



THE COLD WAR

TOPIC 2: EXTENSION OF THE COLD WAR IN ASIA: THE KOREAN WAR

READINGS

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2.1 THE REASONS FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE COLD WAR BEYOND EUROPE

Overview

- America's strategy of containment was not solely defensive but its underlying assumption was that the Cold War was winnable
- After the Berlin Blockade, the Cold War in Europe had 'stabilised' and disputes reached a stalemate
- The Soviets were willing to test other places for a weak point; was Stalin being opportunistic or did he have a masterplan
- International and domestic factors resulted in American determination to extend containment to Asia

The impact of the Soviet atomic weapons

The first Soviet atomic weapon

- Detonated an atomic bomb on 29 August 1949 in Kazakhstan
- The Americans were poorly informed about the Soviet progress in the atomic weapons; caused a panic in America as they only expected it in the earliest, 1953
- By 1950 the Americans had 369 atomic bombs while the Soviets only had 5
- This meant that the Soviets might be more confident in waging their war of nerves and in testing perceived weak spots in the US sphere of influence

The escalation of the nuclear arms race

- In Jan 1950, Truman authorised the development of a hydrogen bomb which was tested in 1952¹

¹ The atomic bomb Little Boy dropped at Hiroshima had a yield of 16 kilotons of TNT, killing 100,000 by the end of 1945. The hydrogen bomb Ivy Mike detonated in 1952 had a yield of 12 megatons of TNT.

- Truman and his State Secretary Dean Acheson were convinced that a delay would not cause the Soviets to delay their work either; believed that the American people would also not tolerate a delay
- In reality, the Soviets started the work earlier
- Since monopoly was no longer possible, the US had to pursue an advantage and superiority in the field of nuclear weapons while the Soviets sought for nuclear parity; start of a nuclear arms race

The Communist victory in China in 1949

- the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the anti-communist Guomindang (GMD) government which received Americans support; a civil war since 1927
- formed the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Oct 1949
- The GMD fled to Taiwan (see History Paper 3 notes)

Mao's foreign policy goals in 1949

- wanted to lean towards the Soviet Union but eventually open relations with the Americans
- to conquer Taiwan
- end the unequal treaties imposed on China since the 19th century

America's reactions to the loss of China

Belief in a monolithic communist bloc

- To the Americans, this represented the 'loss' of China to communism; was due to Soviet conspiracy to take over the world and the Chinese communists were just puppets
- were afraid that Stalin would exploit relations with Mao to promote communism in other parts of Asia
- Contrary to American beliefs, the 1949 revolution was a purely Chinese affair
- The US State Department rejected the view and quietly concluded that communist China would not upset the overall balance of world power
- Was deeply opposed by the anti-communist China Lobby in the US

Refusal to recognize communist China

- the US refused to grant diplomatic recognition to the PRC but also withdrew aid to Taiwan; considered its eventual loss to China as inevitable
- Mao put out diplomatic feelers to the US but the Truman administration looked the other way, forcing the PRC to turn to the USSR for support
- Should Truman have adopted the wedge strategy to divide the Soviets and the Chinese
- new documents from China have shown that the wedge strategy would not have succeeded as Mao considered America as its chief enemy since 1946
- would face strong opposition from the hard-line Republicans in Congress

The impact of McCarthyism and the Red Scare

- in 1948, the Democrats led by Truman won the presidential election for the 5th consecutive time
- This was a major setback for the Republicans and resulted in bitter and partisan politics

- Joseph McCarthy, a Republican Senator, sought to rescue his political career
- took advantage of the anti-communist wave spreading across the US to weaken the Democrats
- claimed that the Democrats were weak on communism and that the State Department was filled with closet communists which was not true; February 1950
- led to a series of witch hunts especially those who were white Protestant upper class
- The House Un-American Activities Committee began investigating communist activity
- Turned its attention on Hollywood, schools, universities, American labour movement etc
- the committee was unable to find actual evidence
- hysterical anti-communist campaign in the mass media
- Truman failed to stop him because he naively felt that the President should not sink to McCarthy's level
- His hectoring and bullying style alienated people
- was later discredited in 1954 when his claims were exposed
- The Communist Party of the USA had only 5000 members where many were FBI agents; communism had little appeal in the USA
- Against such political tension, Truman could not be seen as 'inactive'.

The growing impact of decolonisation

- The end of WWII set in motion the decolonisation process in many parts of the world
- saw the exit of colonial powers and in its place a power vacuum emerged
- Newly independent Third World states (e.g. in the Middle East and Southeast Asia) became hotspots for the superpowers to play out their rivalries and their quest for dominance
- Stalin was not that interested in the 3rd World
- Khrushchev was much more energetic where he enjoyed travelling especially to newly independent countries
- Was determined to aid national liberation movements
- in reality the communist model proved unattractive
- America was opposed to colonialism as it discredited the West and due to its own anti-colonial history but was forced to support its Western European allies who were major colonial powers
- The growing nationalism in the 3rd World would pose a major problem

The development of NSC-68

- the secret NSC-68 Report was issued in April 1950
- was developed without accurate data; used exaggerated rhetoric
- a clear response to the impact of communist China and the loss of atomic monopoly
- Portrayed communism as a coordinated global movement by Moscow; failed to play up communist disunity

- incorporated the concept of '**rolling back**' communism, a more 'aggressive' form of containment aimed at the ultimate downfall of the Soviet system itself
- abandoned the distinction between vital and peripheral interests
- called for a substantial conventional and nuclear military build-up to counter the Soviet threat, which was a major departure from existing policy which relied on America's economic strength; rejected Kennan's emphasis on the use of psychology, economics and political power
- wanted to raise the defence budget from \$13.5 billion to \$50 billion
- Declared that the US must remain more powerful than the USSR
- Argued that Kennan's policy of containment was mere bluff unless the US obtained superior military strength
- Truman refused to publish the NSC-68; made no commitment to it where he filed it away
- Though he accepted the arguments, he felt that the US electorate would not accept the increased taxes and high military spending

The revisionists

- condemned the document as being one that encouraged US expansionism
- Claimed that Truman administration agonized how to sell the NSC68 to the American people and that the Korean War came as a blessing
- Claimed that the sharp increase in military spending would pull America out of the 1949 recession

2.2 THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR

Ancient history

- One of the world's oldest continuous civilizations; first kingdom in 2333BC
- was unified under the Silla dynasty in the 7th century AD
- was part of the Chinese tributary system
- adopted a strict isolationist policy; was called the Hermit Kingdom

Korea under Japan

- During the 19th century, imperialist nations threatened Korea's long-standing sovereignty
- Japan defeated China and Russia and annexed Korea in 1910
- Their rule was deeply resented by Korean nationalists; staged repeated but unsuccessful uprisings
- Remained the status quo until the Japanese defeat in 1945

Korea divided between the superpowers; their Korean clients

Post-war division of Korean

- The Cairo Conference in Nov 1943 declared that Korea was to be independent
- The Potsdam Conference divided Korea into two zones of occupation
- was divided at the 38th parallel with the Soviet Union occupying the North and the US overseeing the South in 1945
- The north controlled the minerals and heavy industry while the south controlled the agricultural areas and 2/3 of the population
- agreed that Korea would govern itself independently after 4 years; elections were to be held to reunify the country

The Soviet client Kim Il Sung

- Obscure early history
- Joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1931 and was engaged in anti-Japanese guerrilla activities
- fled to the USSR in 1940; became a captain in a Korean battalion organized by the Soviets
- was appointed the leader of the Korean Communist Party in 1945 by Stalin because he was not connected to the native Korean communists; to ensure Stalin's control over him

The American client Syngman Rhee

- came from an aristocratic background
- became involved in anti-Japanese activities and was exiled to America after 1911; received his doctorate from Princeton University
- Kept his prestige as he was absent during the Japanese occupation
- Was appointed by the Americans to head the South Korean government in 1945
- was already 70 when he returned to Korea where he felt a deep sense of urgency about unifying his homeland

The establishment of repressive regimes

- the United Nations decided that a unified government should be established following a general election
- North Korea prevented the UN commission from holding elections while they proceeded in South Korea
- the United Nations declared that the Republic of Korea was the lawful government
- Stalin responded by sponsoring an election in the North which formed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which was not recognised by the United Nations
- Kim Il Sung was very vicious in putting down opposition and many anti-communists migrated south; created a single party state
- Began developing an extensive personality cult 'the Great Leader'
- Anti-communist Syngman Rhee became the President of Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea)
- Aided by a conservative group made up of professionals, those educated in America or by missionaries
- Became corrupt and ruthless and had no interest in popular democracy; was extremely repressive where possibly up to 200000 were killed
- in April 1950, US- and UN- sponsored elections took place in South Korea and Rhee did badly with many South Koreans voting in favour of unification with the communist North

Provocations from both sides

- Both were anxious to see Korea unified under their own leadership and system
- both sides threatened to achieve unification by military means
- Before June 1950, about 100,000 Koreans had already died in civil unrest, border skirmishes and guerrilla war between both sides
- Kim launched large scale guerrilla activities to destabilize the south but realized that guerrilla warfare was not sufficient

Overview of the superpowers' role

- the post-1991 view finally revealed that the Korean War was not part of a Cold War conspiracy but due to the civil war in Korea
- John Gaddis argued in the superpowers superimposed their rivalry upon a civil war that would have existed in any event
- neither the United States nor the USSR had vital interests at stake
- it was amazing how little control over events the Americans and the Soviets had

The Soviet role in the origins of the Korean War

- the orthodox view was that Kim was a puppet of Stalin and received orders to invade South Korea
- challenged by the post-1991 view that focused on the role of Kim being an autonomous agent
- In mid-1949, Kim pressed Stalin to support the invasion repeatedly
- Stalin had initially refused support as he was concerned with the relative lack of preparedness of the North Korean armed forces and with danger of US involvement
- Changed his mind in April 1950 but warned Kim that although the USSR approved the attack, it would not intervene directly in the conflict
- Stalin demanded that Kim get Mao's approval who agreed
- Mao paid little attention to the actual preparations in North Korea; did not know what was Kim's precise intentions and timing; more concerned about recapturing Taiwan and Tibet
- The Soviet provision of heavy weapons, supplies and advisors in May 1950 was crucial for the war effort

The Soviet motivations

1. Stalin's opportunism
 - did not have a worldwide plan
 - Possible he changed his mind due to the Chinese communist victory in 1949, the Soviet atomic bomb test and Western economic difficulties
 - took advantage of the Americans who made no secret of their lack of interest in Korea
2. Communist internationalism
 - His expansion in Western Europe had run against its limits
 - May have become more hopeful about the chances of revolution in South Korea and sought to spread Soviet influence in Asia
 - did not want to be seen as holding back the revolution and worried that Mao may take the lead instead
3. Strategic and economic advantages
 - A united communist Korea would further secure Soviet borders, threaten America's new ally Japan and place at his disposal South Korea's extensive reserves of lead
 - feared that Japan was becoming a key military strong point against the USSR

4. Tying China and America down

- Wanted to embroil the US and China in peripheral conflicts to prevent it from becoming too powerful
- Richard Thornton argued that he wanted the war to prevent his worst nightmare; a Sino-American relationship

5. domestic considerations

- use the war as a valuable tool for suppressing his domestic opponents
- created a sense of external danger
- during a time when Stalin launched a new round of purges, culminating in the Doctors' Plot

The North Korean motivations

- It is now clear that Kim had acted independently of the Soviets; wanted war but needed Soviet support; argued by Bruce Cummings

1. Perceived South Korean weaknesses

- was encouraged by the extent of support for communism in the South and the growing opposition to Syngman Rhee's increasingly corrupt and inept regime
- Kim claimed he would have an easy victory and would be supported by a popular uprising in the South

2. American oversight

- was motivated by the US State Secretary Dean Acheson's 'defence perimeter' speech given in January 1950 which omitted South Korea from a list of countries (comprising the Aleutians, Ryukyu, Japan and the Philippines) which the US would automatically defend in the event of aggression
- had carelessly left out mention of Korea
- convinced him that the Americans would not intervene
- possible that Stalin who received the document from his spies assumed that the US would not interfere in Korea

The outbreak of the Korean War

- By 25 June 1950 the North Koreans were supplied with Soviet heavy weapons; 258 T34 tanks, 178 warplanes and 1600 artillery pieces; backed by Soviets military advisers; invaded South Korea
- The Soviet generals planned the operational orders, using the term 'counterattack' to give the impression it was the South that had attacked the North; believed it could be won within a month
- Pulled out the Soviet advisers just days before to avoid capture
- the Americans were caught totally off guard

The revisionists

- Claimed that the Americans were collaborating with Rhee to invade North Korea
- Rhee had repeatedly pressed for American assistance to invade North Korea but failed

- The US had deliberately withheld heavy weapons from the South Koreans to discourage them from aggressive action
- the American troops withdrew in June 1949 leaving behind a 500 man advisory group
- if it had been planned, it is not clear why America and South Korea are allowed themselves to suffer humiliating military defeats

The American response to the invasion

Appeal to the United Nations

- On 27 June 1950, the Americans sponsored the United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 calling for:
 1. All hostilities to end and North Korea to withdraw to the 38th parallel
 2. A UN Commission on Korea to be formed to monitor the situation and report to the Security Council
 3. All UN members to support the UN in achieving this, and refrain from providing assistance to North Korea
- The resolution was unanimously passed in the Security Council only because the USSR was boycotting SC meetings to protest that the Chinese seat (as a permanent member of the Council) should be transferred from Taiwan to communist China
- Voted for the first time to send a military force to assist one country attacked by another
- The decision to involve the UN in collective security action was a calculated move by the Americans to make the military action seem more "legitimate"

American military commitment

- Truman enjoyed widespread support for his decisive action
- Had not gotten Congress to declare war; relied on his constitutional position as Commander in Chief; did not want to set a precedent which would limit future presidents
- A worrying precedent; would be later blamed 'Truman's war'
- The US committed 260,000 troops; UN soldiers from 16 other nations never exceeded 35,000
- Although outwardly a UN exercise, intervention in Korea was essentially an American operation
- The American General Douglas MacArthur was made the supreme commander; was despised by Truman who called him 'God's right hand man'

The American motivation for military intervention

1. US suspicion of Soviet expansionism; the domino theory
 - wrongly believed that Kim had been directed to invade by Moscow
 - Could not accept that Kim was acting independently
 - Truman was convinced that if the invasion was not challenged, it would lead to the invasion of neighbouring countries and possibly to a 3rd World War; was determined not to allow for a repetition of appeasement
 - Truman also believed a firm response would rapidly thwart Soviet expansion
2. US credibility at stake: the litmus test

- a test of US credibility and ability to resist communism across the world
- US inaction in Korea might engender a mood of defeatism amongst its allies

3. US domestic politics

- The Republicans had accused the Democrats of being too soft on communism and 'losing' China as a result
- Truman was facing mid-term elections and had to act resolutely

4. American imperialism

- Revisionists argued it was an opportunity to expand American economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region
- Was to integrate the extractive economies of the 3rd World to the industrial core of the 1st World
- Wanted to protect Japan which served as the core of the US economic interests in the region

5. Justification for the adoption of NSC 68


- Allowed the US to rearm and maintain military superiority over the Soviets
- Created a series of alliances to contain the Soviets

6. Expectation that war could be won easily

- Had a racist attitude that the Asians could not resist western military superiority
- Believed that communist governments lacked popular support

2.3 THE APPLICATION OF THE CONTAINMENT POLICY: THE PROGRESS OF THE KOREAN WAR

The political and military development of the Korean War



Initial UN defeats

- American troops were woefully underequipped
- the North Koreans quickly captured Seoul, the capital of South Korea
- began executing Rhee's supporters
- Conditions for fighting were unpleasant (monsoon season, high temperatures and rugged terrain)
- By 1 July 1950, US-UN forces occupied only a toehold around Pusan; more troops were sent to reinforce them

The UN counterattack

- MacArthur mounted an outflanking movement by launching a daring amphibious operation, landing UN forces behind enemy lines at the port of Inchon, captured Seoul and pushed on towards the 38th parallel in Sep 1950
- At the same time, UN troops broke out of the Pusan perimeter and advanced rapidly north
- The North Korean forces were strung out too thinly over the peninsula, outstretching their supply lines, were forced into quick retreat

Changes in American war aims

- Truman jettisoned the original war aim of simply expelling North Korean forces from South Korea and authorised the crossing of the 38th parallel by UN-US forces, which took place in early Oct 1950
- no longer pursuing a policy of containment but one of 'rollback', the recovery of territory under communist control

- The American instinct was to win wars; influenced by the optimism of the period
- Felt that failure to progress beyond the 38th parallel would mean that the North Koreans were not punished
- lured by the prospect of uniting all of Korea under a non-communist government
- also based on intelligence reports which showed that neither USSR nor China would intervene in the war
- Was not fully willing to commit full resources needed either because Truman recognised that Europe remained very vulnerable
- Crossing the 38th parallel in essence constitutes an invasion (i.e. an act of war), but it was eventually accepted by the UN after much deliberation
- MacArthur raced towards the Yalu River, which separated North Korea from China; the CIA confirmed that the Chinese would not intervene
- was determined to destroy the North Korean armed forces
- was ordered that no US planes would violate Chinese or Soviet air space and that only South Korean troops were to approach the Yalu River
- Truman would stress that unification was not his war aim and would leave the issue to the United Nations
- on October 7, the United Nations voted for a unified, independent and democratic Korean government

Reasons for China's entry into the war

- Mao's government was divided over whether to intervene
 - Only Mao among the top Chinese leaders was keen to support North Korea
1. Pressure from Stalin
 - Kim Il Sung appealed to Stalin for help on 1 October; decided to get the Chinese to rescue Kim
 - Stalin refused to commit Soviet troops and asked Mao to send 6 divisions instead
 - Soviet documents made it clear that Stalin was willing to risk the loss of North Korea rather than risk a military clash with the Americans
 2. Belief that America intended to invade China; security
 - Mao did not understand how the American government worked; took all comments made seriously
 - Thought that America seriously intended to invade China
 - Mao could not accept that China would be a peripheral concern to America
 - his mind was repeatedly poisoned by Stalin
 - Mao feared that Chiang Kai-shek might launch a counter-revolution within China with the support of US armed forces
 3. Revolutionary nationalism
 - Mao and his CCP followers grew up at a time when China's survival was at stake; wanted to revive China's national glory
 - Wanted to take its position of weakness into a prominent one in the world
 - Wanted to abandon existing principles and codes of behavior in international relations; felt it was a Western product

4. Communist internationalism

- China felt it had to help North Korea or it would affect its revolutionary credentials
- Wanted to promote the Chinese revolutionary model throughout Asia

5. Convinced of ultimate victory

- Mao eventually recognized that the war would be prolonged and was convinced that a war of attrition would defeat the Americans

6. Domestic

considerations

- Feared the end of the civil war would cause a loss of revolutionary momentum; used external threats to justify
- The Chinese used the war to bolster domestic campaign to suppress reactionaries; to sustain the Chinese communist revolution

The Chinese intervention



- The Americans consistently failed to understand the Chinese decision-making processes and beliefs; focused excessively on the Soviets

- Seriously underestimated China's challenge to the US strategic interests
- MacArthur met with Truman at Wake Island in October 1950 and assured him that victory was certain and the Chinese communists would not attack
- tried to convince Truman that the war would not expand and that the Americans would be able to leave Korea by January 1951
- MacArthur knew that Chinese forces were amassing beyond the Yalu River, but their numbers were grossly underestimated at 30,000; he also misread the movement of Chinese armies as a bluff
- China sent warnings through India about a possible intervention but were ignored
- 260,000 Chinese troops poured across the Yalu River in Oct 1950
- The Chinese military performance was impressive; forced the Western forces to retreat rapidly
- MacArthur was prepared to use atomic weapons against the advancing Chinese forces on 2 Dec
- In the end the Americans never used atomic weapons because their Western European allies would not have allowed it
- A nuclear attack on China would cause the Soviets to be involved

US reversion to the original war aims

- Truman reverted to the original American war aim of restoring the 38th parallel as the border between North and South Korea.
- the US had decided to fight a limited war in Korea
- called for peace negotiations
- Truman's advisers failed him as they did not propose any other policy like recognizing China and accepting it into the United Nations
- MacArthur was not happy about fighting a limited war and made his commitment to total victory very public
- openly made known his preference for the use of atomic weapons against China, which greatly alarmed US allies
- On 24 March 1951 MacArthur issued a public statement which criticized the idea of negotiating with the Chinese
- In April 1951, Truman relieved him of his command
- angered American politicians and public as MacArthur was hugely popular at home
- The public was frustrated by a limited war which was costly in terms of American lives but did not deliver a quick victory over the communists
- Truman remained unpopular for the rest of his term in office

Stalemate in the war

- MacArthur's successor, Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway was extremely effective
- Managed to revive the morale of his troops and instilled in them an offensive spirit
- Superior firepower especially artillery and command of the air enabled UN troops to re-cross the 38th parallel.
- For the rest of the war, the battle front stabilised along a line 150 miles long just north of the parallel

Stalled negotiations

- Peace talks began in July 1951 but dragged on for two years
- the North Koreans and Chinese rejected the principle that prisoners-of-war should not be returned to their native countries against their will; wanted all of them returned
the Americans were determined to prove that not all POWs wanted to return
- China by July 1951 recognized that the war could not be won; began limiting their commitment
- in July 1951 Kim asked Stalin to permission to make peace but Stalin insisted on fighting on
- wanted to tie down the Americans in Asia
- Wanted to create strains in NATO as the Korean War diverted resources away from Western Europe
- Wanted China to prove its loyalty to him
- The war was a source of vital military intelligence to him

The revisionists

- argued that Stalin wanted an armistice on 23 June 1951
- dropped demands for an American evacuation of Korea, support for China's demand for the UN seat over Taiwan and to allow China to take over Taiwan
- Truman rejected it as he did not want to be open to appeasement charges
- Needed to delay the war to implement NSC68

The Soviet role in the Korean War

- The strategy of a limited war suited Stalin, who had never wanted direct war with the US
- As soon as the conflict started, he withdrew Soviet military advisers from Korea and recalled ships headed for North Korea with military supplies
- Broke his promise to Mao to provide full-scale air cover and military supplies for the advancing Chinese armies
- Later, he did give some help to the Chinese and North Korean forces but Soviet approach was generally cautious; only did it when it appeared that the Chinese forces were making considerable successes
- provided military equipment, operational plans and some air support; made China pay for all the aid
- Made great efforts to conceal the Soviet involvement; Soviet pilots wore Chinese uniforms and used Chinese symbols on their aircraft
- The Soviets were pressed for more pilots and planes but Stalin turned them down; was desperately needed due to the American aerial superiority
- The Americans concealed the Soviet intervention as they wanted to keep the war limited

The end of the Korean War

- Deep war-weariness on all fronts by 1953
- Aided by the election of President Dwight Eisenhower who was determined to end the stalemate
- threatened that he would consider using atomic weapons against China if the peace talks at Panmunjom did not progress in May
- Facilitated by Stalin's death in March 1953

- Stalin's successors were more concerned about economic, domestic and alliance considerations than Stalin
- North Korea and the US signed the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953 but Syngman Rhee refused to do so
- A line corresponding roughly to the 38th parallel was confirmed as the boundary between North and South Korea
- The prisoners-of-war were released and were allowed to make a choice where they wanted to go; 2/3 of the Chinese POWs wanted to go to Taiwan
- At one point, a ¼ million US troops were ranged against communist forces numbering 865,000.
- the US lost 33,629 men in battle, South Korea 415,000, and the UN allies 3,000
- The total communist dead and wounded were estimated at 2 million

2.4 IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR

1. Implementation of NSC 68

- The war led to an undifferentiated global vision which made it difficult to make policy based on special regional circumstances; would cause them to stumble into the Vietnam War
- ready to deploy troops anywhere in order to defend the 'free world'
- Truman now supported the sharp increase in military spending proposed in NSC-68; sharp increase in conventional and nuclear weapons
- American defence spending rose from \$14.5 billion in 1950 to \$49.6 billion in 1953
- The American armed forces doubled between 1951 to 1953
- By 1960 American defence spending consisted of 52.2%; 10% of the GDP
- Became very difficult to reduce the military establishment and budget
- Created a military-industrial complex that was very dependent on government contracts; danger of these businesses pressing for war

The revisionists

- claimed that the Americans prolonged the war to promote military Keynesianism; to pull America out of the 1949 recession

2. American defence of Taiwan

- After the defeat of GMD in China, America gave up on Chiang Kai-shek and had no formal plans to help him resist a communist invasion
- With the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman immediately ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to defend the island against possible communist invasion
- China cancelled their invasion plans of Taiwan in August
- Chiang retained a number of small offshore islands, claiming it was to be used as staging areas to recapture China
- China bombarded the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1954 and 1958
- the Americans sent the 7th Fleet and threatened nuclear retaliation; forced China to back down
- Taiwan received substantial economic and military aid hence helped Taiwan to become a major regional economic power

- US recognised Taiwan as the only official Chinese state until 1971, when recognition was accorded to mainland China.

3. Transformation of Japan

- The original plan was to disarm Japan, destroy the industrial cartels and impose democracy
- Its revival was due to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur who imposed a more lenient scheme
- Turned it into a liberal democratic, capitalist and pacifist society
- The Korean War led to the 'reverse course'
- the Japanese cartels or zaibatsu were restored; the power of unions were undermined
- Led to the Japanese economic boom where the Americans pumped in \$3.5 billion
- became home to hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and their spending power provided a valuable stimulus to Japanese economic growth
- Political reconstruction of Japan was confirmed in the San Francisco peace treaty (1951), which ended the state of war between the US and Japan, restored sovereignty to Japan and terminated the occupation with effect from 1952
- the Soviet involvement in the Korean War caused it to refuse to sign the treaty with Japan; meant that its territorial acquisitions did not acquire international recognition even today
- In return for independence America secured Japan's signature to a Mutual Security Agreement which guaranteed the US military bases both in Japan and on the island of Okinawa
- The Americans wanted the Japanese to develop a large military but it was resisted as the Americans were paying for their defence
- Enabled Japan to focus on its economic development

4. Impact on North and South Korea

- North Korea never recovered from the war and remained a low output agricultural society
- The continued American presence and aid to South Korea enabled it to become a major economic power by the 1960s
- was backed by a mutual security pact and a promise of long-term economic aid

5. Containment through alliances

- America created alliances to surround the Soviet Union
- was determined to ring the USSR in the 1950s through bilateral and regional security pacts
- Formed the ANZUS pact in 1951 which consisted of Australia and New Zealand; pledged to consult each other if there was an armed attack in the Pacific
- Formed the SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation) pact signed in 1954; Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and America
- Formed the Central Treaty Organisation formed in 1955; Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom

- by mid 1960s, the US had 375 military bases overseas and 3000 other facilities
- The American military support to their 3rd world allies often served to encourage the dominance of repressive governments

6. Expansion of NATO

- Greece and Turkey were brought into NATO and military bases were set up in Turkey
- more American troops were committed to Europe
- efforts were made to rearm West Germany and integrate into NATO

The revisionists

- claimed that the Korean War made it possible to openly rearm Germany

7. Growing American involvement in Southeast Asia

- Indochina was seen as the key to the region
- In an attempt to eliminate communism in Vietnam, the US threw its weight behind the French in their war with the Vietminh (Vietnamese communists)
- Believed that the Vietnamese communist Ho Chi Minh was a Soviet agent
- By early 1950s, US was spending \$1 billion a year in military assistance to the French (see Vietnam War notes)

8. The growth of China as a great power

- China's reputation grew as it was seen as having successfully saved North Korea and managed to resist a coalition of Western powers
- This could be seen when they played a major role in the 1954 Geneva Conference
- Richard Thornton argued that China was actually the biggest loser in the war
- Lost over 1 million lives
- Made the CCP realize that it could not just rely on manpower to win wars; growing pressure to modernize the Red Army
- The estranged relations with the West led to lost investment and development which could have ensured the modernization of China
- Became more heavily reliant on the Soviets for military and economic aid

9. Reinforced Mao's and CCP's control over China

- Mao successfully used the 'Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea' and the three 'Antis' mass campaigns to consolidate CCP control over China
- Mao's 'correct' decision to enter the war reinforced the confidence of the top CCP leaders in him; reinforced his unrivalled dominance of the CCP which allowed him to carry out his disastrous utopian projects like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution

10. The growing Sino-Soviet split

- The fissures within the communist camp were exposed by the events of the Korean War

- Due to the failure of the Soviets to fully support the war efforts of the Chinese and North Koreans
- Stalin provided military equipment at extortionate prices to the Chinese and did not provide the military support he promised
- Began considering a policy of self-reliance as a response; the Great Leap Forward was intended to industrialise China rapidly; to prepare China for war

11. The growth of the non-aligned movement

- American condemnation of China alienated a number of Asian regional powers who began to prefer neutralism
- Culminated with the Bandung Conference in 1955 which saw the rise of the non-aligned movement
- Ultimately the NAM was a failure as both superpowers were opposed to neutralism

12. Undermining of the United Nations

- The UN was denounced as a capitalist tool
- The Soviets refused to work with the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie
- Blamed him for the UN's involvement in Korea and forced him to resign in 1953
- China was isolated by the United States where the United Nations condemned it as an aggressor nation
- was prevented from taking its seat in the UN Security Council until 1971
- the exclusion of China encouraged it to adopt a revolutionary foreign policy where they supported national liberation movements in the world against the Western colonies
- it was only when they joined the UN were they forced to adopt a more constructive foreign policy

13. The issue of limited war

- the Korean War created the idea of limited war, where the two superpowers would fight in another country in what became known as 'proxy wars'
- prevented the superpowers from engaging in an all-out war with one another, or use nuclear weapons

14. The growth of the American imperial presidency

- The American Congress was supposed to be responsible for foreign policy
- Due to the exigencies of the Cold War, Congress abdicated its responsibility to the president who could deploy forces without Congressional approval