

## The Chinese Civil War:

### **1. THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR**

#### **1.1 THE IDEA OF A STRONG AND UNITED CHINA**

- The concept of a centralised and powerful China was deeply embedded into the Chinese psyche
- By the end of the Qing dynasty<sup>1</sup>, China had become backwards and badly fragmented
- There was a deep desire by the CCP<sup>2</sup> and GMD<sup>3</sup>
- The CCP saw the Chinese Civil War as a war of liberation

#### **1.2 IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS BETWEEN GMD AND CCP**

- The CCP
  - It was backed by the Soviet Union
  - It was anti-imperialist but the Soviets were imperialists themselves
  - Its policies favoured the peasantry and workers
  - It wanted to transform the economy to a communist one
  - It claimed to favour people's democracy
  - However power was actually centralised in the CCP's hands
- The GMD
  - It was backed by Western powers (the United States)
  - It was anti-imperialist but needed support from the imperialists
  - Its policies favoured the elite and upper classes (bourgeoisie)
  - It promoted a capitalistic system
  - It claimed to be democratic
  - However the system still remained an authoritarian one

#### **1.3 HISTORY OF DISTRUST AND BETRAYAL**

- The 1<sup>st</sup> United Front collapsed after Chiang Kai-Shek / Jiang Jieshi<sup>4</sup> launched the White Terror in 1927 and brutally crushed the CCP
- The 2<sup>nd</sup> United Front collapsed after the New 4<sup>th</sup> Army Incident in 1941 where GMD forces attacked CCP forces

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<sup>1</sup> 清朝

<sup>2</sup> CCP = Chinese Communist Party / 中国共产党

<sup>3</sup> GMD = Guo Min Dang / 国民党

<sup>4</sup> 蒋介石

## **1.4 THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION**

- The Soviet Union
  - It promoted world revolution
  - It sought to protect Josef Stalin's domestic position
  - It exerted very tight control over the CCP in the 1920s
  - It adopted many erroneous policies which proved to be disastrous for the CCP
- The United States
  - It greatly misjudged the CCP
  - Wishful thinking that it could transform the CCP
  - This only encouraged the GMD to seek to fully destroy the CCP

## **1.5 THE IMPACT OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR**

- The brunt of the war fell on the GMD as it was the legitimate government
- The CCP victory in the Chinese Civil War was greatly influenced by World War II
- World War II discredited the legitimate GMD government which suffered heavy losses
- The GMD suffered grievous losses and undermining of its legitimacy due to poor policies
- The CCP took advantage of the War which stopped the continuation of the GMD encirclement campaigns
- Yan'an<sup>5</sup> was protected, allowing the CCP to expand itself and the Red Army

## **1.6 THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS**

- The United States pressurised both factions to negotiate to form a coalition government and naively thought that both sides were willing to compromise
- American ambassador Patrick Hurley was unduly sympathetic to the CCP
- An agreement was reached in January 1946 – however neither side intended to keep it
- The CCP still had a functioning army (the Red Army<sup>6</sup>) and still controlled territory – this was not addressed in the agreement
- The CCP benefited from American pressure as it allowed it time to consolidate so that it could fight a conventional war

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<sup>5</sup> 延安

<sup>6</sup> 红军

## **2. REASONS AND IMPACT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION**

### **2.1 THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION**

#### **Stalin's aims**

- Stalin wanted to ensure the security of the Soviet Union
- He also sought to check the possibility of a revived China and Japan
- The Soviet Union had to reconstruct its heavily damaged economy and society after World War II
- Hence it needed to exploit Manchuria<sup>7</sup> and its resources
- Stalin wanted to assert his continued role as the leader of the communist world
- However he opposed Maoism which he feared may rival his leadership

#### **Stalin's deal with Jiang over Manchuria**

- Stalin invaded Manchuria in 1945
- He agreed to withdraw after a deal was made
- Stalin was allowed to strip Manchuria of its economic resources, taking over \$2,000,000,000 (in 1945 standards) of goods and equipment
- This would later hamper China's industrial recovery
- Mao Zedong<sup>8</sup> got Stalin to delay his withdrawal so that the CCP could deploy in Manchuria

#### **Military aid**

- Soviet advisers taught the Red Army the use of modern weapons and large-scale warfare
- The switch from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare
- The Soviets got Japanese POWs<sup>9</sup> to train the Red Army and help develop an air force
- The Soviets also handed over confiscated weapons from the Japanese to the CCP

#### **Diplomatic aid**

- The Soviet Union did not actively support the CCP in the international arena
- The Soviets remained as only an onlooker during the Civil War itself

#### **Stalin's pressure on Mao**

- Stalin kept trying to persuade Mao to compromise with Jiang as he did not want to provoke further American intervention in the region
- Mao ignored Stalin as he was on the verge of victory and was able to defeat the GMD forces

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<sup>7</sup> 满洲国

<sup>8</sup> 毛泽东

<sup>9</sup> POWs = Prisoners of War

## **2.2 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

### **American aims under President Harry Truman**

- American economic interests in China was relatively small
- The United States was originally more keen on promoting a coalition government
- There was a very strong pro-GMD China Lobby in the United States
- As Cold War tensions grew, there was growing support for containment to prevent the spread of communism worldwide

### **Military aid**

- The GMD used American airpower to airlift 500,000 GMD troops to Manchurian cities to preempt the CCP forces there (the CCP had already seized the countryside by this point)
- 50,000 American Marines were sent over to take over the vital seaports – this enabled the GMD to access to imports
- Growing anti-Americanism in China forced the United States to withdraw their troops
- The United States imposed an arms embargo in hopes of forcing Jiang to accept a compromise
- However American intervention actually harmed the GMD and helped the CCP

### **Economic aid**

- The United States provided a total of \$3,884,000,000 in aid (by 1945 standards)
- Much of the aid was spent paying for American weapons to be supplied to the GMD forces
- Additional economic aid approved by Congress only arrived in 1948 where it was way too late

### **3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE (1928 – 1945)**

#### **3.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JIANGXI SOVIET**

- The GMD tried to destroy the CCP in the 1927 White Terror
- Isolated base areas called 'soviets' were founded and located at border areas
- Mao fled to the Jiangxi Soviet<sup>10</sup> with Zhu De<sup>11</sup> and Peng Dehuai<sup>12</sup>
- Due to geographical isolation from the CCP leadership, Mao adopted very independent policies

#### **3.2 MAO'S IDEAS ON POLITICAL MOBILISATION**

##### **Overview**

- Mao's ideas were not accepted by the CCP leadership who were controlled by the Soviets
- The CCP leadership was obsessed with the Soviet urban uprising model led by workers
- The CCP leadership preferred conventional warfare
- The CCP ordered many failed attacks from 1928 to 1930 and suffered heavy losses
- Most of Mao's policies were made based on pragmatic reasoning

##### **Emphasis on political aims and indoctrination**

- The goal of the communists was to introduce complete social and political justice
- Mao sought to play down the communist ideology
- Instead Mao emphasised the united front among the classes against a common enemy
- Mao focused on Chinese nationalism by inciting hatred against foreigners e.g. the Americans

##### **The mass line and the use of propaganda**

- The CCP gave the appearance of seeking out popular will and incorporating public opinion into policy making (the mass line)
- Both genders allowed to vote but rich people were not allowed to
- Introduced the idea of mass campaigns and mobilised the masses for political action
- Mao used propaganda extensively in the form of newspapers, posters etc

##### **Land reforms**

- Mao adopted a moderate land policy to ensure class unity
- Mao targeted only the pro-Japanese and exploitative landlords – their land was redistributed to all the other peasants
- Mao abolished tenancy and cancelled debts
- Rich peasants were allowed to keep some of their lands

##### **Women's rights**

- Mao banned arranged marriages and stressed monogamy

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<sup>10</sup> 中华苏维埃共和国

<sup>11</sup> 朱德

<sup>12</sup> 彭德怀

### **3.3 MAO'S IDEAS ON GUERRILLA WARFARE**

#### **Conditions for guerrilla warfare**

- Mao recognised that guerrilla warfare was not universally applicable
- China had the right conditions for guerrilla warfare:
  - Vast areas of land: the communist guerrillas benefitted from their mobility
  - Backward and agrarian society: there was much unrest amongst the peasants
  - Weak central control: China was still dominated by the warlords

#### **The importance of protracted war**

- Mao's problem was not ending the war quickly – it was how to keep the war going on
- The GMD was militarily superior and much stronger than the CCP
- Thus the CCP needed a protracted war to steadily weaken its enemy
- Mao used the peasants to slowly surround the urban areas
- This reflected the siege-like nature of protracted war
- Protracted war v. attritional warfare

#### **Relations with the peasants – the people's army**

- Mao recognised the need to win over the peasants
- Mao relied on the peasants for soldiers, supplies, intelligence and logistics
- The peasants had to be convinced that they were fighting for their own socio-economic interests
- Mao conducted literacy programmes and trained the peasants – while indoctrinating them
- Mao introduced the Three Rules and Eight Remarks<sup>13</sup> – this was to ensure the proper behaviour of soldiers towards the masses

#### **Political control of the Red Army**

- Power grows out of the barrel of a gun<sup>14</sup>
- Mao ensured that the Army was under strict control of the party
- Use of political officers attached to army units to ensure firm party control
- Strong use of political indoctrination which surpassed even military training

#### **The importance of base areas**

- Located in remote border areas of provinces
- This allowed the CCP to build up its military and political infrastructure

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<sup>13</sup> 三大纪律八项注意

<sup>14</sup> 枪杆子里面出政权

### **Guerrilla tactics**

- Mao organised small lightly armed units of men to carry out guerrilla attacks
- The units were to be lightly armed and lightly equipped to ensure they could move constantly
- The units were to subject the enemy to harassing attacks constantly
- The guerrilla units attacked weakly defended areas such as railroads, supply stores etc
- They were also used to lure enemies deep into communist territory and encircle them

### **The three stages of revolutionary warfare**

- Mao recognised that guerrilla tactics could not win the war and would eventually be subordinated to conventional warfare
- The first stage would be when the enemy is on the offensive – guerrilla tactics used
- The second stage would be when the enemy is in a strategic stalemate
- The third stage would be when the communists launched the counteroffensive
- The Red Army would be used to carry out conventional warfare

### **Major Communist leaders**

- Lin Biao (Military)
- Nie Rongzhen<sup>15</sup> (Military)
- Zhu De (Military)
- Liu Bochong<sup>16</sup> (Military)
- Liu Shaoqi<sup>17</sup> (Administrative)
- Zhou Enlai<sup>18</sup> (Negotiations)

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<sup>15</sup> 聂荣臻

<sup>16</sup> 刘伯承

<sup>17</sup> 刘少奇

<sup>18</sup> 周恩来

### **3.4 CCP GUERRILLA OPERATIONS FROM 1928 TO 1945**

#### **The Jiangxi Soviet**

- The first stage of revolutionary warfare
- Jiang launched 5 extermination campaigns against the communists through the 1930s
- The first four failed due to the effectiveness of Mao's guerrilla strategy
- As the GMD forces advanced, the local troops consolidated control of the rear – this reduced the amount of territory under communist control
- The GMD forces imposed a tight blockade around the Jiangxi Soviet and cut off supply lines
- By late 1934, the Jiangxi Soviet was no longer under Mao's control as the CCP leadership (the 28 Bolsheviks) had taken over
- The 28 Bolsheviks adopted positional (conventional) warfare rather than guerrilla warfare
- The communists were thus soundly defeated
- Mao claimed that his guerrilla warfare strategy would have avoided this outcome
- The Jiangxi soviet decided to break out to embark on the Long March to Yan'an

#### **The Long March**

- The journey covered 9,600 km
- The communists encountered many skirmishes and few survived till the end of the March
- Mao managed to recapture power and resumed guerrilla warfare tactics

#### **The Yan'an period**

- The second stage of revolutionary warfare
- At this time, Japan invaded China (World War II – Sino-Japanese War)
- The GMD bore the brunt of the Japanese offensive
- Hence Jiang did not launch any major campaign against the communists
- The communists only launched two major battles against the Japanese in 1937 and 1940
- Both battles saw limited success

### **3.5 EVALUATION OF THE CCP'S GUERRILLA OPERATIONS**

- Mao recognised that only the creation of the Red Army which was capable of conventional warfare could defeat the GMD forces
- It was due to fortunate events that the CCP was saved from destruction
- The Japanese invasion in 1937 prevented the GMD from launching further extermination campaigns and weakened the GMD forces



## **4. THE GMD AND CCP STRATEGIES AND THE COURSE OF THE WAR**

### **4.1 THE GMD STRATEGY**

- The GMD possessed considerable advantages in 1945 at the start of the war
- The GMD was recognised as the legitimate government globally
- Jiang decided to make Manchuria the centrepiece of his strategy – this was a mistake
- Jiang expected American support in his campaign against the communists
- Jiang should have consolidated the area south of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze River<sup>19</sup>

### **4.2 THE CCP STRATEGY**

- The CCP troops were located mainly in northwestern China
- Mao originally wanted to seize the cities e.g. Shanghai<sup>20</sup>
- However Stalin prevented them from doing so as he wanted to broker a deal with Jiang himself
- Manchuria was their main target – they had a better chance of defeating the GMD there
- The GMD and CCP forces in Manchuria were more evenly matched
- Manchuria was more developed in industries and was close geographically to the Soviet Union
- Their main strategy was based on Mao's principles
- The CCP originally adopted guerrilla warfare but shifted to conventional warfare in 1948
- The CCP tried to stir up urban uprisings but had little support in doing so
- The Soviet model thus would have clearly failed here in China

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<sup>19</sup> 长江 / 扬子江

<sup>20</sup> 上海

## 4.3 THE COURSE OF THE WAR

### The Manchurian campaign – the GMD in Manchuria

- The GMD forces had to be airlifted to the cities by the Americans in 1946
- The 500,000 GMD forces in Manchuria were Jiang's best troops
- However these troops came from other parts of China and were not well received in Manchuria
- The GMD forces took over the urban areas
- However they were defensive and remained within the cities
- The GMD administrators there abused their power – this destabilised the Chinese economy
- Jiang's strategy was a mistake given the CCP's control of the countryside and Soviet support

### The Manchurian campaign – the CCP in Manchuria

- Much of Manchuria was rural and thus was suitable for guerrilla warfare
- The CCP rapidly moved into the countryside after the Soviets withdrew
- The CCP forces were led by Lin Biao<sup>21</sup>
- Lin Biao integrated many different ethnic groups into his army, including the local Manchurians
- Lin Biao subjected his forces to tough training – this prepared them for conventional warfare

### The course of the Manchurian campaign

- Lin Biao was defeated when using set piece frontal attacks battles initially in 1946
- The CCP forces were not yet prepared for a full-scale war in 1946
- The CCP forces instead surrounded and cut off the GMD cities' communications and supply lines
- The CCP was able to undermine the GMD's airpower advantage by operating during winter
- Lin Biao defeated the GMD forces in Manchuria in the Liaoshen campaign in 1947 to 1948
- The GMD lost 400,000 troops in Manchuria – only 140,000 troops escaped
- Manchuria thus became a vital communist base for food, goods and supplies

### The course of the Huai-Hai campaign

- The Huai-Hai campaign<sup>22</sup> was the turning point of the war
- The GMD forces focused on attacking Shandong, a key communist stronghold
- Areas targeted were Shandong<sup>23</sup>, Anhui<sup>24</sup>, Henan<sup>25</sup> and Jiangsu<sup>26</sup>
- The GMD commanders had **personal grievances and refused** to provide mutual support
- Many GMD commanders were incompetent and were retained by Jiang for their loyalty

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<sup>21</sup> 林彪

<sup>22</sup> 淮海战役

<sup>23</sup> 山东

<sup>24</sup> 安徽

<sup>25</sup> 河南

<sup>26</sup> 江苏

- The GMD forces were hindered by poor and inaccurate intelligence
- As the GMD forces were about to lose, Jiang ordered his air force to bomb his own troops – this was to prevent the heavy weapons from falling into the hands of the CCP
- This drove many GMD troops to defect to the CCP
- The GMD lost 200,000 men and most of the American equipment as a result of their defeat
- The GMD was unable to get more equipment from the USA as the Americans had imposed a trade embargo (to force Jiang into a compromise with the CCP)
- Jiang's enemies led by Li Zongren<sup>27</sup> forced him to give up the presidency in January 1949

### **The Beijing-Tianjin campaign**

- Beijing<sup>28</sup> was not the capital of China at this time – Nanjing<sup>29</sup> was the capital
- Lin Biao advanced against Beijing and Tianjin<sup>30</sup> in November 1948
- The GMD general Fu Zuoyi<sup>31</sup> had his defence plans stolen by his own daughter Fu Dongju<sup>32</sup>
- Some of his own staff were communists too
- Beijing-Tianjin surrendered in January 1949 with 200,000 troops without fighting
- GMD's hold over North China thus collapsed

### **The fall of Central and Southern China**

- The GMD was hoping to use the Yangtze River as a defensive moat
- The GMD was relying on Tang Enbo<sup>33</sup>'s troops but Tang fled China instead
- Jiang decided to withdraw to Taiwan and not defend the Yangtze
- The CCP captured Nanjing in April 1949 and Shanghai in May 1949
- This proved severe – Nanjing was the national capital and Shanghai was the financial capital

### **The establishment of the People's Republic of China**

- On 1<sup>st</sup> October 1949, Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China
- Jiang fled to Taiwan in December 1949
- However Hainan<sup>34</sup> Island managed to resist CCP forces until 1950

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<sup>27</sup> 李宗仁

<sup>28</sup> 北京

<sup>29</sup> 南京

<sup>30</sup> 天津

<sup>31</sup> 傅作义

<sup>32</sup> 傅冬菊

<sup>33</sup> 汤恩伯

<sup>34</sup> 海南岛

## **5. REASONS FOR THE GMD DEFEAT AND THE CCP STRATEGY**

### **5.1 POLITICAL FACTORS**

<b>GMD</b>	<b>CCP</b>
<u>Incompetent and disunited leadership</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Jiang refused to share power and created much rivalry in the GMD</li><li>• Many local warlords refused to support Jiang and the GMD</li></ul>	<u>Superior and united leadership</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Mao focused on the ideological vision of the CCP</li><li>• He left civil administration to Liu Shaoqi and negotiations to Zhou Enlai</li><li>• He left military affairs to Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Zhu De and Liu Bocheng</li><li>• There was an extraordinary cohesion within the top leadership of the CCP</li></ul>
<u>Corruption and inefficiency</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Jiang tolerated corruption as long as his followers remained loyal to him</li><li>• Jiang's government was never able to control China effectively (due to the warlords)</li></ul>	<u>Incorruptible and capable</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The CCP had effective propaganda which presented them as being honest and incorruptible</li></ul>
<u>The lack of democratic reforms</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Jiang tried to push for democratic reforms to win American and local Chinese support</li><li>• Jiang was elected as President but faced challenges from rivals like Li Zongren (who later became Jiang's vice-president), whom he made efforts to exclude from the government and war effort (despite Li Zongren being a capable general)</li></ul>	<u>The people's democracy</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Mao sought to unite people under the CCP</li><li>• Mao created representative bodies which had non-CCP representatives</li><li>• This gave the CCP the appearance of being democratic</li></ul>
<u>Political repression</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The GMD imposed harsh crackdowns when it came to power</li><li>• Jiang had the leaders of the opposition Democratic League executed, leading to widespread protests</li><li>• The GMD repression was inconsistently harsh and undermined the authority of the GMD</li></ul>	<u>Leniency</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Mao encouraged defections from the GMD and treated defectors (temporarily) well</li><li>• The CCP was much firmer and effective in suppressing public dissent</li></ul>

<u>Imperialism</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The GMD was seen as a stooge of Western imperialism</li> </ul>	<u>Imperialism</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CCP cloaked themselves with the mantle of Chinese nationalism</li> </ul>
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## 5.2 ECONOMIC FACTORS

GMD	CCP
<u>Extent of World War II damage</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• China's productive capacity was severely affected – 55% of industries were destroyed</li> <li>• The GMD was blamed for the aftermath of the war as they were the legitimate government</li> <li>• However they failed to defend most of China against the Japanese</li> </ul>	<u>Socio-economic reforms</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CCP had won over the support of most of the people by the end of the war due to its moderate land policies and anti-Japanese nationalism</li> <li>• Mao then adopted radical land reforms – land was confiscated and redistributed; landlords were beaten to death</li> <li>• However these were later reversed in 1947</li> <li>• Most peasants however deserted the CCP when their armies were not present</li> <li>• Most peasants were mere spectators in the civil war and wanted to be left alone</li> </ul>
<u>Economic situation in 1945</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The GMD was not economically hopeless – it had at least 1 billion USD in reserves</li> <li>• The GMD had also received aid from the UN</li> </ul>	
<u>Corruption and inefficiency</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The GMD had failed to live up to the people's post-war expectations</li> <li>• Jiang was unwilling to sweep away corrupt officials and officers who were loyal to him</li> <li>• The CCP also exaggerated and fabricated accounts of corruption</li> <li>• By 1946, the GMD had started to target the upper classes – their original main supporters</li> </ul>	

### Hyperinflation

- The GMD had insufficient revenue and turned to deficit spending and foreign loans
- The military spending (a financially unproductive activity) was the main problem
- By 1947, hyperinflation had set in (similar to 1920s Germany)
- The inflation affected those with fixed incomes e.g. the workers and middle classes – the GMD lost much support from them
- There were many strikes by workers (similar to the Soviet model of revolution) – however this did not play a major role in the defeat of the GMD

### 5.3 MILITARY FACTORS

GMD	CCP
<p><u>Incompetent leadership</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jiang tended to second-guess his generals and frequently issued unrealistic orders</li> <li>• An overly defensive approach was adopted</li> <li>• The GMD command structure was unnecessarily complex</li> <li>• The top commanders vied for Jiang's favour</li> <li>• Jiang refused to deploy capable generals</li> <li>• Jiang had the tendency to order his soldiers to fight on despite certain defeat</li> <li>• The generals failed to master mechanised and air warfare – negating their advantages</li> <li>• They lacked planning and coordination</li> </ul>	<p><u>Capable military leadership</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CCP had talented and courageous leaders like Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Liu Bocheng et cetera</li> <li>• Lin Biao was able to grasp the strategic dispositions of the enemy and was able to mislead them with regards to his own</li> <li>• The CCP were able to turn liberated areas into sustainable administrative regions to support their war effort</li> </ul>
<p><u>Poor strategic planning</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jiang's mistake was to send troops into Manchuria before consolidating his power</li> <li>• Jiang switched his attack to Shandong and Shanxi in Northern China – this was a mistake and overstretched the GMD lines</li> <li>• The GMD were determined to capture Yan'an (the former communist capital) despite its lack of strategic value</li> <li>• Jiang relied mainly on defensive strategies</li> </ul>	<p><u>Superior strategic planning</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mao's people's war strategy was ideal for a militarily weaker army</li> <li>• However the CCP were also able to switch to full-scale conventional warfare at the correct time in 1947</li> </ul>

<p><u>The poor quality of the GMD army</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Sino-Japanese war in World War II had exhausted the GMD forces</li> <li>• There was no proper conscription system</li> <li>• The GMD divisions usually came from the same particular region – this led to a tendency for mass desertion</li> <li>• The GMD troops received training from many different sources – this lack of standardisation badly affected troop training</li> <li>• The GMD were saddled with a collection of unstandardised weapons – this was a logistical nightmare</li> <li>• The American embargo meant that the GMD inventories ran low by the end of the war</li> <li>• Malnutrition was a major problem – led to low morale and defections</li> <li>• There was a serious lack of trained officers – most officers had bought their positions</li> </ul>	<p><u>The better quality of the CCP army</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CCP forces lacked combat experience</li> <li>• They lacked tanks and aircraft but benefitted from GMD defectors and the 200,000 battle-experienced soldiers from the Manchukuo army under the Japanese</li> <li>• The CCP recruited liberally from local bandit chiefs and former GMD defectors and prisoners</li> <li>• The CCP forces received training and equipment from the Soviets and the Japanese – this allowed them to switch to conventional warfare</li> <li>• The CCP forces were subjected to superior indoctrination – leading to higher morale</li> <li>• The CCP switched to creating a conventional army only in 1947</li> </ul>
<p><u>Betrayal of the GMD</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CCP had spies deep within GMD ranks</li> <li>• The CCP was effective and brutal, making it difficult for GMD spies to penetrate it</li> </ul>	
<p><u>Loss of American support</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jiang was overly confident of having Truman's support</li> <li>• The Americans became frustrated with Jiang's refusal to take their advice and form a compromise with the communists</li> <li>• By 1948, the Americans were convinced that Jiang had become a liability</li> <li>• However Jiang was never convinced and did not expect the Americans to abandon him</li> </ul>	