

Introduction:

- Cixi became the Empress Dowager on the death of the Emperor Xianfeng in 1861
- Placed Prince Gong in authority after the end of the palace coup
- Played an increasingly important and largely conservative role in China's recovery
- Interventions in the 100 Days Reform, the Boxer Rebellion and the 1905 new constitution

Thesis:

- Played a major role in China's government as the regent and the true leader of the Qing court
- Intervened whenever there were supposed threats to her power
- See the 100 Days Reform, the Boxer Rebellion and the 1905 constitutional reforms

Analysis (ruthless hold over power):

Child emperors

- China was under pressure from Western imperialist and domestic rebellions
- Xianfeng emperor died in 1861—was the last adult emperor
- China should have had a capable emperor to drive China through the national crises—absolute monarchy meant that China depended on the emperor for survival
- Cixi became the regent because the Tongzhi emperor was a minor; manipulated the succession and made sure that her nephew (Guangxu) came to power in 1875 and ensured tight control
- Failed to ensure proper leadership succession
- Replaced by Prince Chun, who was himself a regent for Puyi

Playing off and undermining rivals

- Made use of talented men by checking them with other factions
- Prevented the rise of potentially change-making reformers
- E.g. Prince Gong, head of the Zongli Yamen, the informal foreign office; was willing to promote Westernization and modernization, and was able to get along with the West, but Cixi used his ambition and corruption against him when his power was reduced in 1869
- Was dismissed from the Grand Council in 1884 as his connections with the West were perceived to be a threat
- In 1889, Guangxu emperor requested personal rule, but Cixi kept a tight rein

- Guangxu kept in check by allies such as Li Lianying, Weng Tonghe and Sun Yu-Wen
- Placed Guangxu under house arrest and executed 6 Chinese reformers after the knowledge that Kang Youwei was planning to kill her

Analysis (corruption):

- Extravagance robbed China of the capital required for reforms
- E.g. diversion of funds intended for the Beiyang Fleet in the late 1880s; the money went to build a new Summer Palace
- Tolerated corruption of SSM reformers such as Li Hongzhang, who supported Cixi and the construction of the Summer Palace

Analysis (domestic reforms):

Lack of vision

- Due to lack of education and her reactionary personality—unable to appreciate the changes in China
- Adopted halfway plans for reform, e.g. SSM where it focused on Western science but neglected other aspects
- Trapped by the issue of Chinese superiority and Confucianism
- Did support reforms but up to the point where her position was threatened

Playing off SSM reformers

- Recognized that reform was necessary; allowed for Tongzhi and SSM
- Recognized that reform could only come from the Han provincial officials, thus supported Li Hongzhang, Zuo Zongtang and Zhang Zhidong
- But unwilling to provide consistent support or a centralized plan to direct and coordinate the efforts
- Wanted provincial leaders also to compete with each other for resources, thus preventing the Chinese from becoming too strong

100 Days Reforms

- Cixi did not originally hinder Guangxu's attempts
- However, Guangxu imposed the reforms hastily and led to the alienation to many conservative groups and thus would have failed even without Cixi's meddling
- Failure demonstrated the folly of top-down reforms and hence revolution occurred to people as the only option

Late Qing Reforms

- Cixi had agreed to the necessity of reforms by 1901, but reforms were too late by then as the sentiment had already been formed
- The reforms helped to entrench the sentiments of revolution

Analysis (foreign affairs):

Xenophobia

- Was concerned with preserving the tributary system and China's superiority—was a xenophobe
- Got entangled in the Sino-French war (1884-85) and Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), where Vietnam and Korea were the territories in question
- Both saw China get defeated soundly and undermined the little gain the SSM had achieved; encouraged development of revolutionary sentiments
- Tactical mistake in supporting the Boxers as she hoped to utilize the popular and recognized the inability of the Qing military in repelling the Westerners
- Thought that the Westerners wanted to remove her; favored Guangxu and the 100 Days reforms
- However, the provincial leaders were split in their response towards her urge to attack the foreigners
- Escape to Xian and imposition of the Boxer Protocol resulted in the imposition of Late Qing

6. Examine the reasons why the Double Ten Nationalist Revolution occurred in China in 1911. (May 2016)

Introduction:

- The 1911 Revolution occurred after the Late Qing Reforms
- The Chinese witnessed the hopelessness of the Manchu leadership during the Late Qing and turned to revolution as their only hope
- Began with the Wuchang Uprising on 10/10/1911 that led to a sea of political change in China

Thesis:

- Though factors include the role of Sun, the Boxer Protocol, the railway rights recovery movement, the Wuchang Uprising, the Late Qing reforms, and the role of Yuan Shikai, it was ultimately Yuan's role that was the most pertinent in establishing causes of the 1911 revolution

Analysis:

Sun Yat-sen

- GMD maintains the view that Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement played a key role in the overthrow of the Manchus, called the father of the revolution
- Had begun the [Revive China society](#) in 1895 to:
 - Expel the Manchus
 - Restore Chinese rule
 - Establish a federal republic (no monarch, elected representatives)
- Developed the three great principles and made it public in 1897, became principles of the Tongmenghui—his greatest contribution was ideological
 - Nationalism
 - Democracy
 - Livelihood of the people

- Tongmenghui (the Chinese United League) was a revolutionary group started up by Sun in 1905 in Tokyo, to accomplish the following:
 - Expel the Manchus
 - Restore Chinese rule
 - Establish a federal republic
 - Give equal land rights
- It is argued that the Tongmenghui was the most important force at work in toppling the Manchus and founding the ROC
- Wuchang Uprising on 10/10/1911 was the culmination of a process that saw 10 abortive revolutionary uprisings organized directly or indirectly by Sun
- 10th uprising was conducted by Sun's associate Huang Xing, in April 1911; was a failure but produced the 72 martyrs, buried at the Yellow Flower Mound
- Abortive revolutions were possible only because of the fundraising efforts of the Tongmenghui—Sun played a major role in raising funds from the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya
- Was elected president by 16/17 representations from the revolutionary provinces—cemented his position

However, his revolutionary movements are suggested to have merely caused the revolutionary tradition but failed to bring about an actual revolution, as Sun's revolutionary alliance was too frail to do so. They also did not contribute directly to the Wuchang Uprising and no top leader was in Wuhan and most second-level leaders were in jail. Sun was in the US at the time of the coup. Qing was also easily suppressing the uprisings, and they fell merely because their own commanders deserted them, and the Chinese elites did not prefer the Qing over the revolutionaries. Hence, Yuan Shikai was the main reason through his control of the New Armies.

The Boxer Protocol

- Was signed by 12 foreign powers after the 8-Nation Alliance put down the rebellion, humiliating China and imposed major punishment
- 2 year prohibition on importation of arms and ammunitions
- Destruction of 24 forts and 12 railroad posts for ready foreign access to Beijing and posting of troops
- Execution of 10 high officials and punishment of 100 others, e.g. the execution of Manchu Yuxian who egged on the Boxers in Shanxi
- Suspension of the civil service examination for 5 years in 45 cities; demoralized the gentry-bureaucrats
- 450 million taels in indemnity; 250 million was the Qing annual income
- Qing court mismanagement of the Boxer catastrophe and the Boxer Protocol led to favorable views of Sun Yat-sen, and was no longer considered an outcast

Railway rights recovery movement

- Qing government realized in 1910 that China required a stable railway network

- Decided to buy out the rights to railroad lines from their Chinese investors and nationalized the whole system under Qing control
- By 1911, borrowing from British-American banking consortium to the tune of 10 million pounds and an additional 6 million pounds from the same consortium meant that foreign powers were given a dominant role in this process
- Gave the impression that the Manchus were selling out and hence “railway protection societies” sprang up to oppose this central plan
- New Armies played a prominent role in revolting against the Qing due to the railway controversy

Wuchang incident

- A rebel bomb maker accidentally exploded one on 9/10/1911 at Hankow; three revolutionary leaders were arrested and executed
- Led to the discovery of a membership list of the revolutionaries including Wuchang soldiers in the New Armies; the soldiers were not really associated with the Tongmenghui
- Realized that they were going to be executed and hence staged a coup on 10/10/1911, taking the city
- Persuaded Li Yuanhong to take over the country and head government; urged other provincial assemblies and New Armies in other places to attack Manchu populations and Manchu garrisons
- 17 provinces had declared independence from the Qing

Failure of Late Qing

- Educational reforms destroyed the basis of Qing control over the gentry and created a new educated youth
- Military reforms led to recruitment of soldiers inspired by nationalism; led to the New Armies who would play a major part in the Wuchang uprising
- Resentment due to the higher taxes imposed
- Ending of the civil service exams raised many questions and cut off support from scholar-officials
- Constitutionalism opened the door to discourse and dissent, and when the constitutional changes did not award the people the freedom they wanted, revolt was on the cards
 - Said that a different perception of the nature of constitutional government was one of the reasons for the conflict between the Assembly and the Qing court—were the National and Provincial assemblies advisory bodies or legislative organs?
 - All power was still in the hands of the Qing court
- Princ Chun’s abolition of the old cabinet and establishment of a new cabinet with 8 Manchu, 4 bannermen, 4 Han
- High anti-Qing sentiment and widening of the division between the two

Yuan Shikai

- Qing called Yuan Shikai to suppress the revolution as his Beiyang Clique was the most powerful in China but Yuan held back to take advantage of the situation
- Was the key figure during the 1911 revolution given his control of the New Armies through his subordinates; was appointed the commander of the first New Army in 1895 and gained significant political influence and loyalty
- Initially retook a number of rebellious regions but held back from seizing Wuchang to come to terms with the rebels—had little regard for the Qing court
- Used his new authority to engineer the fall of the Qing and was not a revolutionary; had no intention to replace the Qing with a republic
- Wanted to become the new emperor of China instead
- Emerged as the only possible arbitrator between the Qing court and the revolutionaries
- Peace negotiations between Yuan and the revolutionaries began 17th December 1911 in Shanghai; the foreign powers heavily favored Yuan given his ability to bring peace and decided that Yuan would be emperor if the Manchus abdicated
- Sun came back to China and became the new President in December 1911—but Yuan realized that the GMD required military strength for a real republic and thus asked Sun to stand down and let him work his military power to let the Qing abdicate
- Abdication of the Qing dynasty was offered in exchange for continued living in the Forbidden City and 4 million in upkeep a year and the treasures of the palace—ultimatum to abdicate or be overthrown by force
- Sun resigned on 14th February after being president on 1st January and gave Yuan the post; Yuan became provisional President in March 1912

7. Analyze the factors that led to the rise of warlordism in the period from 1911 to 1926. (November 2010)

Introduction:

- “Warlordism” defined as a man who was leader of a particular area based on his capacity to wage war—collapse of central Qing authority in China
- The lords waged skirmishes and formed different alliances; formed the Anhui, Zhili and Fengtian Cliques—saw Beijing as the ultimate prize
- Zhang Zuolin—Manchuria, Fengtian Clique
- Feng Guozhang, then Cao Kun and Wu Peifu—Zhili Clique
- Duan Qirui—Anhui, defeated by Fengtian in 1920
- Warlord Era was a period in the history of China from 1916 to 1928 where the control of the country was split amongst various military cliques; began after Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916
- Was ended by the Northern Expedition

Thesis:

- The Warlord Era was definitely rooted in the weakening of the Qing court in the mid-19th century, and therefore not all blame should be prescribed to Yuan
- However, Yuan's self-interested policies and his death served to trigger the formal beginning of the warlord period, lasting between 1916-1928
- Yuan during the 1911-1916 period showed his lack of loyalty to the Qing or the New Republic, instead trying to establish himself as the new Emperor

Analysis (long-term):

Decline of the Qing government and rise of provincial leaders

- Rise of internal rebellions in the mid-19th century left legacy of warlordism and collapse of the empire firmed up this disunity
- China was increasingly swamped by domestic issues and foreign issues—Taiping Rebellion and the Opium and Arrow Wars, which served to show the extent of decay
- The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) saw fatal concessions made by the Manchu court to the gentry and allowed Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang to raise private regional armies (modern-day equivalent: PMCs), resulting in loss of central power
- Thus, the survival of the Qing depended on these people; the Qing power hence fell further as these provincial leaders appointed their own followers in their own provinces
- Little efforts to coordinate these efforts; e.g. Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, where the Beiyang army was left all alone against the Japanese—precedent of selfish policies
- However, decline of the Qing was not the absolute factor; the gentry leaders whom the Qing made concessions to were still loyal to the Qing
- The first two years of the ROC from 1911 to 1913 were not exactly part of the warlord period given the immense activity and supremacy of civilian government—the warlords only became dominant due to decline and disintegration of civilian politics after Yuan militarized politics and oppressed the people from 1913 to 1916
- Thus, Qing decline made warlordism possible; not inevitable

Late Qing Reforms and their impact

- Reforms meant to modernize and professionalize the military resulted in more politicized officer corps
- Creation of provincial military academies in 1901 and establishment of Bureau of Military Training in 1903
- Abolition of the civil service exam also saw more men choose the military—new ladder of power and social prestige
- Late Qing tried to create a new standing army of 450,000 men; failed and the New Armies remained fragmented due to regional-provincial interests
- Many were more loyal to their commanders and Chinese nationalistic sentiments than they were to the Qing Court

- 1911 revolution was not really a united one anyway; it was more of a provincial breakaway from the Qing dynasty; provincial New Armies were at the forefront of the movement and army commanders were in charge of provincial struggles against the Qing
- Yuan's repressive measures led to the failure of the revolution to create stable government and resulted in a crisis of legitimacy
- Opened up the opportunity for military men to "arbitrate" negotiations between civilian politicians

Analysis (Yuan Shikai):

Self-seeking policies encouraging other commanders to reject central authority after his own death in 1916

- Warlordism was traced to Yuan Shikai himself—in 1890 he had created the Beiyang Army, China's first modern military force
- Yuan's setting of a personal example: a lesson in self-interest and his relationship with his generals
- Betrayed Guangxu during the 100 Days Reforms and disobeyed Cixi's declaration of war during the Boxer Rebellion: displayed his lack of loyalty to the Qing
- Yuan was able to maintain his power and control his generals who were in fact his students when he was alive—not so much in death
- Yuan overplayed his hand, trying to make himself Emperor in 1915; thwarted by his own generals and caused unrest in various provinces; denounced by republicans and the southern provinces
- Criticized also for negotiating loans with foreign bankers which compromised Chinese sovereignty; the 1915 21 Demands regarding Japanese interests which included, *inter alia*,
 - Recognition of Japan as taking over Germany's privileges in Shandong
 - Recognition of other Japanese interests elsewhere
- Which Yuan accepted the majority of, and hence deepened his unpopularity
- His death in 1916 left behind a large number of non-Confucian warlords who also did not pledge allegiance to the throne or even the nation's honor and interest
- Encouraged everyone else to do as he did; pursue self-interests

Betrayal of the New Republic causing a crisis of political authority

- Showed his lack of loyalty in the actions from 1913 to 1916 to the Republic
- GMD organization expert Song Jiaoren was assassinated by Yuan in 1913 despite GMD success in the elections as Yuan felt he was a threat to his presidential power
- Removed military governors who were supporters of the GMD in May 1913 and there was an open revolt of pro-GMD forces against Yuan; failed and Sun and the other GMD members fled to Japan
- Yuan then proceeded to outlaw the GMD in November 1913 and evicted them from the Assembly

- Abolished all the assemblies by 1914 and destroyed China's democratic experiment
- 1911 revolution thus failed to create a strong stable central government—resulted in the power vacuum after Yuan's death and a crisis of legitimacy which the warlords exploited
- Yuan left behind no one capable enough to unify all the provincial leaders and his own generals; Duan Qirui took over the Republican government but could not impose central authority on the provinces; led to local regions falling under various warlords

Analysis (role of warlords):

- Major warlords held territories comprising one or more provinces
- Hundreds of minor warlords and subordinate officers served under these major figures
- Many warlords did not owe their positions to previous Republican appointment; some of them seized power knowing the Republic could not resist
- Key generals in the Beiyang Clique began to split; disagreed over policy
 - Duan Qirui
 - Feng Guozhang
 - Cao Kun
 - Wu Peifu
- Duan Qirui became the Anhui warlord in 1916 after Yuan's death
- Feng Guozhang became the Zhili clique leader till 1919—taken over by Cao Kun and Wu Peifu, took over central and northern China by 1924
- Zhang Zuolin controlled the Fengtian clique
- Numerous wars between Zhili, Anhui and Fengtian
- Other warlords included Zhang Xun, ruler of Shandong who supported the Manchu dynasty and unsuccessfully tried to restore Puyi to the throne in 1917
- Zhang Xun later replaced by Zhang Zhongchang who would ruthlessly tax his province to support himself
- Yan Xishan was leader of Shanxi; one of the longest surviving warlords and would only be toppled by the 1949 CCP victory in the Civil War
- Muslim Bai Chongxi, Han Chinese Li Zongren and one more warlord controlled Guangxi
- Essentially, none of the warlords were willing to give up their power or make concessions and **do anything remotely conciliatory**; China would stay divided as long as they were in power

8. To what extent was the May 4th Movement significant in determining the future of China? (May 2010)

Introduction:

- Was a popular movement unified by a desire to redefine China's traditional culture and society
- Catalysts included the humiliating 1915 21 Demands, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, and warlord militarism
- More often used as a metonym for the broad New Culture Movement (1915-1924) which was sparked by the 21 Demands
- The May 4th incident refers to the student demonstrations; the May 4th movement refers to the strikes and boycotts that followed; the May 4th era refers to the revitalization of China in the early 1920s
- Defining "significance" as resulting in deep consequences for people over a long period of time, and shed light on emerging or enduring issues in history; finally it must occupy a meaningful place in the national narrative

Thesis:

- Revived the GMD and saw the creation of the CCP; began mass-line politics
- Saw intellectual discourse and huge nationalist fervor
- Wider criticism of Confucius
- Literary revolution and the establishment of a vernacular
- The movement is considered one of the most eventful and crucial stages in the long process of China's transformation to adjust herself to the modern world

Analysis (political):

Shifted the intellectual movement from cultural to political and the need to find a new political philosophy to move China forward; influx of diverse foreign ideas led to two main opposing strands of thought on social reconstruction and national regeneration, which then led to the creation of the CCP and revival of the GMD

The CCP

- Early leaders who founded the CCP were involved in this Movement, e.g. Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu
- Western-style liberal democracy was still somewhat attractive until the advent of the Treaty of Versailles, which then was viewed as a betrayal of China's interests
- Wilson's 14 Points were seen as western-centric and hypocritical, as not only did they fail to convince other imperialist countries to adhere to the 14 points, the US also did not join the LoN—did not seem right to them
- Marxism then **began to take hold in Chinese** intellectual thought and Communism was then studied seriously by Chinese intellectuals such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao
- Especially Chen: lost faith after the ToV and turned to Marxism; struck by the will of the students in the May 4th incident, where students from 13 local universities demanded that negotiators repudiate any treaty hostile to Chinese sovereignty; burned down the head negotiator's house (Cao Rulin)—31 arrested and 1 died

- Radical thinkers in universities justified their resistance using revolutionary theory; the 1917 Russian Civil War then provided a practical precedent for a popular revolution against the ruling class
- The May 4th movement was seen as the catalyst for the founding of the CCP, as it led to Marxism being seen as a working ideology for the Chinese agrarian society
- 20 revolutionaries met in 1921 to found the CCP, Mao was amongst them
- Li Dazhao had the idea of Sinicizing Marxism, as he felt that the peasantry played a larger role than the proletariat in revolution in China—there were not much proletariats
- Li Dazhao was executed by Zhang Zuolin in 1927, but his idea lived on in its adoption by Mao—decisive in gaining support from the peasantry much later

Revival of the GMD

- Sun supported the May 4th movement on purely ideological grounds
- Had realized that his party was now politically impotent and badly in need of rejuvenation—the youth of the May 4th could be recruited, forming a new base of power for his party
- GMD did get a major boost after 1919 as the elite and younger people flocked to the party—stemmed from the desire to defeat the warlords and reunify China
- GMD grew in strength and the Comintern got the CCP and GMD to form the first united front which was vital for the success of the Northern Expedition

Anti-foreigner and nationalistic sentiments

- Really, the May Fourth movement was an anti-imperial and nationalist political response to the Treaty of Versailles
- Was the first sign of intellectually led mass nationalism in urban China; the 7-day strike in 1919 showed how students, merchants, industrialists, workers and shopkeepers created ad hoc organizations and collaborate in shutting down the biggest industrial city in China (Shanghai)
- One key motivation was to destroy the imperialist presence in China and gave a sense of direction to radicals and revolutionaries—eject the imperialists and foreigners, and rejuvenate China
- Climax of May 4th came in a 1925 incident—a large crowd marched in protest against an earlier shooting of Chinese workers by Japanese guards; a British commander ordered his forces to fire and killed 12 people
- Ensuing outrage resulted in organization of further riots and strikes
- Guangzhou and Shanghai was in anarchy
- Youths and students would play a vital role in this upsurge of nationalism and would also play a part in the mass boycotts of Japanese goods in 1930s

Analysis (socio-intellectual):

Impact on women

- Gave rise to discourses on liberation of women, from free marriages to career opportunities

- Nurtured a more active suffrage of women and brought them into sociopolitical activities
- Produced an added appreciation of women's rights and even had a feminist wing amongst the New Culture thinkers
- Education increased continuously during May 4th and the Nanjing Decade, and there was an increase of women entering urban professions
- Rise of the feminist movement in the May 4th era led to the warm reception of gender equality and resulted in the bill passed by the GMD in the late 1920s which guaranteed women's property rights and in 1924 congress laid down equality in various spheres e.g. education
- However, Chinese women were still prevented from owning property and the bill became anachronistic
- The GMD fell in 1949—women's rights had been neglected

Impact on youths

- Mainstream intellectual opinion came to the fore in 1915 than the path of real change lay in the changing of young minds
- Many intellectuals saw the youths as those responsible for China's survival
- Beijing University students proceeded to demonstrate against foreign powers and the Chinese collaborators on May 4th 1919 to demand that the ToV not be recognized as it still left Japan in control of Shandong
- The youths were able to organize and mobilize other key social groups such as workers and merchants, resulting in strikes in Beijing and Shanghai
- Strikes symbolized the cohesion of the three central bodies and demonstrated the leadership of the youths in mobilizing society
- May 4th also symbolizes the role of the youths in beginning the Communist legacy—Red Guards would fulfill a similar purpose in 1966

Intellectual significance

- The New Culture Movement and the May 4th Movement was far more effective at destroying the past by attacking old ethics, customs, literature social relations and economic and political institutions—was much more effective than Qing reforms
- Intellectuals recognized the need for a complete transformation of traditional Chinese civilization
- Needed to introduce Western technology, laws and political institutions in addition to re-examining Chinese philosophy, ethics, science and social theories
- May 4th criticized China's traditional society and Confucian values, and emphasis on youths went against Confucianism
- Emancipation of the individual—the individual should be freed from the bondage of the traditional stagnant ethics and institutions
- Classical traditions lost their appeal
- Chiang tried to revive the old customs through the New Life Movement—purged Western ideas and brought back Confucianism

- Jiang Qing would launch the destruction of Confucianism in 1973 during the Cultural Revolution; criticizing Lin (Biao), criticizing Confucius
- Confucianism as an ideology is still coming back in the 21st century; the CCP uses it as ideological justification for their rule and criticism of the West

Literary revolution

- May 4th is considered the Chinese Enlightenment
- Establishment of the vernacular in 1920 and rise of new literature in the vernacular
- 1921—all primary school texts used vernacular
- Became the popular form of writing and dominated literary circles
- Would become the standard even till now

9. Compare and contrast the aims and policies of the Communists and the Nationalists in China during the First United Front established in 1924. (May 2009)

Introduction:

- Formed in 1923 under the Sun-Joffe pact: Joffe was a Comintern agent
- Cooperated under the planning and executing of the Northern Expedition: a military operation to see forces move north and defeat all opposing warlords, including the Beiyang government
- 1926-1928, ended with the White Terror which saw Jiang purge the country of the CCP
- Jiang had turned on the CCP after the success of the Northern Expedition and gaining access to the wealth and influence of powerful commercial classes
- Both the CCP and GMD definitely had similar aims and a common immediate purpose which was to defeat the warlords and establish a unified government for China
- However, they differed as to what that form of government should be—practically incompatible
- CCP used the GMD to spread ideology; GMD used CCP to gain popular support for the Northern Expedition

Thesis:

- The aims refer to the goals of the GMD and the CCP while the policies refer to their actions which were designed to attain their goals
- GMD and CCP's aims were conflicting and the policies would ultimately destroy this marriage of convenience

Analysis (aims and policies):

Defeating the warlords and uniting China

- Both the GMD and CCP wished to create a united China—the principle was embedded in history since the Qin dynasty

- Common problem due to Yuan's death: warlordism in 1916
- Warlords had their own regional armies and imposed their own laws and taxes over their region; the Beijing government had little power and was plagued by constant wars
- Common solution to carry out the Northern Expedition and united China after defeating the warlords

Establishing national government

- GMD wished to implement Sun Yat-sen's 3 Principles and a 3 stage revolution—military government, political tutelage, then democratic republican government
- CCP wished to implement a communist dictatorship of the proletariat based on Marxism and authoritarianism

Strengthening their own parties

- Sun realized the weakness of the Tongmenghui as organizationally inefficient and disunited; was the main revolutionary organization but plagued by such problems
- Had 50000 members in 1922 and was dominated by the bourgeoisie
- Wanted to cooperate with the CCP to gain Comintern experience and did so through Comintern agent Borodin who reorganized the GMD using the principle of democratic centralism
- CCP on the other hand had leaders e.g. Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao recognize that the party was very young and had only 200 members in 1922, dominated by intellectuals and students
- Required Comintern support hence they were obliged to follow its lead and to join a United Front with the GMD
- Comintern helped the CCP develop communist cells and provided the finances and advice
- Sent young Chinese to Russia to learn Marxism, train as organizers and learn tactics at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East
- Comintern ordered the CCP to join the GMD to strengthen itself

Building up necessary means to aid the Northern Expedition

- GMD focused on building up the military force which was critical for defeating the warlords
- Soviets helped the GMD establish the Whampoa Military Academy which produced 3000 graduates by 1926 and were from the bourgeois class
- Soviet funding ensured the GMD troops were well paid and looked after—provided weapons and ammunition as well as military advice
- GMD was willing to work with the business class and secret societies—espoused by marriage to Soong May-ling which allied him with the Soongs
- Willing to work with supportive warlords
- CCP preferred development of popular movements to support the Northern Expedition which was their specialty

- CCP was divided—Chen Duxiu favored the Soviet approach and was backed by the majority to capture power in cities with proles; approach dominated the party because Comintern said so
- Li Dazhao wanted to utilize the peasantry and rural areas
- CCP would ultimately focus on developing unions in the cities through strikes and sabotage, but would realize that the lack of military might let them down in the White Terror: political power grows out of the barrel of a gun

Ending imperialism in China

- GMD's and Sun's ideology wanted to end imperialism—hoped to use diplomacy to undermine imperialism in China
- Seen in the Sun-Joffe manifesto in 1923 where the Soviets gave up rights to unequal treaties under the Tsarist regime
- CCP supported Marxist beliefs where they thought capitalist conflict was inevitable and the Western powers would destroy themselves anyway
- Lenin wanted to export communism to Asia where many countries were victims of capitalist colonization
- China was the conduit for expansion of communism into Asia

To destroy each other

- Both parties saw that the existence of the other was a threat to the existence of itself
- The GMD CEC had a quarter of the members as dual members of the CCP
- Sun assumed that Comintern would control the CCP but in reality the CCP was slowly subverting the GMD
- GMD was divided over the issue of continuing the United Front; Wang Jingwei, leader of the GMD leftists, was willing to continue but Hu Hanmin of the GMD rightists wanted the CCP gone
- CCP might have wanted the GMD eliminated—see Zhongshan incident, 1926 where the communist captain allegedly tried to kill Chiang
- Led Chiang to adopt increasingly restrictive measures on the CCP—culminated in the 1927 White Terror where over 5000 communists were shot in Shanghai and this purge spread to other cities
- Stalin authorized the CCP to break free only after he defeated Trotsky—but even then because the CCP had no military power, they could only stage uprisings such as the Autumn Harvest Uprisings in August-December 1927 but they failed

Carrying out socio-economic reforms

- Was not a major issue for both during the United Front—concentrated resources on the Northern Expedition
- The GMD made no effort to promote any because the GMD itself was dominated by traditional elites resistant to change
- CCP only launched on radical land reforms after the 1927 White Terror where liquidation struggles saw landlords and kulaks killed, their land redistributed

- To win over support of the peasants against the GMD, but was too late in the context of this period—would come in handy much later

10. Why did the Communists and GMD in China create a United Front in 1924, and why had it collapsed by 1928? (November 2001)

Introduction:

- Formed in 1923 under the Sun-Joffe pact: Joffe was a Comintern agent
- Cooperated under the planning and executing of the Northern Expedition: a military operation to see forces move north and defeat all opposing warlords, including the Beiyang government
- 1926-1928, ended with the White Terror which saw Jiang purge the country of the CCP
- Jiang had turned on the CCP after the success of the Northern Expedition and gaining access to the wealth and influence of powerful commercial classes
- Both the CCP and GMD definitely had similar aims and a common immediate purpose which was to defeat the warlords and establish a unified government for China
- However, they differed as to what that form of government should be—practically incompatible
- CCP used the GMD to spread ideology; GMD used CCP to gain popular support for the Northern Expedition

Thesis:

- Similar aims as reflected in their reasons for forming the 1st United Front
- But inherent differences and attitudes towards the front—knew that it was a mere marriage of convenience
- Even if the GMD had not struck first, it is highly likely someone would have done so anyway given their differences

Analysis (reasons for forming):

1. The GMD and CCP were convinced that revolution was impossible if the warlords were not eliminated
2. Many of the revolutionaries belonged to both parties
3. Sun was on good terms with the Comintern and was open to cooperation
4. Comintern had greater faith in the GMD as a revolutionary force compared to the CCP; Comintern agents also assured Chen Duxiu that the GMD was pro-left due to its nature of membership and furthermore Chen was asked to focus on their common goal and not what divided them
5. CCP was initially too small to effectively act on its own; most CCP members were also overawed by the Comintern and blindly followed given their status as world leaders of Communism

6. Argument for the existence of the United Front was also catalyzed by the May 30th incident in 1925—a large crowd had marched in protests against an earlier shooting of Chinese workers by Japanese factory guards; the British commander of the international settlement ordered forces to scatter with rifle fire but killed 12: led to outrage and strikes and riots, attacks on foreign legations and disorder in Guangzhou and Shanghai—China's internal and external enemies were seen to only be properly eliminated by force

Analysis (reasons for failure):

Differences in ideological objectives

GMD

- Based on Sun's 3 Principles—national freedom, democratic government and the people's welfare
- Democracy was popular amongst the economically prosperous and educated middle class—had been denied a voice
- People's welfare could have appealed to the peasantry but the GMD did not really bother with a significant peasant base

CCP

- Desire in relieving the conditions of the peasantry
- Sinicised Marxism—Li Dazhao and adoption by Mao, diverging significantly from traditional Marxism
- Rural China with a tiny proletariat saw Mao choose to focus on the peasantry as the revolutionary peoples
- CCP wanted a profound restructuring of society i.e. class warfare
- Meant elimination of the bourgeois which did not sit well with the GMD whose main power base was the financial and industrial elites
- GMD also did not place their faith in the ability of the peasantry to deliver economic prosperity
- CCP did not take well to GMD's Western-leaning culture and party members; rejected democracy as a Western tool
- CCP and GMD hence had clear ideological differences and aims for national unified rule

Elimination of warlords and foreigners was a common aim—but marriage of convenience

- Both shared a similar goal in this sense
- However, also because they both needed each other to strengthen themselves and make use of one another
- Sun joined forces with the Communists to take advantage of the CCP's affinity with labor and agrarian movements and Soviet aid
- Sun wanted also to absorb rapid CCP growth into the GMD as the CCP growth may undermine his own national revolution
- 12/1/1923: Comintern ordered CCP to enter the GMD and join Sun's national revolution; the Comintern thought GMD was the mainstream of Chinese nationalism and hence the CCP should use the base of the GMD in expanding

- Chen Duxiu was reluctant; may corrupt the workers and peasant members
- Adolf Joffe and Sun met and issued a joint statement to achieve national unification and achieve national independence
- Russia would support Sun and this would also allow them to plant the CCP onto the established GMD to seize control of it
- Comintern agent Borodin convinced the CCP to join and told them that in the short run the CCP would be better able to reach out to urban and rural workers
- Alliance was indeed a marriage of convenience

Dual memberships issue led to tensions

- The CCP members who entered the GMD did not lose CCP membership; hence the First United Front was more of a CCP bloc within the GMD as a whole
- The GMD however thought the CCP members were coming in with zero prior affiliation and expected them to fall in line with GMD laws but the CCP formed a secret bloc instead and demanded they listen to the CCP organization
- Many CCP members became nominal GMD holders and real CCP members
- Conflicting orders led to friction; raised issues in discipline and suspicions of subterfuge and spying

After Sun's death—Sun as the holding force of the united front because of his stature and prestige

- 1925—released the anti-Communist forces within the GMD which Sun had previously held off
- A right-wing group secretly met in Beijing to demand the dismissal of Borodin and the dropping of relations with the CCP
- In 1926, the CCP held 60% of the delegates in the GMD congress—the rightists held their own congress in Shanghai and broke away in response to leftist domination
- Falling apart of the United Front in political terms

Chiang Kaishek's suspicion (pre-White Terror)

- Chiang and almost all the GMD leading members had received training in Moscow in the early 1920s but did not identify with Marxism
- Conviction was that the CCP had to be crushed
- Zhongshan incident in 1926: suspected that the crew of a gunboat named Zhongshan was about to kidnap him and hence seized the boat and purged Communist supports in Guangzhou
- The CCP wanted to leave but Borodin persuaded them to stay; Stalin also needed to show that the United Front was sustainable to oust his political opponent Trotsky
- Chiang dismissed a number of CCP officials from their GMD posts and arrested several Comintern advisers
- Pushed Wang Jingwei out of office—his closest rival

- Reinforced his military control of the GMD
- Chiang's action during the Northern Expedition when it killed several foreigners in Nanjing displayed the different agenda; the expeditionary force entered and killed foreigners and looted the embassies, which led to the British killing a number of Chinese
- Chiang blamed the Communists to avoid antagonizing the West; executed some of the soldiers who were "responsible"
- The expedition was a success eventually and by 1928, the warlord power was broken and Chiang immediately turned his attention to the CCP

Chiang Kaishek (White Terror)

- Tension reached peak highs in the White Terror in Shanghai in 1927
- Shanghai saw the growth of a powerful trade union movement under Zhou Enlai
- Formed a worker's army so effective it undermined the local warlord's attempt to prevent Chiang's GMD forces
- After Shanghai fell due to the CCP worker's army, Chiang, backed by the merchants and industrialists, rooted out and shot over 5000 Communists and sympathizers
- Similar coups were carried out by GMD armies in a number of cities including Guangzhou

11. Assess the successes and failures of Guomindang (Kuomintang) rule in China between 1928 and 1937. (May 2005)

Introduction:

- 1928-1937 known as the Nanjing Decade
- Began with the defeat of Zhang Zuolin who controlled the Beijing area
- GMD had also driven the CCP into hiding
- Nanjing was the new capital
- Followed Sun's 3 stage revolution: military unification, political tutelage, then civil constitutional government
- 1928 period was tutelage—provisional government

Thesis:

- Was largely a failure for the GMD in almost all aspects except for foreign relations
- Even then, foreign relations saw marginal improvements
- Have to understand the constraints that Chiang was working with

Analysis (political):

Success: advances towards democratic reconstruction

- By the end of the period of political tutelage which was 6 years long, the GMD hoped that the country would be ready for constitutional advances
- 1931 saw GMD issue a provisional constitution which created a 5-branch system of government—the executive, legislative, judicial, examination and control bureaus
- Original legislative saw 51 members and was chosen for 2 years by geography
- However, it was a law-drafting organization which merely translated GMD principles into law—the GMD was still the main source of power

Failure: compromises with warlords

- Chiang was so eager to win during the Northern Expedition that he negotiated with some more progressive warlords and absorbed them into his system
- These “new warlords” cooperated with the GMD and preserved their own interests
- The warlords had little concern for the suffering of the peasantry and the welfare of the masses
- Chiang only enjoyed partial victory over the warlords; never controlled more than 1/3 of China and 2/3 of the population at any time
- Some militarist governors broke away in the 1930s from Nanjing and ruled their domains independently
- This led to the Nanjing government really controlling only 5 provinces directly
- Considerable percentage of GMD officials hailed from the bourgeois class—the landed interest—and hence they were not hard up for any radical reform that would risk their own position
- Sun’s principle of the livelihood of the people was thus not achieved

Failure: existence of leftover warlordism

- GMD increased the provinces under their control from 2 in 1928 to 8 in 1936; defeated the coalition of Feng Yuxiang and Yang Xishan, but was still unable to unify the whole country

Failure: development of a dictatorship

- GMD proclaimed democracy as a long term goal, but claimed that the people were not ready; hence the political tutelage period
- Chiang was chairman and took on the title of Generalissimo in 1931 to mark his elevated status
- Chiang was Confucian in thinking; showed little sympathy for democratic ideals
- Never fully achieved Sun’s principle of a republican system based on Western ideals during the Nanjing period

Failure: Confucian fascism

- Blue Shirts formed in 1931 by Whampoa officers—infamous for terror activities
- Dai Li (leader) built up the Investigation and Statistical Bureau into a security organization akin to the NKVD/Gestapo
- Had about 1800 agents working under him by the mid-1930s and they operated outside the law; free to arrest and detain without charges or trial
- Blue Shirts wanted to revive the GMD and enforce Chiang's dictatorship
- Played a leading role in the New Life Movement, ripping up journals and pouring acid on "immodest" people
- Blue Shirts openly admired Benito Mussolini, were anti-Communist and violent; even believed children were the property of the state and not families
- Chiang and the GMD right used the promise of fascism to overcome any potential Communist class struggle

Failure: GMD corruption

- Weakened the bureaucracy
- Public office was bought and nepotism was the main means of advancement
- Corruption was rampant; opium and narcotics was integral to Shanghai economy and politics, resulting in bribes and deals forging intimate connections between gangsters and officials
- Green Gang paid vast bribes amounting to significant portions of government revenue
- E.g. Du Yuesheng who was appointed to multiple positions in the Nanjing government including chief of the Opium Suppression Bureau—Du was a drug baron
- Green Gang had a monopoly on the drug trade and funneled a share of the profits to the Nanjing government
- Links between the government and gangsters grew more intimate; even Chiang got involved
- Gave the CCP powerful material against the GMD in their growing conflict
- GMD betrayed their own sense of moral purpose

Failure: lack of sympathy for peasants

- Chiang's party support base was largely drawn from the capitalist classes and congregated in the ports and cities
- 90% of revenue came from the Shanghai region
- Had little care for the peasantry

Analysis (economic):

Success: financial reform

- Outstanding accomplishments included the substitution of the silver dollar in place of the tael and the introduction of paper currency (fa-pi)
- Government abolished the tael in 1933 and introduced the silver dollar at 1 dollar for 0.715 taels

- However, sharp rise in silver value in the world market led to an outflow of silver from China given the US buying more to balance their own currency backing
- Government nationalized silver in 1935 and introduced paper currency (fa-pi) to the 4 national banks on 25% silver reserve
- 1936 saw introduction of a decimal system of nickel coins in 5, 10, and 20 cents to supplement the paper currency
- Chiang's brother-in-law Soong Ziwen established a central bank and specialized banks to deal in foreign exchanges and to provide microcredits to peasants and finance transportation developments

Success: communications

- Establishment of a Ministry of Railways in 1928 to direct improvement of existing lines and building new ones
- Built a further 5000 miles of railways and increased roads to about 69000 miles
- National airline operated flights and airmail
- Postal services and telecommunications improved and expanded; telegraph lines were restored to working condition after warlord era
- Created work and investment; helped integrate economic regions and strengthened sense of national identity in China

Success: industrial development

- Between 1927-1937, importation of industrial equipment reached Ch\$500 million which was considerable for a war torn economy
- Progress in light industries such as cotton, flour, matches, cements, chemicals
- Advances achieved in new industries e.g. electricity generation and in older industries such as coal, where output grew by 7% per annum
- But most growth concentrated in the treaty ports and Manchuria—also, many larger enterprises were mostly foreign-owned

Success: development of Shanghai

- Shanghai stock exchange went international
- Subsidies to help the film industry which would become internationally renowned
- Similar government support enabled Shanghai fashion houses to compete with Paris and Milan

Failure: budget deficits

- Heavy military spending meant government revenue would only cover 80% of their expenditure
- Government found it difficult to increase revenue as it was unable to collect taxes effectively
- Banks sold large quantities of discounted government bonds and increased government liabilities

- Government spent more than it raised; had to resort to borrowing from foreign financiers
- GMD slowly led China towards bankruptcy

Failure: Great Depression

- US began buying more silver to balance gold reserves during the Great Depression—price increased and the metal flowed out of China
- Chinese economy fell into a deflationary spiral
- Wholesale prices fell by a quarter between 1932 and 1935
- Net exports fell from 1417 million yuan in 1931 to 535 million yuan in 1934
- By 1932 1/3 of urban factories and 40% of stores closed
- Farmers were hurt by lower prices and devastating floods in the mid-1930s
- GMD was powerless to prevent a widespread famine occurring in China in the years 1934-35, causing the death of 30 million Chinese

Failure: poor treatment towards the peasants

- GMD tried to alleviate the difficulties of the peasants by passing a land law restricting rents but was never enforced
- Sharp drop in income for peasants due to the depression and outflow of silver
- National Agricultural Research Bureau set up in 1932 to extend credit to farmers but most loans went to the landlords and little was reinvested
- GMD failed to carry through declared policies of land reform and equitable rents; people's livelihood was not secured

Failure: communication

- Communication achievements were not credible as more of the labor was conscripted and peasants were not allowed to use the road anyway
- The roads were supposedly for military use only
- Almost half the railway mileage was built in Manchuria—under Japanese control

Analysis (social):

Success: education

- Chiang became minister of education in 1930
- MOE reorganized and combined a number of public universities, colleges and schools into 13 national universities, 5 colleges and 9 provincial universities
- 4-5fold growth in secondary enrolment
- 3 People's Principle taught in school
- To be fair education record was uneven, provision of education was much better in the cities than the countryside

Success: New Life Movement

- Launched in September 1934, encouraging the practice of the four Confucian values

- Propriety
- Justice
- Honesty
- Self-respect
- Disseminated Western ideas and etiquette e.g. to stop spitting and smoking
- Tried to produce a thoroughly disciplined society
- Argued that the Movement led to psychological uplift and confidence from military training and instruction
- Movement also had a Christian section with Jesus being a model for emulation; YMCA was very active with social work

Success: literature

- Extremely lively during this decade
- Lu Xun, Mao Dun
- Satire, sarcasm and pity to comment on the "old" society's decadence and backwardness

Success: reformation of family law

- Modern civil code in 1929 to 1931 to explicitly grant rights to women in divorce, marriage and inheritance
- One of the most liberal laws of its day in divorce; granted equal access to women on ten grounds including adultery and ill-treatment
- No-fault divorces possible by mutual consent
- Equalized the definition of physical cruelty
- New law also gave concubines more rights; regarded as legitimate members of the family

Failure: education

- Many schools were underfunded and students were not well off
- GMD clamped down on political activities in the universities

Failure: New Life Movement

- Government officials only put on their best behavior when Chiang was around
- Observers saw the hypocrisy; Mdm. Chiang would smoke foreign cigarettes and the government supported Du Yuesheng's opium business
- New Life Movement was a harmful movement in the opinion of the revolutionaries given the reinstatement of Confucianism
- Government sought to essentially reclaim the very liberties it had granted, e.g. bobbed hair or short-sleeved dresses in Shandong

Failure: family law

- No effect on the countryside where traditional norms prevailed

Analysis (foreign relations):

Success: tariff autonomy

- Won autonomy in 1928 and achieved a major goal
- Reversed the fixed 5% ad-valorem tariff which was imposed after the Opium War
- Great powers gave up their consular jurisdiction
- 1928: foreign treaties and agreements which had expired would be replaced by fairer ones and the rest would be abolished and renegotiated according to legal procedures
- Subsequently the US, Germany, Italy, Belgium, UK, France, and Japan would enter equal agreements

Success: foreign concessions

- Succeeded in revoking a number of concessions
- British agreed to relinquish their concessions at Hankou, Jiujiang, Weihai and Amoy from 1927 to 1930
- Belgian concession at Tianjin was recovered by 1931
- Reduced concessions by 1931 from 33 to 13
- Chiang was thus able to somewhat get rid of foreign dominance

Limitation: foreign concessions

- Restriction of China's rights only fully achieved in 1943 where the US and UK abolished all unequal treaties with China but was only because they needed China as a wartime ally

Analysis (military):

Success: encirclement campaigns

- Lasted from 1929-34
- Chiang adopted a series of encirclement campaigns aimed at denying resources to the Reds until they broke
- Tried to squeeze the Communists into a shrinking area by aerial bombing and manned blocks and pillboxes
- By 1934 CCP and Mao fled Jiangxi and embarked on the Long March, reaching Yenan in 1935
- CCP appeared broken by 1935 and seemed that the GMD had fully established control

Success: German military aid

- Chiang's chief military adviser between 1934 and 1935 was General Hans von Seeckt who led a military mission to China
- Reformed Chiang's army into 60 trained divisions—important influence though only 20 was created by 1937
- GMD's tactics, discipline and uniforms were all based on German models
- Nazi Germany supplied GMD weaponry till 1936

Failure: Manchuria

- Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and set up a puppet state in 1932 called Manchukoku

- 1933 saw Japan and China sign a truce, ceding northeast to Japan
- Chiang needed the time to build up its resources and hoped that international reaction would restrain them
- Chiang also wanted to eliminate the CCP completely first
- "Internal pacification before external resistance"
- Government suffered badly in public eye even though Chiang was right in that he had time on his side
- Were seen as not nationalist
- Failed to get rid of Japanese influence; instead appeased Japanese aggression in northern and north-eastern China

12. Compare and contrast the policies and tactics of the Guomindang (Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). (November 2005)

Introduction:

- 2nd Sino-Japanese War was the precursor to the Chinese Civil War
- 2nd United Front formed during this time period to defeat the Japanese
- The GMD bore the brunt of fighting and fought a defensive war
- CCP adopted guerilla warfare; both sought to preserve their own areas
- Mao became the party leader and introduced rural reforms
- GMD was portrayed in a negative light but CCP was also self-serving

Thesis:

- Both sides had similar policies but their tactics to achieve their aims was largely different
- CCP was thus largely able to gain an advantage over the GMD

Analysis (policies):

Approach towards the United Front

GMD:

- Chiang adopted a very passive approach towards Japanese aggression since the 1931 Manchurian crisis, preferring to focus on defeating the CCP threat through the Extermination Campaigns
- Deep pressure on Chiang to work with the CCP following the Xian incident and growing anti-Japanese nationalism

CCP:

- Was already hard-pressed by the Long March; capitalised on popular demand for a united front which would end GMD persecution
- Had the chance to kill Chiang after his kidnapping but was pressured by Stalin to form the united front

Defeating the Japanese invasion

GMD:

- Was the legitimate government and was obliged to put in the most effort resisting and defeating the Japanese threat

CCP:

- Benefitted from focusing on their anti-Japanese efforts and burnishing their credentials
- In reality they were consolidating their forces after the devastation of the Long March
- The war served to distract the GMD

Preserving or winning national power

GMD:

- Wanted to ultimately wipe out the CCP which was their biggest threat
- 2nd United Front broke down by 1941 as seen in the New 4th Army incident; GMD attacked the CCP forces
- Imposed a blockade of Yen-an and openly persecuted CCP supporters

CCP:

- Was determined to defeat the GMD so that it could achieve national power
- Had to recover from the Long March and established the Yen-an base

Analysis (tactics):

Conventional and guerrilla warfare

GMD:

- Was a conventional army since its 1924 creation
- Was due to Soviet and German influence in the 1920s to 1930s
- Were pitched battles in 1937-8 such as Shanghai/Nanjing where 500000 Chinese clashed with 200000 Japanese and over half the Chinese became casualties
- Chiang lost Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan in 1937-1938 within a few months
- Forced back into Chongqing; was an overall defensive war
- Failed to make significant headway
- Poor conscription management and barely 3000 men had any training in 1936-46—conscription practices included literally snatching passers-by, drafting the poor, drafting the exempt, even the sick
- Only 28.9% of draftees met health standards
- Over a million men died on the way to their units
- The Japanese advance slowed down by 1941

CCP:

- Developed as a guerrilla force since the Jiangxi Soviet period
- Derived from Mao's "On Protracted War" in 1938
- Sought to avoid large scale battles, but rather develop a remote base area from which they could extend influence over the surrounding area
- Focused on winning over the peasantry by treating them well
- Tried to burnish their anti-imperialist credentials by prematurely using conventional warfare in the 100 Regiments offensive in 1940, led by Peng Dehuai, targeting Japanese strongpoints and communications
- Was a major failure where they lost 22000 while Japanese lost only 4000

- Guerrilla tactic would tie down a large number of Japanese troops and win respect from the people
- Moved into Manchuria after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, gaining weapons and ammunition left behind by the Japanese

Reliance on foreign powers

GMD:

- Relied strongly on the Allies to provide for desperately needed supplies from British India to sustain survival alone
- Relied on the USSR prior to 1941 heavily
- Adopted protracted war, trading space for time
- Chiang budgeted for America's entry into the war and was convinced that America could defeat Japan
- Americans provided limited financial loans which increased after 1941
- Provided much economic and military aid after 1941
- US strategy of using China as a bomber base failed when Japanese destroyed their bases
- Eventually the US gave up on positioning troops

CCP:

- Links with USSR dropped sharply due to the war
- Also reflected Mao's desire for self-reliance and rejected the Soviet model
- Though the Yen'an Soviet gained international recognition the US would only ally with GMD given their better image and army

Propaganda

CCP:

- Was exclusively a CCP tactic; they were the only party who could capitalise anyway
- Was most adept at manipulating propaganda to their benefit
- Kept focusing on the GMD's refusal to fight the Japanese and their desire to defeat the CCP
- Benefitted from Japanese aggression and abuses against Chinese civilians like the Rape of Nanjing
- Great appeal to the masses
- Manipulated people like Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley who promoted the CCP and undermined the GMD
- Aided by literacy schemes which aided indoctrination process

Political control and support

GMD:

- Sought to establish a one-man dictatorship in order to strengthen China against its enemies
- Was supported only by the traditional elites
- Chiang distorted history and cherry-picked facts to prove the unequal treaty system was the main problem

- Advocated revival of Confucian views; led to accusations of him being dictatorial
- Had an elected People's Council which was mere lip-service; no attempt to share power
- Gagged the press
- Used repression under Dai Li and the Blue Shirts Society to ensure control
- Turned disgruntled citizens against the GMD

CCP

- Also wished to establish a one-man dictatorship but under the guise of a people's democracy
- Called for a new democracy which emphasized national revolution, giving the impression of inclusion of the classes
- Saw rapid CCP expansion
- By 1945 Mao dominated party leadership and made Maoism the official ideology—the Sinification of Marxism (if it was to mean anything to China, it must be imbued with Chinese characteristics)
- Introduced the 3-Thirds system which gave the appearance of shared power
- Promoted mass movements to mobilize the masses
- Did also use repression such as the rectification campaign in 1942, Yen'an, to correct "wayward" ideology, denouncing Marxism
- Was an attack on Soviet influence
- Used informers and secret police

Economic warfare

GMD:

- Tried to promote a war economy even before 1937 but the retreat to Sichuan made this hard
- Lacked modern industries as it was largely dependent on agriculture
- Tried to tax the people to gain revenue from grain, requiring it to be sold at fixed prices and transported to venues which led to high costs which more than doubled tax burdens
- Failed to carry out economic reforms to address agrarian crisis, leading to a famine condition and lost peasant support
- Henan famine of 1942-43 exposed the poor GMD practices which created severe hardship for the people
- Unemployment also rose after the Japanese began bombing and destroying mines and factories
- Badly mismanaged national finances due to sharp increases in military spending and diminishing income, worsened by reckless money printing (from 1.7 billion dollars in 1937 to 163332.8 billion in 1948) which led to hyperinflation (to the tune of 230% per annum), alienating the masses
- Black markets due to shortage in commodities

CCP:

- Promoted moderate economic reforms like rent reduction, limited property seizure, banning of usury

- Creation of producer cooperatives in 1943 for purchasing grain and advancing credit and pooling labour and resources
- PLA trained to be honest and respectful in all dealings—eight guidelines and three points of contact
- Would lead to the growth of the CCP from 40000 in 1937 to 1 million in 1945—would also then lead to the growth of the PLA
- Cut down top-heavy bureaucracy and distributed surplus members to villages to help development
- All members of the administration were required to participate in production and to attempt self-sufficiency in food and cotton
- About 40% of basic needs supplied in this way by 1945
- Aided the increase of agricultural productivity

13. Why were the Communists able to defeat the Nationalists in China in 1949? (November 2007)

Introduction:

- 1949 marked the end of the Chinese Civil War
- CCP victory resulted in the rise of Mao and his party as the absolute rulers of the People's Republic of China
- The Chinese Civil War arguably has its roots in the fall of the First United Front in 1928 after the Northern Expedition and White Terror—Sino-Japanese war was a brief respite for the CCP

Thesis:

- Despite the war saving the CCP from the GMD in 1945, a Communist victory was by no means certain
- Aided by Nationalist mistakes in strategy, policy, and behaviour in the Nanjing Decade and the war—undermined their support and strengthened the CCP
- GMD weakened by corruption, weak government, poor military strategy and failure to retain respect and support
- CCP strengthened by an able and confident leadership and had attractive policies which retained support and undermined the GMD morale

Analysis (strength of the CCP):

Mao's leadership

- Won the loyalty of a large portion of the population by virtue of his organizing ability and power to manipulate others
- Orchestrated the PLA campaigns from his Yen'an base
- Was the undisputed leader of the CCP and initially began with the strategy of guerrilla warfare but then decided to change to conventional warfare in 1948
- Was also Mao who drew up the grand strategy for the campaigns but did leave the details of the fighting to the commanders

- However,
 - Mao's self-confidence led him to make serious errors of judgment—e.g. in November 1945 where he overruled his commander Liu Shaoqi and ordered the PLA forces to defend the pass between Manchuria and China
 - Was clearly unprepared
 - Overrun by nationalist forces and was forced to fall back on Liu's original plan to consolidate in northern Manchuria

Military strategy and tactics were effective against the GMD

- 1949 CCP victory was arguably a military victory rather than a political victory—their tactical superiority was crucial to the victory
- In the war against the Japanese, Communists had learned valuable lessons on fighting numerically superior forces
- Guerrilla warfare was effective against the Japanese and would be equally successful against the Nationalists in Manchuria—an area that was geographically suitable due to hilly terrain and large forested areas
- "Wear and tear"—the Communists gradually picked off GMD forces and reduced their numerical advantage
- CCP also seized the initiative during the war—dominated rural zones and struck at vital communication routes such as railway lines while the GMD was getting isolated
- Lin Biao was a commander of outstanding ability; transformed the PLA in 1947 from a guerrilla to a conventional army, absorbing the Manchukuo puppet government's army and recruiting peasant supporters
- Intensive training and use of weapons captured from the enemy and political indoctrination made the PLA a formidable fighting force
- Afterwards, Lin Biao and the other commanders moved on to an offensive strategy which brought victory in Manchuria and later in northern, central, and southern China

Ideological appeal due to pro-peasant policies and promises of land reform

- Red Army grew during the Sino-Japanese War
- Mao impressed on soldiers in the PLA the need for discipline and to treat the civilian population with respect; e.g. prohibition of usury and to be honest in all transactions with the peasants
- Were popular policies; played a major role in the growth of the party from 40,000 in 1937 to 1 million by 1945—volunteers for the Red Army came from this base of support
- Many of the peasants were nationalistic in their outlook and desired a united China free and independent of foreign intervention, thus supporting the CCP against the Japanese
- PLA also presented themselves as a patriotic fighting force in contrast to the GMD who took on American aid

- CCP succeeded in mobilising peasant support because they were nationalistic and showed superior military and organizational ability against the Japanese
- CCP were popular among the peasants as they gave them licence to seize the property of their hated landlords
- Incentive of land reform led to the ranks of the PLA being swelled with new recruits from the peasants
- Also relied in a vast army of peasant militia to support the regular troops
- During the CCW, in 1946, the Communists returned their radical policies of land confiscation and overthrow of large estates—the “land to tillers” programme
- Reverted to class struggle and violence, an integral part of the process
- May 1946 saw a directive issued authorising the seizure of land from collaborators and also the Outline Agrarian Law in October 1947 which provided for the confiscation of all land belonging to landlords and for its redistribution to the local population
- Sanctioned violence against landlords was already prevalent in many villages, escalating to rural revolutions
- Landlords and richer peasants were denounced and subjected to humiliation and violence—highly likely that part of the reason for the CCP support came from the fear of retribution by these landlords in case of GMD recapture
- Return to Manchuria in 1945 saw the CCP realise that land alone was not enough to garner the peasant support; required a promise of “revolutionary transformation”, meaning to convince poor peasants that support for the CCP would mean land AND participation in decision making bodies after the revolution
- Awakened the peasants to their conditions of exploitation and gave them confidence to act against it, organizing struggle meetings at which poorest of peasants were allowed to voice their grievances

Effective CCP propaganda

- Portrayed themselves as essentially different from the GMD; the willingness to cooperate with the GMD despite their widely publicised murderous intent suggested that they were selfless

Analysis (foreign intervention):

Limited US support to the GMD

- The US was accused of failing to provide the GMD with the aid necessary
- Some believe the US had the ability to save China from Communism
- US support in itself gave Mao strong anti-GMD material for propaganda
- Chiang held the US responsible for the defeat as the Americans would pressurize him to broker truces at crucial times during the Civil War
 - E.g. 1946 when the CCP was under pressure in Manchuria, Marshall persuaded Chiang to broker a ceasefire, lasting four months which gave the CCP enough time to regroup, train its troops and organize defences

- War would resume in October 1946, and Chiang was now unable to break the defensive forces in Manchuria
- Chiang misgauged US's support; assumed they would continue with aid, but once he was considered a political liability to the US, the support declined
- GMD brutality and incompetence did not help the situation—moreover, the USA were pivoting to Japan and rebuilding it as the base for US power in East Asia
- The US arguably found Communist China unpalatable but also tolerable, as the PRC would not be much of the threat to the US security position for a long time
- However, it is incorrect to accuse the USA of being complicit in Chiang's downfall—the US priority was in Europe and they did enough for Chiang, airlifting 100,000 troops from Chongqing to northern Manchuria; also gave Chiang vast amounts of money amounting to US\$570 million in 1948 alone
- Unpopularity of the GMD and the USA's primary commitment to Europe due to the Cold War meant that the US was prepared to ditch Chiang

Sino-Japanese War

- Weakened the GMD—large areas of GMD's support were under Japanese rule and Chiang lost a lot of tax revenue
- Chiang met this problem by merely printing more money, leading to inflation which greatly impacted the middle classes and led to the GMD losing support
- GMD bore the brunt of fighting with the Japanese in the early stages of the war, resulting in heavy losses; meanwhile the CCP was fighting a guerrilla war with light losses
- The public opinion fell for the GMD after it was thought that the GMD was pulling back and waiting for the Americans to win the war
- Strengthened the CCP—gave the Communists much needed breathing space when the war broke out in 1937 as the Japanese focused on fighting the GMD
- CCP turned towards a Maoist guerrilla strategy, emphasizing the countryside and China's vast rural population—Mao used his guerrilla assaults on the Japanese as propaganda material to promote the CCP as the true nationalists
- Mao accused the GMD (who were receiving US aid) as nothing more than a puppet of the West
- Mao slowly won peasant support through land reforms during the Sino-Japanese war; by March 1945, the CCP liberated 678 out of 914 country towns and implemented their policies of land reform, setting up of village schools, reduction of taxes and abolishing debt
- Also avoided inflation by taxing people in goods, not money
- Provided military leadership for the defence of peasants against the Japanese

Analysis (weakness of the GMD):

Inability to manage inflation and economic collapse

- Chronic inflation began to rise uncontrollably in 1937
- GMD tried to make up for the loss of revenue during the Sino-Japanese War by borrowing heavily from abroad and by vastly increasing the issue of paper currency
- Resulted in a drastic fall in the value of money and was exacerbated by the huge military expenditure
- An army of 5 million troops raised by the GMD by 1945 accounted for 75% of government expenditure—tried to pay their escalating domestic and foreign debt with increasingly worthless money
- Printing of more bank notes to finance their expenditure worsened inflation
- Unemployment reached 30% by 1946 even in the capital Nanjing, leading to industrial strikes which the Communists took advantage of in infiltrating labour unions
- Inflation accelerated in 1946, and by 1948, Shanghai wholesale price index had risen to 1,368,049 and the economy was on the verge of collapse
- GMD tried to replace the worthless paper currency and issue the gold yuan note, but failed as the new currency had no backing and no balanced budget
- Hopes of a currency stabilization loan from the US also failed
- October 1948—the government tried to reduce the budget deficit by increasing taxes on consumer goods, prompting a rush to stockpile goods leading to shortages and collapse of the currency reform
- Monetary system collapsed by 1949—the GMD was discredited and the Nanjing government was demoralised as were the Nationalist armies
- Possibly the most important reason was inflation—even if the GMD won the CCW and were not driven out of mainland China, failure to manage inflation would have made it extremely difficult for the GMD to hold power

Lack of political progress under the GMD

- Alienated the GMD base of support
- Sun Yat-sen had prescribed that after a period of political tutelage by the GMD, a constitutional government would be introduced—a constitution had been drafted in 1936 and the Political Consultative Conference had agreed to introduce it
- However, the GMD commitment was undermined by a faction that did not want to give up their monopoly of power
- Constitution was promulgated in 1947 and elections were held, but condemned as a farce
- GMD was regarded then as too corrupt, too intolerant of minority parties, and too indifferent to the issue of civil liberties to be able to make progress in government

Poor leadership of Chiang

- Chiang did not decisively stamp out corruption or remove incompetent officials

- Many expected the collaborators with the Japanese to be punished, but only a few were met with this action and others could retain their jobs
- GMD was accused of commandeering Japanese property, whereas the industrialists and merchants received no compensation for having property seized by the Japanese
- Chiang was either a poor judge of character or refused to look—trusted people he liked even when they were incompetent
- Was suspicious of independent-minded men, especially commanders
- Promotion in the GMD army depended on connections and loyalty
- Could not bear to delegate power and tried to micromanage campaigns even though he was far removed from the situation
- His decisions were impractical and contradictory
- Chiang erred by sending troops into Manchuria without securing control over northern and central China—should have consolidated first
- 1947—Chiang made the poor decision to eliminate warlord remnants and personal armies, leading to thousands of unemployed and decommissioned officers defecting to the PLA

Poor military strategy and policies

- GMD possessed a far larger and well-equipped army compared to the CCP at the start of the civil war, but its troops were poorly trained, low on morale, and lacked discipline
- GMD troops gained a reputation for brutality and ill-discipline amongst local populations of the regions they took over—often used terror
- GMD was mainly a conscripted army, having little incentive to fight
- Troops often went days without food and water and their pay was frequently stolen by their officers
- Heavy losses in battle and desertions severely weakened the GMD armies; morale was low due to poor pay and bad treatment
- GMD's plan to recover Manchuria was misguided; patient consolidation of the southern and central regions in China would have been a better strategy
- Nationalists were plagued by espionage—Chiang's assistant Chief of Staff Liu Fei was a CCP spy and leaked vital military plans to communist commanders
- Manchuria army's Nationalist commander was CCP spy Wei Lihuang—his action secured CCP victory

14. How significant was the Japanese invasion and occupation of China from 1931 to 1945 in ensuring the ultimate victory of the Communists in 1949? (November 2013)

Introduction:

- Japanese invasion and occupation of China began in 1931—staged a fake attack on the Southern Manchurian Railway and overran Manchuria in 5 months
- Would attack Shanghai and invade Hebei by 1932-33 and the Tanggu Truce negotiated in May 1933 left Beijing and Tianjin open to attack
- The war ended in 1945—led to the resumption of the CCW and the eventual victory of the CCP

Thesis:

- War may have saved the CCP from the GMD in 1937, but the eventual victory in the Civil War was the result of the political and military strengths of the CCP, and the errors of the GMD
- By 1945, the CCP was by no means in any position to take over the country—took the war for this to be confirmed

Analysis (Sino-Japanese War):

- Weakened the GMD—large areas of GMD's support were under Japanese rule and Chiang lost a lot of tax revenue
- Chiang met this problem by merely printing more money, leading to inflation which greatly impacted the middle classes and led to the GMD losing support
- GMD bore the brunt of fighting with the Japanese in the early stages of the war, resulting in heavy losses; meanwhile the CCP was fighting a guerrilla war with light losses
- 1937—the Japanese attacked the Marco Polo Bridge and Chiang came under pressure to resist and attacked Shanghai, sending his best troops—egged on by Zhang Zhidong, CCP spy and GMD commander of Shanghai
- Battle of Shanghai/Nanjing in August 1937 saw 500,000 Chinese clash with 200,000 Japanese—almost 250,000 Chinese died
- Nanjing fell in 1937—even with so many men and supplies lost in defending it
- GMD retreated to Chongqing and fought a largely defensive war
- It is highly possible that the GMD focus on the Communists as the real danger was a main reason for why the war was so prolonged—the GMD saw the Japanese as the “disease of the skin” but the CCP as the “disease of the heart”; this manifested itself in the encirclement campaigns and leading up to the Long March and the 2nd United Front
- The public opinion fell for the GMD after it was thought that the GMD was pulling back to Chongqing and waiting for the Americans to win the war
- Strengthened the CCP—gave the Communists much needed breathing space when the war broke out in 1937 as the Japanese focused on fighting the GMD
- The CCP took the official position that they would work with anyone against the Japanese—said that the Chinese cannot fight each other
- The Communists did very little fighting throughout this time period—70% rest, 20% fight the GMD, 10% fight the Japanese

- Mao himself used the war years to secure his own position—through the 1930 Futian incident, where he got rid of the alleged Anti-Bolshevik League in the Jiangxi Soviet, and the 1942 rectification campaign in the Yen-an region, where he tried to align the conformity of the new party members with Mao thought and Maoism
- CCP turned towards a Maoist guerrilla strategy, emphasizing the countryside and China's vast rural population—Mao used his guerrilla assaults on the Japanese as propaganda material to promote the CCP as the true nationalists
- Mao accused the GMD (who were receiving US aid) as nothing more than a puppet of the West
- Mao slowly won peasant support through rural land reforms during the Sino-Japanese war; by March 1945, the CCP liberated 678 out of 914 country towns and implemented their policies of land reform, setting up of village schools, reduction of taxes and abolishing debt
- They were able to capture these territories through guerrilla activity against the Japanese and the puppet regime
- Also avoided inflation by taxing people in goods, not money
- Provided military leadership for the defence of peasants against the Japanese
- The end of the Sino-Japanese war benefitted both parties in its immediate aftermath—the CCP moved into areas taken by the USSR in Manchuria, and the GMD supported by the US returned to their territories in eastern China

Analysis (CCP strengths):

Mao's leadership

- Won the loyalty of a large portion of the population by virtue of his organizing ability and power to manipulate others
- Orchestrated the PLA campaigns from his Yen-an base
- Was the undisputed leader of the CCP and initially began with the strategy of guerrilla warfare but then decided to change to conventional warfare in 1948
- Was also Mao who drew up the grand strategy for the campaigns but did leave the details of the fighting to the commanders
- However,
 - Mao's self-confidence led him to make serious errors of judgment—e.g. in November 1945 where he overruled his commander Liu Shaoqi and ordered the PLA forces to defend the pass between Manchuria and China
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- Also relied in a vast army of peasant militia to support the regular troops
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- Reverted to class struggle and violence, an integral part of the process
- May 1946 saw a directive issued authorising the seizure of land from collaborators and also the Outline Agrarian Law in October 1947 which

provided for the confiscation of all land belonging to landlords and for its redistribution to the local population

- Sanctioned violence against landlords was already prevalent in many villages, escalating to rural revolutions
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Effective CCP propaganda

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Analysis (GMD weaknesses):

Inability to manage inflation and economic collapse

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- GMD tried to make up for the loss of revenue during the Sino-Japanese War by borrowing heavily from abroad and by vastly increasing the issue of paper currency
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- Monetary system collapsed by 1949—the GMD was discredited and the Nanjing government was demoralised as were the Nationalist armies

- Possibly the most important reason was inflation—even if the GMD won the CCW and were not driven out of mainland China, failure to manage inflation would have made it extremely difficult for the GMD to hold power

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- Constitution was promulgated in 1947 and elections were held, but condemned as a farce
- GMD was regarded then as too corrupt, too intolerant of minority parties, and too indifferent to the issue of civil liberties to be able to make progress in government

Poor leadership of Chiang

- Chiang did not decisively stamp out corruption or remove incompetent officials
- Many expected the collaborators with the Japanese to be punished, but only a few were met with this action and others could retain their jobs
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- Promotion in the GMD army depended on connections and loyalty
- Could not bear to delegate power and tried to micromanage campaigns even though he was far removed from the situation
- His decisions were impractical and contradictory
- Chiang erred by sending troops into Manchuria without securing control over northern and central China—should have consolidated first
- 1947—Chiang made the poor decision to eliminate warlord remnants and personal armies, leading to thousands of unemployed and decommissioned officers defecting to the PLA

Poor military strategy and policies

- GMD possessed a far larger and well-equipped army compared to the CCP at the start of the civil war, but its troops were poorly trained, low on morale, and lacked discipline
- GMD troops gained a reputation for brutality and ill-discipline amongst local populations of the regions they took over—often used terror
- GMD was mainly a conscripted army, having little incentive to fight

- Troops often went days without food and water and their pay was frequently stolen by their officers
- Heavy losses in battle and desertions severely weakened the GMD armies; morale was low due to poor pay and bad treatment
- GMD's plan to recover Manchuria was misguided; patient consolidation of the southern and central regions in China would have been a better strategy
- Nationalists were plagued by espionage—Chiang's assistant Chief of Staff Liu Fei was a CCP spy and leaked vital military plans to communist commanders
- Manchuria army's Nationalist commander was CCP spy Wei Lihuang—his action secured CCP victory

15. Examine the achievements and failures of Mao Zedong's leadership between 1949 and 1976. (May 2016)

Introduction:

- Mao came to power as the paramount leader of China after winning the CCW in 1949
- Immediately set about forming government and a transition to a socialist state
- Political, social and economic reform and continual revolution—assess degree of success or failure in different fields and recognize that achievements could be easily undone given continual movements
- Key areas: CCP dominance and centralization of power, economic prosperity, social welfare, and to increase Chinese international status

Thesis:

- Varying degrees of success and failures in different fields
- Each accomplishment could be just as easily undone by the next action
- Main failures were the Great Leap Forward (1958-59), followed by the Cultural Revolution (1966-76)

Analysis (political):

Main effort of the CCP was to consolidate control in the civil government and create strong central government, asserting control over all territory deemed part of China

Establishment of the CCP's dominant position in the PRC and strong central government

- New system of government saw their position legitimised; Mao tolerated the existence of other political parties in line with democratic socialism—15 parties in total including the CCP took part in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949
- Parties however were tolerated as long as they did not threaten CCP grip on power

- Properties were seized and the banks and public utilities were under state control
- Democratic socialism—the true democracy of the PRC lay in the obedience of all members to the authority and instructions of the CCP leaders; only the leaders were sufficiently educated enough to understand rule of China

PRC Structure

- CCP was at the heart of the government structure in China—leading party members also held key government positions
- Mao dominated the Standing Committee in the 1950s, making key decisions for party and country
- Structured three large bureaucracies—the CPPCC, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, and the Central People's Government Council under the 1949 Organic law
- Country divided into 6 regions, governed by a bureau of 4 major officials
- Military commander and political commissar posts filled by the officers of the PLA—China was effectively under military control
- Party membership grew to 10 million by 1955

Reunification campaigns

- Tried to reinforce control over the outlying areas of China
- Three PLA armies dispatched north, south, west
- One sent to Tibet in 1950 to crush resistance and impose a regime of terror
- One sent to Xinjiang to impose local communist control over the region bordering Outer Mongolia (large Muslim community)
- One sent to Guangdong—traditional base of GMD power
- Limitation: Tibetan resistance movement was not destroyed, instead going underground
- Re-emerged in 1959 to organise a national uprising
- Communist force tried but failed to seize Quemoy in Taiwan in 1949

1954 Constitution and the legal system

- Temporary arrangements for running the PRC was replaced by a formal constitution
- Highest organ of state was the National People's Congress (legislative) whom met each year to elect government officials and discuss major decisions
- Provided a framework for the development of a legal system, modelled from the Soviet Union
- NPC given power to dismiss and appoint judges and enact legal codes
- Right to trial and defence by a people's lawyer
- Limitation: equality under the law was non-existent until after Mao's death
- Party committees replaced courts and from 1954 to 1957, double standards destroyed any idea of justice
- Mao's 100 Flowers Campaign in 1956 saw huge criticism from legal specialists—punished severely in 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign

- Court system existed only for show trials by 1960s

Analysis (economic):

Main effort of the CCP was to gain control of the economy, curb inflation and increase government revenue—wished for self-sufficiency and development of heavy industry to put the PRC on par with the USSR and the West; Mao's basic policy was governed by belief of collective ownership of means of production (nationalisation)

Agrarian Reform law of 1950

- Redistribution of land in China—the CCP created a unified fiscal system
- Law authorised the redistribution of land in China—half the farmland was redistributed by confiscating the land of rich families and allotting to poorer families
- Drew millions of peasant farmers into the revolutionary process
- 43% of China's cultivated land by 1952 had been confiscated and redistributed—60% of the population benefitted
- CCP cadres assigned to villages across China and identified the biggest landholders in the village and to organize meetings to denounce the landlords
- Land reforms were only completed by 1952 except in areas occupied by national minorities
- Limitation: process did not result in equal landholding across China—in the north, population was less dense and average family holdings were as high as 2.3 acres while high population density in the south meant that it was as low as 0.5 acres
- Landlords faced harsh treatments and execution; those considered innocent were denounced and released with only just enough land

Mutual Aid teams of 1951

- Mao thought that forcing peasants into larger collectives would encounter resistance and undermine peasant support
- Adopted a cautious move towards cooperation and introduced mutual-aid teams to ease the peasants into collectivisation
- Were already encouraged during the Yanan period
- Groups of about 10 families to formalize the sharing of resources by 1950s
- Relatively successful as the families who lacked basic equipment could now share labour or plough to enhance productivity
- Peasants realised only mutual aid teams would allow them to harvest their crops given sharing of resources

Agricultural and Advanced Producers' Cooperatives

1952-53: Agricultural Cooperatives implemented—families retained their titles to their plots but the land was farmed cooperatively and crops were divided according to how much land and labour was supplied

- Grouped together between 30-50 households

- 1955—only 14% of the peasants had joined

Mao's impatience led to the call for Advanced PCs in 1955-56 requiring peasants to share tools, equipment, and land—people received wages mainly based on their amount of labour

- Consisted to 200-300 households
- Socialist transformation of agriculture was complete by 1956—only 3% of peasant households farmed as private individuals
- Collectivisation had been achieved 15 years ahead of schedule
- Limitation: many peasants joined the APCs reluctantly—actually contributed to lower productivity
- Impact was disappointing and agricultural production grew by only 3.8% and in 1957 grain production increased by only 1%

1st Five-Year Plan

- 1952—Mao's communist government drew up the First Plan for China
- Plan covered 1953-1957 but did not really work out until 1955
- Focus was on heavy industry, not consumer goods
- Attention given to development of Chinese automobile and transport industry
- Construction of vast rail-bridge and road across the Yangtze river and the building of the Tiananmen Square in 1956
- Exhorted Chinese to save money in State Banks which then used this to finance national investments
- Though incomes increased, the Chinese had more savings, meaning increase in industrial investments
- Government procurement quotas saw the CCP take a proportion of food produced by peasants and paid them at artificially low prices
- Enabled the government to feed the growing urban population and keep wages down
- Results were impressive but the numbers were massaged
- Limitation: there was a tendency for officials to exaggerate official figures just as in the USSR
- Were anxious to appear to be fulfilling their targets
- Expensive modern equipment was ruined due to lack of proper installation and lack of maintenance, mainly due to workers not having the necessary skills and being unable to read instructions—quantity over quality
- State planners were ignorant of basic procedure and saw serious bureaucratic delays, leading to production bottlenecks
- Heavy dependence on Soviet aid and support during the 1st Five Year Plan lessens the achievement

Great Leap Forward (1958)

- Mao gave a speech in 1958 at the Supreme State Conference, declaring that China would become a new world superpower that would challenge the USA and overtake Britain in 15 years

- Theory of permanent revolution and embarking on the GLF in the summer of 1958 (modernising all aspects of China's production capacity)

Agriculture

- Between 1956-58, 750,000 existing cooperatives were merged into a number of large communes
- 70,000 communes
- Collectivisation process an essential part of the Great Leap Forward
- Each commune was made up of 750,000 brigades—each brigade was made up of 200 families, under direct control of PRC's central government
- Four Noes Campaign during the Great Leap Forward—eradication of flies, pests, mosquitoes, rats, and sparrows
- Ecological balance was actually upset
- Lysenkoism, a fraudulent scientific technique of increasing harvest of crops but made infallible by the CCP in 1958—led to famine on a gigantic scale
- Claimed 20 million lives from 1959-62—many died after from other ailments
- 1959-61 known as the Three Bitter Years
- Massive imports to the tune of 6 million tonnes from Canada and Australia by 1961—continued till 1970

Industrialisation

- Vastly increased targets were set for industrial production—unrealistic
- Target for steel output for example was fixed at 6.2m metric tons, a 19% increase in February 1958; but increased to 12 million by August 1958
- To achieve high targets, hundreds of new state policies started—employment of people in industries doubled to over 50 million, placing strain on system of food procurement

State-owned enterprises

- Important feature—attempt to bring the industry under total government direction
- Firms no longer could be privately owned and manage
- Prices, output rates, targets all fixed by the state
- Fulfilled the notion of centrally controlled industry and socialist economy
- But they were largely inefficient due to lack of incentive and the iron rice bowl

Backyard furnaces

- Huge emphasis on production of iron and steel—Mao insisted that China develop backyard furnaces
- Primitive smelting devices that every family was encouraged to have
- Saw this as a communal activity which all the people could participate—enthusiasm was the requirement, not skill
- "Learning by doing"—600,000 furnaces sprung up by 1958
- However, home-made steel was essentially worthless—but continued to be regularly gathered by authorities who would dump the useless steel into deep pits which were then covered—a heavy environmental price to pay as many trees were felled to support the furnaces

Decline of Mao and purge of Peng Dehuai

- Mao agreed to step down as Chairman of the PRC in 1959 and was usurped by Liu Shaoqi
- Peng Dehuai sent Mao a private letter in 1959 at the Lushan Conference that the GLF was a mistake and his disapproval at the Sino-Soviet split—Mao chose to publish the letter and attacked Peng openly
- Removed Peng from the Politburo and his position as Minister of Defence, placed under house arrest
- GLF revealed Mao's weakness as an economic planner and his limited understanding of the industrial process and lack of knowledge of agricultural science
- GLF revealed also failure of the reliance on willpower alone
- One weakness was the lacking of the essentials, e.g. technical skills, managerial know-how, efficiently run factories and plants, adequate transport system

Analysis (Social):

Wished to address the inequality between men and women; to destroy the remnants of bureaucratic capitalist class in China, and to improve education

Policies towards women

1950 marriage law—made men and women equal and proclaimed rights of a woman to seek divorce and outlawed concubinage and child marriage

- Payment of dowries and bride-prices forbidden
- All marriages had to be officially recorded and registered
- Legal marriage age set at 20 and 18 for men and women
- Limitation: three main obstacles, namely husbands, mothers-in-law and cadres; rural China also remained a largely patriarchal society

Land reforms and the Great Leap Forward: granted women the right to own and sell land and property

- Women were granted land in their own name
- Most important and enduring change—entry of women into the workforce
- Required more full-time workers—women were the answer
- Women began to work full-time in the fields by 1958
- Limitation: ended the holding of private property due to collectivisation, required living in communes

Education

- Mao wanted to see a major spread of education among its people and a sharp decrease in illiteracy
- National system of primary education was set up by the mid-1950s
- Literacy rates rose from 20% to 50% by 1960
- 1955—Mandarin was adopted by up to 80%
- Adoption of pinyin

Excessive repression and purges

Three Antis Campaign of 1951—to address wastes, corruption, and inefficiency

- Targeted managers, state officials, and party members—involved mass meetings at which officials and managers were denounced

Five Antis Campaign of 1952—to address industrial sabotage, tax evasion, bribery, fraud, and theft of government property

- Wanted to destroy the remnants of the capitalist class—group criticism sessions organised for employers to confess or denounce
- Some investigated were indeed guilty but it mostly became an instrument of terror and revolt
- 2-3 million killed themselves rather than face humiliation
- Caused a drop in trade with HK, rising unemployment, declining production—the campaign was concluded as a “success” by 1952

Hundred Flowers Campaign, 1957—to have widespread discussion as a precursor to push towards socialist economy

- Mao launched this campaign under the slogan of letting “a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend”
- Mao wished for free and open voicing of criticisms of the CCP and its policies—the greatest danger facing the CCP was bureaucracy
- However, some believe Mao cooked up this plan to set up a trap—either this or Mao was shocked by the extent of such criticism
- May-June 1957—government received a deluge of complaints in the form of letters and magazine articles and posters
- Democracy Wall created by Beida students

Anti-rightist Campaign, 1957—called off the 100 Flowers Campaign and re-imposed censorship

- Launched this campaign to identify and remove from positions of power members of the CCP who were not adequately leftward or communist in thinking
- 500,000 branded as rightists and subjected to persecution, ranging from imprisonment, time in labour camps, and spells in the countryside

Analysis (foreign policy):

Aimed to increase China’s international status and to seek an alliance with the USSR due to little possibility of assistance from the US

Relations with the USSR

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, 1950

- Signed in 1950 providing Soviet loans to China and assignment of Soviet technicians to assist China’s modernisation
- Terms required China to repay the US\$300 million in aid—Stalin also secured the right to explore and develop natural resources in the Xinjiang Region
- Soviets also retained Dalian and Port Arthur, resulting in 80,000 Chinese going to Russia to study
- 20,000 Russian and East European experts arrived to China for assistance, developing over 200 Chinese projects
- Important provision: promise of mutual support in the event of an attack by Japan

- Expression of generosity in 1957—Soviets agreed to assist China in nuclear development
- Treaty was abolished in 1958—Sino-Soviet Split
- Split occurred when differences led to the split, such as:
 - Unfair terms in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950
 - Korean War cost falling on the Chinese of US\$1.3 billion
 - Hungarian Uprising exposing Soviet ineptitude
 - Conference of Communist Parties portraying the CCP as the world leader of Communism
 - Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in 1958 and poor treatment
 - GLF of 1958 leading to USSR revelling in the failure as it was done despite their advice
 - Taiwan Crisis of 1958 (bombarding Quemoy) exposing Mao's fanaticism
 - Conflict over the Soviet withdrawal of aid to Albania in 1961—led to the final severance of diplomatic relations

Korean War, 1950-53

- Alliance contributed to China's involvement in the Korean War
- Assisted by Peng Dehuai's troops, North Koreans drove the UN forces back to Seoul and a truce was signed in 1953
- PRC played an active role and gained international prestige
- Helped the PLA with the problem of demobilising soldiers after the victory in the civil war by remobilising for service in Korea
- Gave the PLA experience in fighting world-class mechanised enemies
- Helped Mao and the CCP crush remnants of the GMD on the mainland
- However, resulted in the USA severing all ties with China, and extended an embargo, as well as blocking the PRC from entering the UN
- This isolation continued till 1971—Truman also denied the PRC's invasion of Taiwan in 1950 by directing their seventh fleet to prevent the attack
- The US recognised the GMD on Taiwan as the legal government of all China
- Domestically, the PRC also suffered from loss of 700,000 to 900,000 PLA casualties

Non-aligned Movement

- Participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference
- More successful at the Bandung Conference in 1955—a diplomatic triumph as Zhou Enlai won recognition
- Accorded China's leadership position in the Afro-Asian bloc and was seen as an underdog who found a viable formula to elevate its status

16. To what extent did Mao Zedong achieve his vision of a socialist state in China by 1961? (May 2014)

Introduction:

- Mao came to power as the paramount leader of China after winning the CCW in 1949
- Immediately set about forming government and a transition to a socialist state
- Define socialist state using tenets of what the Chinese define socialism as (ie Socialism with Chinese characteristics) which will link into the themes you want to address.
- Socialism in the Political Domain: Strong central government working hand in hand with the masses under the concept of "democratic centralism"
- Socialism in the Economic Domain: Sharing of all factors of production; no private ownership, command economy (hence state-ownership of factors of production)
- Socialism in the Social Domain: End of class-based society; equality

Thesis:

- Thesis: Mao and CCP (other leaders beside Mao) achieved mixed success in achieving Socialism and often times, national interests obstructed the fulfilment of the ideology.

Analysis (political):

Socialism in the political domain: Strong central government working hand in hand with the masses under the concept of "democratic centralism"

- Seen in the successful reunification campaigns by the PLA, for example, they were sent to Tibet in October 1950 and within six months had taken over Tibet.
- Mao also sought to reinforce the dominant position of the CCP using "democratic centralism".
- "Democracy" was achieved through the use of Mass Line, where policies come from the masses. While the strong central government aspect of socialism is achieved through the "centralism" where ideas would be refined within the party and policies to be followed without opposition.
- "Democratic centralism" was reinforced with the Organic law in 1949, where the overarching administrative and executive power resided with the Central People's Government Council. All key decisions were undertaken by council members such as Mao and other Yanan veterans (Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping).
- However, Mao undermined the "democratic" aspect of socialism by oppressing the opinion of the Masses.
- Seen in the 1956 100 Flowers Campaign, where Mao appeared to involve mass opinion only to have his critics suppressed during the Anti-Rightist campaign in 1957.
- Despite political oppression, it is arguable that China in 1949 needed a strong central government to provide stability following the chaos of the 1949 Chinese Civil War.
- Moreover, it is not within the Chinese psyche to have a democratic representational government since historically, China has never had a

democracy before; hence there was little incentive for CCP to deviate from China's historical trajectory.

- Therefore, the CCP was not completely successful in achieving socialism in the political domain but created an authoritarian central government, which was arguably more important for ensuring stability after the civil war.

Analysis (economic):

Socialism in the economic domain: Sharing of all factors of production; no private ownership, command economy (hence state-ownership of factors of production)

- CCP removed private ownership of land through their 1950 Agrarian Land Reform Law, which saw land being redistributed to the people.
- In 1952, the Agrarian Land Reform had redistributed to 300 million peasants.
- Moreover, Mao introduced the Advanced Producers' Cooperatives (APC), which saw units of 200-300 households sharing tools, equipment and land.
- By 1956, the socialist transformation of the agriculture was virtually complete with 97% of households in an APC.
- APCs were a success as it increased grain production from 163.9 million in 1952 to 192.6 million in 1956.
- In addition, socialist planned economy was achieved through the CCP's 1st 5-year plan (1953-1957).
- Mao focused the economy on heavy industries like steel and coal, which saw early success with steel output increasing from 4.12 tonnes in 1952 to 5.35 tonnes in 1957.
- However, in introducing socialism into the economic domain, Mao crippled China's economy during his 2nd 5-year plan - The Great Leap Forward.
- In agriculture, apart from collectivisation, Mao made Lysenkoism the official agricultural policies during the GLF. Lysenko's fraudulent methods led to a man-made famine, killing 20 million.
- In industrial output, the GLF failed due to unrealistic targets planned by the CCP. An example would be steel production, where Mao raised targets from 6.2 million metric tonnes in February to 10.7 million in August and a few weeks later he increased it to 12 million.
- Moreover, Mao introduced socialism into industries by introducing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to remove private ownership.
- This led to a rise in inefficiency due to a lack of material incentives and therefore a drop in productivity seen in the manufactured goods index for heavy industries fall from 100 in 1959 to 44.2 in 1962.
- Ultimately, socialism was reduced in the economic domain with pragmatic leaders such as Liu Shaoqi re-introducing capitalist elements such as Private-ownership under the "Three Privates, One Guarantee" policy in 1962.
- Overall, the CCP could not completely achieve socialism in the economic domain but did however, achieve control of the economy albeit crippling it in the process.

Analysis (social):

Socialism in the social domain: End of class-based society; equality

- To achieve equality, the CCP introduced the Marriage Law 1950, which made men and women equal and granted the right of divorce to women, allowing them to have autonomy over their future relationships.
- On a pragmatic note, Mao wanted to free women so that they could enter the workforce to address the labour shortage in China at the time.
- Another successful application of socialism would be CCP standardising the Chinese language.
- This is to give equal opportunity for everyone to increase the literacy level. CCP introduced a new written form of mandarin called "Pinyin" so that all speakers and writers could recognize and use.
- With Pinyin, and a national system of primary education, literacy rate rose from 20% to 50% between 1949-60.
- CCP succeeded in advocating continuous class struggle albeit at a huge human cost.
- Mao launched the 1952 5-Antis Campaign to destroy the remnants of the "bureaucratic capital class"
- Organised group criticism sessions for employers to confess their own crimes and denounce others.
- This movement became a reign of terror for the business class. As a result, there was a decline in entrepreneurship and productivity, which led to a decline in economic growth in China.
- The CCP was largely successful in pushing for socialist equality by liberating women and increasing literacy rates and successful in carrying out continuous class struggle.
- However, it had negative impacts on China's industries and many feared to take initiative. While Mao succeeded in establishing socialism through social control, China lacked social development.

17. Why did the Great Leap Forward fail to achieve Mao Zedong's expectations? (May 2005)

Introduction:

- Great Leap forward was a movement from 1958 to 1961 that saw the CCP advocate an ambitious economic plan to modernise all aspects of China's productive capacity
- To overtake Britain in 15 years—wanted a quicker path to Communism
- Characterised by unrealistic goals, lack of proper planning and foresight, and belief of quantity over quality

Thesis:

- Was motivated by Mao's personality and beliefs which intended to create a strong Communist state
- But the failings of Mao and the CCP combined with natural disasters and foreign intervention caused the GLF to be a major disaster

Analysis (expectations):

To increase agricultural productivity

- Agrarian reform law of 1950 destroyed the landlords and land was redistributed especially to the poor peasants and landless workers
- 1955—Mao pushed for collectivisation in the belief that it would increase production
- 1956—over 96% were in cooperatives
- Forced peasants to sell grain at very low prices to feed workers prior to 1957
- Removal of incentives and hence the undermining of marketing and distribution of food
- Mao was convinced that the peasants were selfish and overly concerned with their own welfare, as rural productivity failed to rise in 1957
- Meant that the workers could not be fed
- Population had exploded from 57 million to 131 million by 1960

Desire for immediate Communist society to challenge the USSR

- Nationalisation of domestic and foreign industries
- First 5-Year Plan focused on highly planned heavy industrialisation program
- Over 60% of the national capital was based in heavy industry in urban areas—84% of the population, however, was in rural areas
- Expansion of output for coal, steel and petrochemicals
- Success of the 5-Year Plan sharpened Mao's ambition when he wanted China to surpass Britain within 15 years
- Convinced that the Soviets were abandoning what he thought was real communism
- Thought Stalin was correct (forced collectivisation and rapid industrialisation)

Need for national defence

- Mao thought that war with the capitalist nations was inevitable—adding to the worry was nuclear war
- Encouraged by the Soviet launch of the ICBM and Sputnik
- Sought to develop own nuclear weapons which required development of industries

Continual revolution

- Mao worried that the end of the CCW would lead to a weakening of the revolutionary fervour of the Chinese people
- GLF was merely another mass campaign
- Believed too much in propensity for Chinese people to wish for change, revolution and action

Controlling the masses

- GLF allowed the CCP to exert control over the masses especially the peasants through the use of large scale organisations

- Creation of 26,000 large communes after 1956, affected over 99% of the peasantry
- Total control of the lives of the peasants

Analysis (failure):

Human will over material incentive

- Flawed ideology—convinced that ideological fervour and sheer will would overcome the laws of economics
- Ignored Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun who wanted material incentive and favoured machinery and fertiliser
- Focused too much on quantity rather than quality
- Sought to focus on manpower because he wanted to end China's reliance on foreign imports and technology
- Reflected his lack of understanding of the outside world—aim of autarky

Over-ambition and misguided policies

- Determined to “walk on two legs”
- Realistically should have slowed down the rate of investment in heavy industry and be directed to light industry—increase in consumer goods would have stimulated agricultural sector as it would be incentive
- Mao thought better red than expert—hindered by lack of dedicated experts and technocrats
- Intellectuals cowed into submission by the Anti-Rightist Campaign
- Mao called for decentralisation of economic management, leading to local cadres coming into responsibility
- Led to prioritisation and serious planning, leading to exaggeration of reports

Misguided farming and scientific techniques

- Agriculture: Lysenkoism—the overcrowding of crops, deep ploughing, anti-pest campaign
- Industry: focus on backyard furnaces of steel and iron
- More than half the steel produced by 1959 was useless—cutting down of trees led to ecological disaster

Peasant and worker resistance

- GLF ended all material incentives
- Closed down growth markets, all produce went to the state
- Came under cadre coercion and persecution
- Distracted from farming due to obligation to participate in gigantic projects like water control and irrigation
- Resented loss of family and personal life due to communal canteens and schools
- Resented favourable treatment of the proles who received housing, subsidised meals, provisions, welfare, state insurance
- However, the proles themselves also suffered from long working hours which led to exhaustion and accidents

- Faced food shortages

Poor allocation of resources

- China still continued to export grain to the USSR and East Europe
- Tried to show off, essentially
- Tried to aid Albania and replaced the USSR as the source of economic aid in 1961 to win over the Communist world
- Domestically though, their people were starving

Grandiose projects

- Major ostentation
- Tiananmen Square is just one example

Moral failure of leaders

- Mao was deceived by the exaggerated reports
- Reflected his isolation
- Was aware of some failures such as the backyard furnaces but did not want to dampen enthusiasm
- Peng Dehuai was not backed by at the Lushan Conference in 1959 by anyone—these other people were manipulated by Mao's suggestion of leading a guerrilla war against the CCP if he were fired

Lack of foreign support

- Due to the Cold War and Korean War, China lost all economic aid from the West and became reliant on the USSR
- Soviet Union's criticism of the GLF reflected ideological conflict and competition
- Sino-Soviet split in 1960 saw them pull out their advisers, blueprints, and the halting of aid

Foreign policy

- China was occupied with the apparently growing US threat especially with reference to Taiwan
- Had to maintain large conventional forces and diverted funds for development to nuclear projects
- Funding was wasted with attacks on Quemoy and Matsu in 1958

Natural disasters

- Flooding of the Yellow River and drought in 1959 and 1960 respectively—affected at least 55% of agricultural land

18. Assess the impact of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” on China in the period 1966-1976. (November 2007)

Introduction:

- A power struggle in which Mao attempted to assert his ideology over that of the more pragmatic figures since their rise in the aftermath of the GLF
- Was a struggle for control over the future of China
- Relegation of Mao to the second line in 1961
- Attacked the CCP and engaged the youth through Red Guards

Thesis:

- Cultural Revolution represented Mao's attempt to gain power but also an attempt to impose his ideological beliefs
- Threw China into deep chaos but the pragmatists gained the upper hand and sought to reverse the policies later on

Analysis (political):

Spread of Maoism and rise of the Mao cult

- Mao's authority was undermined by Liu and Deng in the early 1960s
- Cultural Revolution raised Mao cult to new heights—the Little Red Book, Tiananmen Square rallies, and study sessions all contributed to reinforce Mao Thought
- Maoism spread through the Red guards and their railway travel
- Chaos did lead to the gradual disillusionment of Mao

Destabilisation of the CCP leadership

- Mao deliberately sought to restore his sagging authority over the CCP as he had been relegated to the second line over the GLF fiasco
- Key leaders purged especially Liu Shaoqi and Deng—Liu died in prison
- GPCR appeared to restore his authority by 1968, but ironically new threats manifested itself in the form of Lin Biao and the rise of the PLA
- The removal of Lin Biao in 1971 led to a new power struggle between the three groups: Zhou Enlai, Gang of Four, and Hua Guofeng—became intense in the 1970s due to Mao's ailing health
- Mao's obsession with retaining control over China meant that he failed to implement a proper succession system, choosing Hua who lacked power base
- Left a power vacuum after his death

Destabilisation of the Chinese government

- Mao was concerned with the increasing bureaucracy of the government and felt he needed to check the trend
- CCP feared that it was becoming a new ruling class—needed to decentralise the government
- 1967—officials and ministers first came under Red Guard attack
- Up to 60% of CCP officials were replaced by new groups of officials who used the rhetoric of revolution for their own gains
- GPCR promoted ironically only careerism
- Not a surprise that fiscal policy failed (taxes)

- Zhou Enlai did remain responsible for some administration of China—helped shield the officials

Lack of national direction

- China drifted due to lack of positive leadership
- Mao provided no clear guidance and was out of Beijing most of the time
- Zhou was left to administer the country, and recognised that his position depended on Mao—did not assert himself strongly until Mao was going to die

Failed devolution of power to the masses

- Mao never really sincerely sought to devolve power to the people—seen in the suppression of the Shanghai people's commune in 1967
- Creation of autonomous self-governing unit would have been the logical conclusion, except Mao wanted to retain centralised control
- Created revolutionary committees which comprised of the masses too—but the PLA was rising during this time period, hence masses played a small role

Terror as social control

- GPCR reinforced the totalitarian nature of CCP rule
- Red Guard humiliated their victims, used brainwashing sessions, the laogai, and executions
- Cowed the Chinese
- Revulsion led to efforts to rehabilitate victims post-1970

Analysis (economic):

Economic disruption

- Reforms carried out by Liu and Deng had ensured steady growth after the GLF
- By 1965 agricultural production restored to 1957 levels and industrial output grew 17% from 1963-65
- Mao wanted decentralised economy with no capitalist practice—was not concerned about growth
- Wanted policy of autarky and condemned foreign links
- Forced peasants to abandon occupations to destroy capitalism, forced participation in rural industrialisation and cause rural productivity and living standards to stagnate
- Engaged in 3rd front industrialisation policy, located industrial areas far away from population centres to prevent nuclear and strategic bombing—very wasteful
- Disruption due to the decentralisation process and the replacement of managers by those unqualified, as well as violence and overly taxed transportation
- Autarky led to inefficient allocation of resources
- Annual industrial growth of 13.5% up to 1970 was deceptive—output was poor

- Mao delayed China's ability to become a real economic power
- Mao's economic measures were reversed under Zhou and Deng from 1975 onwards, allowing revival of capitalist incentive
- Recovered and enjoyed 11.9% growth in 1975
- Made efforts to open up China and accept foreign aid
- Laid the foundations for Deng's 4 Modernisations in 1978 and the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy

Analysis (social):

Impact on youths and education

- Mao wished to radicalise the youths and to develop revolutionary spirit
- The youths would play a major role in the movement
- Led to a very negative impact, with the schools being closed for a number of years
- Reflected Mao's disdain for technocrats
- Purged academics and educational personnel, leading to a serious loss of intellectual capital
- Did realise that the Red Guards were out of control by 1968
- Sent them down to the countryside, affecting over 12 million
- Loss of education was very damaging and would later lead to the disillusionment of many of these students
- Led to some taking part in the pro-democracy movement

Analysis (cultural):

Cultural sterility

- Deng and Liu were convinced that culture was not for indoctrination but also entertainment
- Were okay with foreign culture
- Mao wanted to abolish the Four Olds—old thoughts, old customs, old habits, old culture
- Promoted iconoclasm, rejecting the Chinese past and Western culture
- Persecuted many artistic figures such as Lao She
- Destroyed China's cultural heritage

Attack on the West

- Rejected Western values and culture
- Encouraged xenophobia and closed societies

Attack on religion

- Organised religions came under assault
- Forced underground since the 1950s

Analysis (military):

Rise and fall of the PLA—Lin Biao

- Lin Biao was seeking to build up the Mao cult and wanted to ride on Mao's coattails

- Promoted the politicisation of the PLA and the Little Red Book
- Promoted the “learn from the PLA” campaign
- Was in reality PLA’s opportunity to infiltrate schools and factories
- Supported the idea of politics in command and military professionals were subordinated to the political commissars—promoted egalitarianism and abolished all ranks and insignias in 1965
- Clearly attempting to raise the political profile of the PLA even though the CCP was well aware of the need to keep the PLA under tight party control—the party controls the military, not the other way round
- The PLA dominated party congress, the Central Committee and the Politburo by 1968; Lin Biao became earmarked for succession
- 1969—Mao realised Lin Biao was a threat and took steps to undermine him, sparking a failed coup and the eventual death of Lin Biao
- 1973—predominance of the PLA in key party and government bodies was gone, instead coming under the control of Deng

Analysis (foreign policy):

- Zhou, Deng, and Liu preferred diplomatic relations on a regular basis with foreign countries, especially western powers—tried to present a moderate image during the Bandung Conference in 1955
- Mao was not really interested in foreign policy but was willing to allow export of Maoism to raise their international profile in the 3rd world
- Allowed foreign ministry to be taken over by the Red Guards, hence breaking off relations with several countries and replacing China’s ambassadors with radical ones
- Attacked foreign embassies in Beijing
- No specific direction, programme or aim—hence it fizzled out with China became embroiled in domestic chaos
- Conflict with the USSR worsened during this period
- Border disputes and clashes in 1969, leading to movement of troops to the border and reorientation of nuclear weapons against each other
- Foreign policy actions isolated China—only broken when Nixon came in 1972

Pre-Exam Practice

Topic 4

Analyse the reason for, and the consequences of, China’s attempt to modernise and overcome its weaknesses in the period 1862 to 1894.

Introduction:

- 1862-1894: the Tongzhi Restoration and the Self-Strengthening Movement

Thesis:

- Domestic revolts and foreign aggression sparked the need for such movements
- Attempts to modernise led to internal power struggle, and very limited resulting reforms

Analysis (reasons):

Domestic revolts

- Succession of weak and pleasure-seeking emperors like Xianfeng led to the steady loss of the faith in the Mandate of Heaven—Confucianism justified a revolt as such
- Chinese bureaucracy was weakening and the sale and offices of sinecures contributed hugely—corruption and inefficiency
- Serious agricultural weaknesses as well as overpopulation which led to the agrarian crisis, which was worsened by natural disasters and collapsing infrastructure
- Nomadic Manchus congregated in urban areas—the Chinese Green Standard Manchus also were oppressive
- By the 19th century they had lost their fighting power and were relying on antiquated weapons
- Rise of anti-Qing sentiments since the fall of the Ming dynasty—destroy the Qing, revive the Ming
- Taiping, Nien and Moslem rebellions in the 19th century which were quite the handful for the government
- Forced to allow the provincial forces to raise private armies and collect taxes to suppress such rebellions

Foreign aggression and unequal treaties

- Chinese tributary system assumed Chinese superiority, clashing with Western ideals of sovereignty
- Chinese agrarian self-sufficiency vs. industrial West
- Chinese barbarism vs. Western due process
- Conflict over opium trade in China leading to the war
- Opium and Arrow wars were very humiliating—the Arrow war led to the capture of Beijing
- There was a desire to imitate the West to strengthen China by adopting Western technology
- Unequal treaties were a reason—China wanted them gone; the terms were
 - Indemnities
 - Removal of Chinese monopolies on business
 - Opening of trading ports
 - Loss of tariff autonomy
 - Concession of Hong Kong
 - Extraterritoriality
 - Diplomatic representation in Beijing
 - Freedom of travel

Analysis (consequences):

Political struggle in the Qing court and the provincial leaders

- Deep political struggle which saw Cixi and Prince Gong seize the throne in a power struggle in 1861
- Cixi then suspected that Prince Gong was too sympathetic to the west—undermined then dismissed him in 1884 from the Grand Council
- Replaced by the Prince Chun who was incompetent and xenophobic—would be responsible for the failure of Late Qing
- Power struggle hindered reforms
- There were too few reformists provincial leaders and they each gained in power, making the court wary of them
- Provincial leaders were still dependent on the court for honours and rewards
- They competed with each other and refused to cooperate—unable to benefit from new technologies and new industries
- Also did not support each other militarily
- Lack of sustained commitment given the weakness of the court and reformers, sapping the Qing dynasty

Limited efforts to adopt Western practices in diplomacy

- Creation of the Zongli Yamen, a foreign affairs ministry
- However, could not make decisions unless the court allowed it
- Was undermined later by Li Hongzhang who was corrupt
- Tentative acceptance of Western diplomacy—there were imperial audiences for Western diplomats but made them wait for interviews; Chinese ambassadors were condemned upon return from their missions
- Tributary system led them to wars with France and Japan—poor foreign policy

Limited effort to carry out bureaucratic and educational reforms

- Tried to restore traditional bureaucracy as they thought they were the solution
- Rebuilt schools and resumed the exams
- Some effort to reduce corruption and slow down the sale of sinecures, but failed to address low pay—the real root cause
- Failed to reform the exams—the ones exposed to Western knowledge through the Tongwen Guan and those sent to the US in 1872 failed to gain positions
- Failure to reform meant Confucian mindset stayed—hindered reforms

Limited effort at economic modernisation

- Scholar officials were wedded to the idea of a stable and frugal agrarian system when in reality it was outdated
- Agriculture was outstripped by increases in population and people failed to appreciate the possibility of industrialisation
- Guangdu-shangban—nation-owned industries and communications
- But were more for addressing the government and military needs, not economic development
- Lacked central government support
- Rejected due to job security worries and fengshui concerns

Limited effort at military modernisation

- Modern arsenals and shipyards were inferior and expensive
- Lacked cooperation, funding, consistency
- Were plagued by corruption, incompetence and fear of Western involvement
- New armies and navies lacked competent commanders and was rife with nepotism
- Lacked modern training and standardised weapons
- Led to defeats by France in 1885 and Japan in 1895
- Collapse of the tributary system and the imposition of heavier penalties
- Triggered Scramble for Concessions
- Encouraged growth of revolutionary sentiment after 1895

Why did China fail to modernise effectively between 1861 and 1894? (May 2005)

Introduction:

- Defining modernisation: adopting western institutions and inventions
- Defining effectively: defending Qing China from domestic and foreign threats and to preserve sovereignty
- 1861-1894 saw the Tongzhi Restoration and Self-Strengthening Movement—the Tongzhi Restoration was taken under the Tongzhi Emperor and saw various changes and additions such as Tongwen Guan, Zongli Yamen, Maritime Customs Service, etc., while SSM saw military modernisation
- Ultimately shown to have failed following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95

Thesis:

- Which factor was the most important? Mainly conservatism, poor circumstances and weaknesses resulting from the foreign imperialism

Analysis (political):

Reliance on the institution of the Emperor

- The Qing court was an absolute institution
- Strength of the nation was dependent on one man with no checks and balances
- Decline from the Jiaching emperor—succession of child emperors
- Emperor Tongzhi was an infant—reforms pushed by self-seeking individuals

Weakness of Qing leadership

- Split between Cixi and regent Prince Gong—who led the Tongzhi regency
- Cixi and Gong were competing for power—Gong was more sympathetic towards the Westerners and reform, while Cixi was more interested in retaining her power
- Undermined Gong by resisting reforms—Gong's powers declined after 1869 and ended after 1884
- Was very xenophobic and undermined Qing finances due to her extravagance

- Failed to support the SSM reformers fully
- Split between the court and the provincial leaders

Weakness of the SSM leaders

- Qing court did not trust the Han self-strengtheners
- Cixi played off the various reformists to keep them in check
- The reformists had to deal with the Court and the conservative establishment
- Li Hongzhang, the SSM leader, was corrupt

Lack of coordination

- The SSM leaders worked in competition, not cooperation with each other
- Trying to develop their own power bases

Weakness of Qing bureaucracy

- Scholar officials chosen based on literary exams, which did not prepare them for practical issues
- Became a nomenklatura—bloated, abusive, corrupt
- Conservatism was an effective hindrance of reform
- Domestic rebellions undermined the effective government
- Reformers mistakenly thought that the scholar-officials would revive the system

Impact of Confucianism

- Had a paralysing effect on the reforms, with excessive emphasis on harmony and obedience
- Individualism was discouraged and conformity was imposed
- Reformers affirmed Confucian values—took the wind out of their sails of reform due to failure to change mindset
- Half-way modernisation in effect; failure to appreciate just why the West was superior—because of its culture and philosophy

Analysis (economic):

Overreliance on agriculture

- Failed to modernise
- Population boom outstripped agricultural production, leading to severe economic crises
- Made worse by natural disasters and lack of infrastructure
- Hindered by lack of awareness—did not realise that industrial reforms were necessary to solve unemployment

Impact of unequal treaties

- Growing inflation due to the outflow of silver as a result of opium
- Impacted government finances deeply—were heavily reliant on taxes
- Unequal treaties such as indemnities, tariffs and quotas led to chronic shortages of capital to fund modernisation

Failure to develop entrepreneurial instinct

- Traditional Confucian mindset disdaining trade and profit incentive
- Modern industries and communications were to serve the government and the military, not for the economy

Hindrance of merchants

- SSM leaders could not raise sufficient capital and turned to merchants but hindered them with red tape and lack of a unified approach
- Hindered by corruption putting a squeeze on the merchant class
- Reinvestment of profits back into industries were uncommon as there was a fear of misappropriation
- No modern legal and administrative systems to support such growth

Traditional beliefs

- Industries and infrastructure seen as bad for fengshui
- Modernisation was a disadvantage to traditional markets as industry required foreign technicians of varying degrees of competency
- Were a major threat as perceived by the population—was resisted

Analysis (military):

Degradation of Qing military forces

- Manchu bannermen gathered in the cities and became corrupt
- Became bloated and ineffectual, unable to handle foreign and domestic threats

Unwillingness to reform

- Drain on national revenue
- Resisted modernisation effort as it affected their livelihood

Inability to modernise Qing military

- Reformers thought Western technology was the key to success but failed to consider Western civilisation
- Arsenals and dockyards run by unsuitable foreign advisers such as the Jiangnan Arsenal
- Failed to adopt Western training
- Plagued by corruption such as the diversion of funds to build the Summer Palace
- Failed to coordinate and share technology and resources

Temporary hiatus in imperialism

- Occurred post-1860s as they were satiated by their gains
- Caused complacency

Impact of wars

- The Sino-French War in Vietnam and the Sino-Japanese War in Korea, both tributaries, led to disastrous results and losses

Analysis (social):

Discrimination against the Han Chinese

- Preservation of the Han-Manchu divide by banning migration to Manchuria, intermarriage, footbinding
- Confucian hierarchy discriminated against the development of modernisation
- Disdain for commerce
- Discrimination against women

Lack of a middle class

- Discouraging the rise of economic talent, hindering the development of a Chinese middle class who could have driven the reforms with their entrepreneurial skill and capital

Lack of Western-educated personnel

- Tongwen Guan tried to develop a pool of Western-educated students but were unable to attract the West given the Confucian exam system
- Those sent to the West were accompanied by conservative minders who undermined them
- Scheme was abandoned by 1881

“The Hundred Days Reforms (1898) had no chance of success.” How far do you agree with this statement? (November 2006)

Introduction:

- Was enacted after the failure of the Sino-Japanese and Sino-French Wars
- This led to the scramble for concessions—reform movement introduced by the Guangxu Emperor who was advised by Kang Youwei
- Reform by issuance of decrees and Cixi had withdrawn from governance
- Cixi however ended the reforms as she was alarmed by it

Thesis:

- 100 Days reforms adopted a more radical programme than the failed SSM and was much faster (103 days)
- Limited chance of success given the lack of opposition by Cixi in June 1898
- However it was implemented too hastily and alienated many groups of people
- Even then, it was Cixi who brought an end to the reforms due to the plotting by the reformers to overthrow Cixi

- Possible to argue that if the reformers did not touch Cixi's position, the reforms may have been completed—Cixi launched a similar programme later on in 1901
- However the Boxer Rebellion had already sealed China's fate and the fate of the Qing Court

Analysis (leadership of the reforms):

Personality of the Guangxu Emperor

- Physically and mentally weak, and often fell into depression
- Lacked the vigour to push through reforms

Guangxu's lack of a power base

- Came to power as a child and was controlled by Cixi whose power was entrenched
- Kept a tight rein over power despite her retirement in 1889—Guangxu's insistence on personal rule led to the reforms becoming more of a power struggle
- Kept in check by her allies like head eunuch, grand councillor, imperial tutor and Manchu commander
- Relied on radical reformist scholar-officials like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao—but Kang Youwei alienated the conservative base and the traditional Confucian bureaucracy
- Overly confident and highly emotional who was an impractical dreamer
- Heterodox thinking showed in the reform measures and scandalised the Confucian scholar-officials
- Could not get his officials installed in key positions and was in a lowly position himself in the Tongwen Guan
- Growing politicisation of the educated elite which resulted due to the Sino-Japanese War was not capitalised on by the reformers

Analysis (Cixi):

- Was a political infighter who was determined to preserve her power and could be seen in her steady elimination of her rivals such as the undermining of Prince Gong
- She did allow for the Tongzhi and SSM reform movements to be carried out
- Did not immediately stamp out the 100 Days Reforms but did so because it was a threat to her own position
- Was a conservative reformer—wanted reforms within reason

Analysis (content and pace of reforms):

- Neither Guangxu nor the Chinese reformers had any direct exposure to the West and did not employ foreign advisers unlike the Japanese and may not have fully understood the reforms and their impact
- Could not cope with the massive paperwork as there was over 40 decrees during the whole period

- Issued so many mixed reforms and a whole mishmash—failed to adopt a focused and systematic approach
- China lacked a strong bureaucracy and could not really implement anything anyway

Analysis (nature of reforms):

Political

- Adoption of a constitutional monarchy and a parliament, encouraging self-government
- Right of newspapers to write freely and to streamline the bureaucracy
- Introduction of monthly budgets
- Would have undermined the Qing court though—increased power to the Han
- Would also strengthen the power of the provincial leaders who were already stronger given the SSM
- Freedom of press would stimulate growing interest
- Focus on elimination of bureaucracy would have gotten rid of sinecures, thus harming Manchus
- Budgets would undermine rampant corruption—against some interests

Education

- Exams would focus on practicalities
- Setting up of a new university and to send students abroad
- Would undermine the traditional Qing examinations which were the source of social mobility, undermining the prestige and power of scholar officials

Economic

- National cash currency introduced
- Promoted railway building, currency reform, machine making, mining, postal administration
- To promote profit—but would have strengthened the merchant class, who were considered the lowest level of the Chinese social class
- Resisted by the scholar-officials as it went against Confucianism

Military

- Demobilised surplus troops and to try to train a modernised army
- But displaced a lot of Manchu bannerman and the Green Standard Soldiers

Analysis (coup attempt):

- Was either due to Guangxu's orders or the initiative of reformers like Kang Youwei
- Unwise to seek the overthrow of Cixi—no evidence that she sought to stop the reform process despite growing dissatisfaction from the conservative bloc
- Tried to enlist the support of Yuan Shikai—big mistake as he betrayed them
- Had no military might whatsoever

“The Reforms introduced by China’s Qing dynasty between 1901 and 1911 hastened its end instead of saving it.” How far do you agree with this statement? (May 2003)

Introduction:

- After 30 years of humiliation and decline, the Qing court and Cixi launched a last-ditch attempt to reform and tried to ensure the survival of the dynasty
- After repeated defeats and disasters such as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Boxer Rebellion

Thesis:

- Late Qing Reforms were arguably too late—revolutionary sentiment had become too strong by then given the Boxer Rebellion and the ensuing Boxer Protocol
- In fact, many of the reforms actually hastened the demise of the Qing court

Analysis (political):

Manchu domination of the government

- Ascension of child emperor Puyi to the throne led to the exclusion of the Han from the administration by regent Prince Chun due to the fear of the Chinese
- This stirred up deep resentment and was picked up upon by Sun’s Alliance Party which focused on anti-Manchu nationalism and a desire for Chinese leadership

Constitutional reforms

- Believed that a source of power for the West was derived from the constitution—influx of such ideas was due to the treaty ports and the foreigners
- Constitutional outline appears in 1908 and raised hopes
- Created provincial assemblies who were however dominated by the gentry
- Delay of the creation of a national parliament by 6-9 years created discontent
- Provincial assemblies were the ones who began the 1911 revolution especially in Guangdong and Sichuan—unhappiness with the railway sellout and lack of compensation played a major role in uniting opposition groups like New Army and other provincial assemblies

Analysis (economic):

Industry

- Lack of capital and entrepreneurial spirit
- This could have possibly relieved the unemployment problem due to the agrarian crisis but a strong working class could have been a problem for the Qing power base

Commercial

- Promotion of chambers of commerce was a good move, but attempts to control them was resented

- Growing politicisation of the businessmen who organised anti-American boycotts shows the dynastic opposition
- Businessmen involved in the railway rights recovery movement—to buy back railways from foreigners

Overseas migration

- Lifted ban on migration and overseas Chinese became an important source of income
- But they were also exposed to western ideals—would be huge in supporting the Tongmenghui

Agriculture

- Failed to address the growing agrarian crisis
- Rural-urban migration worsened agricultural production
- Rural revolts grew in frequency
- Peasants really played no role in the 1911 revolution but they did contribute to the unrest

Analysis (military):

New Army

- Best trained and the best equipped army but their loyalty to the Qing was doubtful—were more loyal to officers like Yuan Shikai
- Government tried to transfer these commanders to Beijing but the Beiyang clique remained loyal to Yuan Shikai
- Government had to raise taxes to pay for the New Armies and this created discontentment
- Felt a deep sense of humiliation given the Western imperialism
- New Army was susceptible to revolutionary activities especially in Hubei and Hunan—subjected to Tongmenghui subversion
- Such subversion would spark the 1911 revolution after the accidental bomb explosion
- Attempt to undermine Yuan caused him to betray the Qing
- Only he had the power to defeat the revolutionary forces—the Qing were forced to rely on him

Analysis (social):

Education

- Led to the influx of new ideas—the end of the Confucian exams affected the gentry and the existing system as the system was the most important way to achieve social mobility
- Modern schools and overseas sending of students opened them up to revolutionary ideals
- Stimulated by the rise of translators, study groups, and publishing houses
- Revolution broke out in the cities where these facilities and movements were established

To what extent was Sun Yixian responsible for bringing about the revolution of 1911 in China? (November 2008)

Introduction:

- The Double Tenth Nationalist Revolution in China occurred as result of the Wuchang Uprising and various provincial uprisings, orchestrated by the New Armies
- Led to the toppling of the Qing dynasty and installation of the GMD as the new government

Thesis:

- Much of the reasons for the revolution were largely due to the actions and ill judgment of the Qing court and their impact on the Chinese elites
- Yuan Shikai was the most responsible for ensuring the success of the revolution through his Armies
- Sun was largely a spectator in the revolution itself but was a major agitator in his pre-1911 actions which stoked deep revolutionary sentiment

Analysis (Sun Yat-sen):

Spread of revolutionary ideals

- Credit must be given to Sun due to the spread of revolutionary sentiment—his activities stoked this enthusiasm
- Revive China Society in 1894
- Travelled widely especially in Southeast Asia, Europe and the USA to spread ideas through various mediums
- Was not that successful since there was stronger support for the pro-Qing league until 1908 amongst overseas Chinese

His ideals

- Came up with three People's Principles and a three-stage revolution
- Ideology based on nationalism, democracy and socialism gave a focus for the revolutionaries to unite over
- In reality was pretty vague and highly unlikely that people actually understood
- Main message: appealing to anti-Manchu nationalism
- Given the key role played by the provincial elites, it was unlikely that they were drawn to democracy or socialism
- Ideological disunity during the post-1991 period reflected that the three People's Principles had little appeal—would explain the lack of fundamental reforms
- 3-stage revolution was idealistic
- Clearly seen in the warlord period

Role as a revolutionary party organiser

- Was among the earliest to form a revolutionary party dedicated to the overthrow of the Manchus for a Chinese government in 1894
- Came from a peasant background with no exposure to classical education and received a western education overseas
- The existing elite were also too committed as scholar-officials to the existing system

- Formed the Revive China Society in 1894, the overseas Chinese, secret society members and Christian converts
- To be fair they were not very effective in organisation—role of Song Jiaoren and Huang Xing was the key to the creation of Tongmenghui in 1905, uniting a number of revolutionary groups
- Divided between the southern secret societies, peasants and urban poor, vs. the privileged students and officers from the Yangzi region
- Important role in spreading revolutionary sentiments especially in the New Armies
- Sun Yat-sen was autocratic and alienated his key allies in the Tongmenghui—it fell apart
- By 1910 Sun had abandoned the Tongmenghui and formed his own Revolutionary Party of China
- Main weakness of the Tongmenghui was the lack of military power as the revolutionaries were mainly junior officers—easily defeated by Yuan Shikai in 1911
- Sun was also unable to attract the support of the Confucian scholar-official
- Events of 1911 frankly depended much more on the elites

Role in getting foreign support

- Was probably the most prominent Chinese to get western recognition
- Was in part due to his western education—the kidnapping in London in 1896 raised his profile
- Was in reality unable to get much significant foreign support especially from Japan as they were determined to protect their treaty rights
- Sun was expelled from Japan and Southeast Asia due to the machinations of the Qing government in those places
- Managed to get foreign governments to stop loans to the Qing government and secure their neutrality, failed to get financial loans to support the rebels
- More likely that the Western governments recognised the level of opposition to the Qing

Role as a fundraiser

- Played a major role in raising funds especially from overseas Chinese
- Made outrageous promises but most of his money was stolen by his subordinates

Role in planning and executing uprisings

- Encouraged the use of armed uprisings but most of them were badly planned, lacked security, weapons and funds
- Secret society contacts were badly led and equipped
- Staged at least 10 failed uprisings from 1906 onwards
- Turned to people like Homer Lea in desperation
- Sun focused excessively on southern China which was where Sun was from—unrealistic because it was so far from Beijing
- Sun was not involved in the 1911 revolution—was in the US collecting money

Position as a figurehead

- Disparate revolutionary elements—only Sun had the authority to lead the revolution and was unanimously voted to be the president in December 1911

- Even Sun himself realised he had no real power—gave the seat up to Yuan Shikai

Analysis (provincial elites):

- Included the provincial gentry in the assemblies
- Were increasingly autonomous of the central government since the SSM
- Were already resentful of the exclusion of Chinese in higher levels of the government
- Unhappy with abolition of the Confucian exam system in 1905—affected their social mobility
- Assemblies were created in 1908 and there was growing unhappiness due to the stalling of the reforms
- The chambers of commerce were formed by the Qing to control the merchants but they assumed a larger political role as seen in the anti-American boycotts in 1905
- Tried to recover railway rights due to profit incentive and anti-West motive
- Lacked sufficient resources hence the Qing introduced a nationalisation policy that would poorly compensate the Han and relied on Western loans more
- Angered the Chinese

Analysis (new armies):

- Formed in 1901, had a history dating back to the SSM—autonomous military units under the provincial gentry leaders like Li Hongzhang
- Were a relatively elite force and better paid and trained
- Loyal to their commanders, not the central government
- Supported the 1911 rebellions
- Involved in the Wuchang coup—Hubei New Army had come under agitation and also feared being discovered due to the accidental bomb explosion
- Uprising was poorly planned and badly executed but the Qing forces did not hold their ground

Analysis (Yuan Shikai):

- Was the key person in the 1911 Revolution
- Controlled the New Armies and was disgruntled by the Qing court forcing him to retire in 1908
- Able to use his military to defeat the Tongmenghui, demonstrating his ability to the Qing but also secretly opened negotiations with the revolutionaries
- Assassinated key Manchus and used demands for a republic to pressurise the Qing court
- The court lost the will to resist in 1912 and abdicated
- Yuan was made president on 1st April 1912

Compare and contrast the attitudes of the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang to the First United Front (1924-1927). (May 2008)

Introduction:

- The word "attitude" refers to a state of mind or position towards an object
- CCP and GMD came together after the Sun-Joffe Pact in 1924 which united the two primarily to fight off the warlords

Thesis:

- They came together as a result of a marriage of convenience
- The Soviets under Stalin played a major role in brokering the United Front and keeping the CCP committed to it
- However, the different goals and tactics meant that they could not co-exist—the United Front was no longer in existence by 1928

Analysis:

Establishment of a national government based on their ideological beliefs

GMD

- Wanted a republican government based on Sun's Three Principles of democracy, welfare and nationalism
- Opposed to communism—much of the GMD was supported by the bourgeois

CCP

- Committed to creating a communist republic based on Marxist elements, stressing class conflict and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie
- Was ordered by the Comintern to set aside the communist revolution in favour of a national bourgeois revolution

Unifying China against the warlord

GMD

- Needed aid to expand out of Guangdong which came under Sun's control in 1923—supported the Northern Expedition to unite China

CCP

- Same

Opposing imperialism

GMD

- Had an ambivalent relationship with foreign powers and needed Soviet aid
- Would later close down the Soviet legations and broke relations with Moscow in 1928
- Were not keen on openly challenging the imperialists—were focused on the warlords

CCP

- Had also an ambivalent relationship with the foreign powers—needed Soviet aid and was very much subjected to Soviet control through the Comintern
- E.g. 1923, Stalin ordered the CCP to join the GMD or in 1926 where despite persecution, Stalin ordered them to preserve the United Front
- Not too keen to openly challenge the imperialists as they were focused on the warlords

Promoting socio-economic revolution

GMD

- Bourgeois origins and base of support—unwilling to allow socio-economic revolution and instead focused on political unification

CCP

- Forced to suspend radical goals following the birth of the First United Front
- Focused on political unification too
- Shifted focus only after 1927 when they came under immense persecution
- Adopted then radical socio-economic measures like landlord liquidation and the Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1927

Strengthening their own party

GMD

- Were weakened due to Yuan Shikai's crackdown after the 1913 elections
- Further undermined by Sun's insistence of tighter control and loyalty oaths to himself
- Began growing after the May 4th Movement where youths and the bourgeois began flocking to it—over 50,000 members by 1922
- Recognised the need for a party reorganisation

CCP

- Was only formed in 1921—attracted intellectuals and students and remained small—only 200 members
- Needed to leech onto a more established party to expand influence and numbers

Building up mass support

GMD

- Dominated by the landlords, industrialists and secret societies
- Did not really care about developing their support—bourgeois origins made them suspicious of mass movements

CCP

- Intellectuals were deeply influenced by the Russian Revolution and ideas of masses involved in political activities
- Keen on developing mass movements especially among the peasants and workers and to facilitate the advance of the GMD armies—Soviet expertise

Building up military support

GMD

- More keen on developing a credible military force with Soviet aid

- Creation of the Whampoa Military Academy—received Soviet advisers, weapons and so on—army was well trained and paid
- Commander Jiang and officers were very anti-communist, and not surprising that they wanted to destroy the CCP

CCP

- Failed to recognise that political power came out of the barrel of a gun
- Did not build a rival army—did not bother
- Only develop a Red Army after June 1927 in response to the White Terror launched by the CCP under Stalin order

To undermine each other

GMD

- Sun wanted the alliance in order to check the growth of the CCP—expected the Comintern to control the CCP
- GMD did not intend to sustain the 1st United Front beyond its usefulness
- Post-Zhongshan warship incident, Jiang and the Comintern agreed to limit the CCP involvement
- Launched the White Terror in 1927 in Shanghai to purge the Communists
- Killed over 5000 in Shanghai alone

CCP

- Very reluctant to join the GMD as the GMD were bourgeois but were ordered to by the Comintern
- CCP allegedly tried to kidnap Jiang in 1926 through the communist captain of the Zhongshan warship
- Wanted to resist the White Terror but were ordered to stay put by Stalin until 1927
- Staged armed uprisings in Jiangxi, Nanchang and Hunan in 1927 but were badly defeated

Topic 6

To what extent was “warlordism” in China defeated by Jiang Jieshi in the period 1926 to 1937? (May 2007)

Introduction:

- Warlord era began after the death of Yuan Shikai in 1926
- Jiang Jieshi came to power as the Nationalist ruler of China after the White Terror and the end of the Northern Expedition

Thesis:

- Features of warlordism:
 - Weak control by central government
 - Military cliques and factions
 - Anti-democratic policies
 - Lack of economic development
 - Lack of social development

- Lack of reforms and militarisation of society
 - Collaboration with imperialist powers
- Despite the veneer of a united China, warlordism did survive until the Communist victory in 1949

Analysis (political):

Failure to achieve united China

- Northern Expedition did not see total destruction of the warlords and unification under one central government
- Chiang had made deals with Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang to attack other warlords during the Northern Expedition
- Tolerated Zhang Xueliang who agreed a deal with the GMD after the death of his father Zhang Zuolin in 1928
- Forced to allow other warlords to retain their fiefdoms and refused to send taxes to the Nanjing government
- Had real control only over 5 provinces
- Faced repeated rebellions from the warlords—northern warlords in 1930 and Fujian in 1934
- Unable to totally wipe out the CCP as well—very similar to warlords
- Encirclement campaigns did not prevent the CCP from establishing a new base at Yanan
- Chiang lacked the military power to impose his authority over China
- Large army of 2 million but with lack of competent officers
- Only controlled 79 out of his 165 divisions but even then most were poor quality
- New Life Movement was described as Confucian fascism—was met with huge resistance
- Little success given poorly planned programmes and undue interference in lives

Authoritarian rule over China

- Nanjing government was a one party dictatorship where Jiang dominated due to the militaristic nature of his government which was intolerant of democratic ideals
- Jiang and the elites who came from the bourgeois and landlord classes were deeply resistant towards democracy and had no interest in getting support from the peasants and workers
- Had the trappings of a democracy but power was in reality concentrated in the hands of Yuan Shikai
- Terror used to suppress opposition e.g. the Investigation and Statistics Bureau by Dai Li

Party factionalism

- Constant power struggles
- Divided as Jiang's party leadership was repeatedly challenged by Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei
- Wang formed his own breakaway government in 1931 and Hu Hanmin would challenge Jiang's leadership

Analysis (economic):

Failure to promote economic reforms

- GMD was a bourgeois party filled with businessmen, gentry, landlords etc.
- Jiang himself was backed by the Soong family and had access to the financial and business world
- Also backed by the Green Gang—led to corruption and abuse
- Economic development focused on the coastal cities, not the interior

Failure to develop agriculture

- No reforms—GMD was dominated by landlords
- Low productivity given the reliance on traditional methods, overpopulation and lack of investment capital
- Tenancy, moneylending, tax were major issues which contributed to the agrarian crisis

Failure to develop industries

- Tried to expand industries but faced hindrances due to lack of capital and the war
- Most projects directed towards military needs, not economic growth

Failure to develop communication

- Failed to develop a strong transportation network due to Western control and lack of capital
- Focused efforts to support the Encirclement Campaigns against the CCP

Failure to stabilise financial situation

- Reckless printing of money and use of deficit spending
- 50% of the state revenue was for military purposes—unproductive

Analysis (social):

Neglect of social services

- Did not want to promote radical social changes—would undermine the elites and also due to insufficient resources given instability
- Failed to focus on education and welfare—did not promote women's rights

Analysis (foreign policy):

Revision of unequal treaties

- Ambivalent relationship with the imperialists—Soong family had close ties with the US
- Was a basis of support for the regime and required US aid
- Did want a gradual revision of the treaties and used diplomacy especially through the Soong family to lobby US
- Managed to get the tariff autonomy restored and the British returned a number of territorial concessions
- Unequal treaties not totally abolished until WW2

Failure to defend China

- Was unwilling to resist the Japanese invasion as Chiang was more focused on the CCP—self-interest was evident

- Began with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, then the attack on Shanghai in 1932 and then invasion of Renhe and Hebei in 1933
- Culminated in the Sino-Japanese War in 1937-45

“Jiang Jieshi’s rule in China between 1927 and 1937 betrayed the Guomindang’s ideals.” To what extent do you agree with this statement? (May 2013)

Introduction:

- Was the period of the Nanjing Decade
- Three People’s Principles of Democracy, Nationalism, and People’s Livelihood

Thesis:

- Did achieve considerable progress in promoting nationalism and some progress towards democratic reconstruction but failed miserably to provide economic and social reform to better the livelihood of China’s population

Analysis (nationalism):

To unite the Chinese and the oppose imperialism especially the unequal treaties to attain independence and equality of China among nations

Failed to create a united and centralised administration over China

- Controlled only 5 provinces outright in China and had to make deals with the “moderate” warlords during the Northern Expedition to expedite his claim to national leadership
- Sacrificed national unity for political expediency
- Each warlord area had their own army and taxation system, draining resources from the national government
- The warlord rebellions were met with appeasement not destruction

Failed to create an honest bureaucracy

- Corruption was endemic since imperial times
- Very little effort to crack down on corruption—the Control department investigated 70,000 cases and prosecuted only 13
- Corruption existed in Jiang’s family itself

Wanted to present the image of China as a modern country

- New Life Movement or Confucian Fascism
- Return to the hierarchical Confucian system to maintain unity
- Wanted a rejection of May 4th values but ultimately failed as it was too intrusive for the people

Tried to remove the unequal treaties but could not do it completely

- The GMD came to power due to the support of the West themselves during the Northern Expedition
- The GMD had close ties with the foreigners

- Resorted to a gradual and diplomatic approach to treaty revision, downplaying the revolutionary anti-imperialism
- Sent diplomats overseas and cultivated the China lobby
- Tariff autonomy was indeed restored in 1928 while the UK gave up many concessions from 1927 to 1929
- Got international rejection of Manchukuo
- Did not get full abolition of the treaties until 1943 due to WW2 pressures

Failed to defend China from Japanese imperialism

- Was more concerned with the CCP and refused to resist the Japanese until 1937
- Failed to build up a strong military backed by industry to fight a modern war
- Lack of competent officers, understaffed armies and poor quality of equipment and divisions
- No multi-arm army, no navy, no air force
- Lacked a strong industrial base

Analysis (democracy):

To create 5 equal and separate branches of government—favouring a strong state over individual rights—three stages of revolution in 9 years

Was too deeply influenced by Confucianism

- Was deeply autocratic by nature and could not tolerate disagreement or accept advice—saw politics as a zero-sum game
- China had no prior tradition of democracy
- Jiang was unlikely to be even inclined towards democracy

Jiang's government was highly unrepresentative

- 13 out of 17 key posts held by people from Zhejiang which was his home province

Did adopt an electoral system beginning with village heads in 1929

- Was planning to extend to the national level with the National Assembly in 1936 but was delayed till 1948—allegedly due to WW2
- Post-WW2 revealed that Jiang allowed such democratic measures only due to foreign and US pressures as well as declining Civil War fortunes

Usage of terror

- The Blue Shirts Society to enforce his dictatorial rule
- Arrests, tortures, executions, assassinations
- Targeted repression at universities, schools, the media
- Crushed the May 4th Movement
- White Terror in 1927—first example

Analysis (people's livelihood):

Accepted capitalism but opposed deep income inequality—wanted to equalise land but opposed land expropriation; capitalist development but under government controls; protectionism, regulation of capital, and resisting foreign imports

GMD main political base was the urban bourgeoisie and the landlords

- Main alliances lay with the Shanghai business class represented by the Soong family and the secret societies led by the Green Gang
- Clearly against policies that would rock the boat and benefit the working class and peasants

Failed to carry out major agricultural reform

- Did not invest to promote technological improvements—did try to establish cooperatives, provide microcredit and reduce taxes and levies
- But were opposed by local village elites
- Landlordism, usury and tenancy were major banes
- Failed to address natural disasters like the 1929 drought and the 1931 flooding
- Government did not try to equalise the land and landlordism still existed—was only solved by forced expropriation of land in 1950

Did promote industrialisation which benefitted the GMD base

- Much of the industrial development took place along the coast and treaty ports, such as Shanghai
- Did see impressive growth which was almost like Japan's
- By 1937 it could produce the major branches of basic modern industrial production
- More than 50% were manufactured or partly so—e.g. textile industry
- Most industries were in Chinese hands, not Western—by 1931 foreign firms were a minority
- By 1933 only 1/5 of the firms were owned by foreigners—the shareholders were often Chinese
- Did have a degree of self-sufficiency
- Chinese banks introduced and broke the monopoly of the foreign banks by 1937

Neglected China's inland provinces

- Failed efforts at import substitution due to poor quality of Chinese goods and the impact of the Great Depression
- Imports flooded in due to the US purchase of silver, leading to a shortage in China which was relying on the silver dollar—led to costlier exports
- 2 million factory workers with low pay, long hours and low safety—could not strike due to the Green Gang

Fiscal chaos was due to corruption and international circumstances

- Heavy reliance on deficit spending and printing of money—connected to Jiang's family
- GMD army used up over 50% of the state revenue
- Attempt to replace the weak silver dollar with fabi paper currency but still lacked backing
- Undermined due to the Great Depression

Failed to develop the communication system, affecting the lives of the people economically

- A postal and bus network had been developed and there was an increase in railway construction, but was primarily to support the GMD encirclement campaigns

Devoted much resources to the military—social services were underfunded

- Neglected medical care—50% of children died before 5, due to poor sanitation and shortage of medical services
- Failed to devote sufficient resources to education—more went to secondary education which catered to the bourgeoisie
- Failed to stamp out vices especially opium

Failed to emancipate women

- Due to the deeply patriarchal beliefs of Chinese men and Jiang
- Sought to destroy the feminist ideas forwarded by May 4th
- Limited impact of laws granting rights to women due to traditional beliefs
- Made no effort to encourage entry into the labour force

Topic 10

“Government by mass campaigns.” How true is this criticism of Mao Zedong’s approach to government in the period 1949 to 1976? (November 2003)

Introduction:

- Defining government as the act of governing, especially the control and administration of public policy
- Mao as the leader of China after 1949 tried to create a socialist state and to adopt communist ideology

Thesis:

- Mass campaigns were organised by the government when they used mass movements consisting of people of various social groups to support the government’s goals
- Gelled well with Mao’s belief in the permanent revolution, which called for constant change in order to enable the Chinese society to become a Communist utopia
- Largely true but it did not completely govern his governance consistently due to influence of pragmatists like Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping who used rational bureaucratic government

Analysis (political policies):

To ensure CCP dominance

- Determined to wipe out political threats to their existence and hence reinforce Mao’s desire to ensure his personal power and dominance
- Organisation into mass movements—a form of social control
- Three and Five Antis, anti-rightist campaigns, all used to control domestic enemies
- Anti-domestic counterrevolutionaries mass campaign directed against the GMD and the 5 antis was against the bourgeoisie

- Mass movements also directed at the CCP to prevent ossification and creation of a nomenklatura—the purge and purify through the 3 antis, the 4 cleanups, and the Cultural Revolution
- Enforced by Maoist cult of the individual and propaganda especially during the Cultural Revolution
- Leaders like Zhou, Liu and Deng preferred rational leadership
- Parallel CCP and state hierarchy where the top CCP leaders also controlled the government
- China was administered using the provincial system and the hierarchies extended to the villages
- Social control through the usage of communes in the rural area and work units in the urban areas
- Infiltrated all mass organisations, public bodies, educational systems, PLA etc.
- Tight control through thought reform in the Laogai
- E.g. persecution of 500,000 people in the anti-rightist campaign in 1957

Analysis (economic policies):

Creating a self-sufficient and prosperous communist economy which was industrialised

- Seen in the mass mobilisation of manpower in the Great Leap Forward
- “Walking on two legs” to achieve both industrial and agricultural progress at the same time
- Was a major failure especially in the rural sector—led to a massive famine and overall national income fell
- Resumed during the Cultural Revolution where Mao encouraged Red Guards to take over existing economic personnel
- Attempts to adopt more rational approaches were seen in Liu and Deng, after 1961 and 1972—laid the basis for growth and sought to promote foreign aid, technology transfer, etc.

Analysis (military policies):

To ensure control of the military

- Mao was influenced by his experiences of people’s war prior to 1949 and argued that the PLA should be close to politics
- Was more obvious with the rise of Lin Biao after 1959—politicised the PLA and ironically undermined CCP control of the PLA
- Little Red Book in the PLA sessions, “learn from the PLA” campaign
- “Politics in command” which aided the PLA and Lin’s infiltration of key schools, institutions, etc.
- Led to the dominance of the PLA, peaking in 1969
- Did not always rely on the use of mass movements
- PLA under Peng Dehuai sought to professionalise the army and subject it to strong party control prior to 1959
- To modernise it and reduce numbers, acquire modern weapons, improving training and undermining involvement in politics

- Was resumed by Deng in 1971, leading to a drop in PLA representation in the highest government and party echelons

Analysis (social policies):

Education as a means of social control

- Mao mobilised students and youths to get involved in politics, rather than educate themselves—better red than expert
- Used it to undermine his political opponents in the CCP
- Suspended schools and universities and led to the Red Guard movement
- Zhou and Liu favoured the stable educational system
- Reflected in the early 1950s and the post 1968 era
- Accelerated in 1975 under the 4 Modernisations
- Vital need for an educated people to ensure economic development

Control over religion

- Mass movements like “resist America and aid Korea” campaign in the early 1950s to expel foreigners especially the missionaries
- Used the Red Guards

Analysis (cultural policies):

Promotion of revolutionary ideals

- Promoted especially during the Korean War period to attack westernisation
- “Four Olds” of culture, habits, customs, thoughts
- Red Guards as the vanguard

Analysis (foreign policy):

Promotion of a revolutionary foreign policy

- Encouraging such a policy thought it had no positive programme; violence was an end to themselves
- Thought the cultural revolution could be exported especially in 3rd world countries—fuelled also by the enmity between China and western imperialists
- Mass movements to support China in their conflict with the USSR especially after 1960
- Red Guards to attack embassies of “hostile” countries
- Replacement of ambassadors with radical ones
- Zhou adopted instead regular diplomatic relations
- Downplayed the radical image
- 1955 Bandung Conference involvement
- Reopening of ties with the US in 1972
- Opening up China to aid with the 4 Modernisations

Analyse the impact on China of the “Four Modernisations” adopted after the death of Mao Zedong. (May 2007)

Introduction:

- Mao died in 1975—aimed at creating a modern Chinese state by 2000 and this aim of his had to be reassessed due to realities
- Demands of political democracy led to student unrest and government repression

Thesis:

- Four Modernisations were introduced in 1975 which targets agriculture, industry, defence, science and technology
- Sought to make China a great economic power by 2000 which was to be achieved by opening China up
- Economy had to develop on non-ideological, utilitarian lines and a willingness to embrace capitalist methods

Analysis (political):

Led to tension within top CCP leadership

- Disagreement over the extent and pace of the 4 Modernisations
- Tension between hardliners and pragmatists
- Aged oldtimers were retired by 1987 but they retained influence through their protégés like Li Peng and Yang Shangkun
- Pressure from the hardliners drove Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to resign from 1987 onwards

Unchallenged CCP primacy

- CCP refused to move on the issue of their primacy
- Reflected in the 4 Cardinal Principles which rejected the demands for the 5th modernisation: keeping to the socialist road, keeping to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought, keeping a democratic dictatorship, and ensuring primacy of the CCP
- Limited tolerance of democratic movements, e.g. the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square incident
- Ended the 4 Big Rights

End of mass movements and undermining of revolutionary fervour

- Depoliticisation of the masses to redirect energies towards economic development
- Led to a growing pool of politically apathetic people who were more attracted to getting rich

Undermining the Mao cult

- Demystification of Mao—removal of portraits, the Little Red Book, etc.
- 70% good 30% bad

Undermining of Communism

- Downplaying Communist ideology and renaming it socialism with Chinese characteristics
- CCP's mandate was based on ideology—led to growing challenges

End of the purge of the CCP

- Rehabilitation of those purged by Mao
- Over 2 million had been affected
- Added to growing disillusionment with Maoism

Analysis (economic):

Economic disparities within China

- Willing to tolerate some inequality
- Encouraged provincial and regional officials to have greater autonomy
- Benefitted the coastal provinces especially those with the SEZs
- Inland provinces remained backwards—lacked utilities, schools and healthcare
- Sharp disparity between rural and urban income—by 1990, urban incomes were twice that in the rural areas

Agricultural developments

- Priority given to agriculture in the earlier part of the Deng period
- Broke up teams, brigades, communes
- Household responsibility system
- Move towards private ownership
- Significant growth in production and rural income till the mid-1980s
- Steady decline in agriculture due to rapid urban growth after 1984
- Affected by decrease in government support for agriculture due to collapse of communes and neglected investment in water control, irrigation, machinery etc.
- Less than 50% worked in agriculture by the 1990s

Industrial developments

- Joint investment with foreign and overseas Chinese companies
- Opening of a stock market to raise capital
- Shift away from state enterprises to private or mixed enterprises
- Managers had greater autonomy to set wages, prices, or reinvest profits
- Focus on light industries using western techniques
- SEZ and export oriented industries based on FDI
- Sharp rise in foreign trade
- Special privileges
- Multiplier effect and trickled down wealth

Problems

- Growing worker unhappiness was major
- Loss of the iron rice bowl and the undermining of state enterprises as well as early retirement due to influx of young workers
- Unemployment, slow rise in wages and harsh working conditions

Corruption

- Looser controls and materialism—corruption soared
- Smuggling, speculation and currency manipulation were very common
- CCP cadres and children often involved

Inflation and national deficit

- Soaring inflation was sparked off by lifting of price and wage controls
- Was up by 20% in the late 1980s
- Deficit kept rising

Public resentment

- Especially among the intellectuals, workers, civil servants

Analysis (social):

Rise of materialism

- “To get rich is no sin”—8 bigs, 3 highs
- Social ills like prostitution, drugs

Higher education

- Renewed emphasis on higher education especially on science and technology
- Gifted education, expansion of universities with rigorous competition examinations
- Growing class of educated young people, unable to find jobs in the 1980s due to inability of the economy to absorb them
- Deep resentment
- Disaffection due to poor living conditions, low pay, rising inflation

Tolerating religious freedom

- Allowed official representation
- Restoration of buildings
- Christianity in particular grew

Population control

- China recognised need for population control
- One child policy
- Growth of infanticide against females
- Social problem of little emperors

Weakening social supports

- Neglect of social services especially health and primary education in rural areas
- Need to divert money to support the Four Modernisations, e.g. imposition of fees for primary schools with deterred parents
- Loss of the iron rice bowl as well

Cultural revival after the GPCR

- Relaxing of the criteria of culture
- Influx of foreign and western influences—brief attempt to condemn this but campaign was withdrawn
- Rise of critical material like scar literature—attack on the GPCR

Analysis (military):

- Reduction in size and adoption of modern training and technology
- Steady withdrawal from politics
- Strong party control

Analysis (foreign policy):

Passive international position

- Not very dogmatic about ensuring strong international presence despite a P5 seat
- More focused on domestic
- No real clout to project power anyway

End of ideological influence over foreign policy

- Deng shied away from supporting national liberation movements in the 3rd world after 1976
- Establishing regular diplomatic relations with national governments
- Downplayed relation with the 3rd world

Improvement in relations with the USSR

- Originally Deng continued hardliner approach
- Gorbachev's unilateral concession would soften this attitude by 1986
- Visit in 1989
- Enabled diversion of spending back to the economy

Relations with the West

- Significant warming of ties under Deng especially in 1978
- Deng's visit to the US in 1979
- Open Door Policy and human interactions between the Chinese and Americans